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Abstract 
Financial intermediation has been associated with several 
risks. We study sunspot panics, information-based bank runs, 
contagion, uncertainty about consumption time preference, twin 
crises and a number of policies attempting to resolve these issues. 
We offer a basic model where sunspot panics and 
information-based bank runs co-exist. This framework can be 
used to evaluate a number of policies. We examine closely the 
policy of suspension of deposit convertibility and observe a 
trade-off regarding its implementation. Although suspension 
eliminates sunspot panics, it presents important drawbacks in an 
environment vulnerable to information-based bank runs, thus 
generating a dilemma for policy makers. It removes the advantage 
of discretionary liquidation of long-term technologies when 
portfolio returns are expected to be extremely low, and eliminates 
the signalling property of suspension that continuation of 
investment is beneficial, which can mitigate the spread of 
contagion. We offer an alternative solution, with discretionary 
rules accounting for every possible state of the economy. 
Studying uncertainty about consumption time preference, 
we demonstrate that partial suspension is welfare improving on 
LV 
the outcome of full suspension. Nevertheless, in the absence of 
limitations preventing the formation or the efficient operation of 
an inter-bank market, borrowing and lending among 
intermediaries will be the optimal solution. In demonstrating this, 
we make sure we respect the sequential service constraint that 
necessitates redemption obligations to be honoured in a first- 
come first-served basis. 
Opening up the economy, by the addition of a foreign 
exchange market and by assuming a fixed exchange rate regime, 
we study the possibility of twin crises. We abstract from foreign 
capital as the source of instability and focus on the role of 
domestic depositors. Speculative opportunities in the currency 
markets can result in banking crises, while banking crises can 
lead to betting against the exchange rate regime. Suspension of 
convertibility can limit funds for speculation, but at the expense 
of depositors' welfare, thus raising a dilemma for policy makers. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
What is the role of an intermediary? Financial 
intermediaries undertake a number of functions. One of the views 
on why intermediaries exist emphasises the existence of 
transaction costs and market imperfections in information 
gathering and portfolio management. Due to economies of scale, 
a financial intermediary enjoys a comparative advantage in 
information technology investing, which allows efficient 
differentiation among risk and return diverse projects and 
monitoring during the stages of the projects' implementation. If 
this was not the case, everyone would manage his own portfolio 
as efficiently as the existing professional portfolio managers. 
A second role for intermediaries is in managing risks and 
providing insurance to risk averse individuals. Often, people 
facing uncertainty like to trade part or all of the riskiness 
attached to unwanted outcomes for the utility equivalent expected 
income, even if this is lower in expected nominal terms. This 
implies that financial intermediaries performing this function 
Introduction 2 
have to manage the accepted risk efficiently in order to honour 
their contracts. 
But perhaps the most important function of intermediation 
is that of liquidity transformation. This involves transforming 
securities of short maturities, preferred by lenders, into securities 
of long maturities, preferred by borrowers. Consider banks that 
issue liabilities at low yields to facilitate the liquidity needs of 
depositors. Part of the funds is invested in low yielding liquid 
assets, to facilitate the early liquidity needs of depositors, and 
part is invested in high yielding illiquid assets, for their later 
needs. 
Why do financial crises take place? Attempting to answer 
this question, let us break down the problem of crises in three 
sub-cases. First we consider crises in the banking sector, then in 
the foreign currency sector and finally twin crises that combine 
the two individual types. 
A combination of the conditions and services justifying 
financial intermediation can be used to explain banking crises, 
phenomena that have dominated banking history indiscriminately 
of geographic or epoch differences. The work of Sprague (1910) 
on the US National Banking System from 1873 to 1907, Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963) on the US from 1867 to 1960, Demirgüc- 
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) studying 45 to 60 countries from 
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1980 to 1994 or Glick and Hutchison (1999) studying 90 
countries from 1975 to 1997 are only but a few examples 
portraying the diversity of banking sector failures. 
The seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provides 
a framework to work with. Consider depositors that require 
insurance against uncertainty over consumption timing, in an 
environment where investment opportunities are illiquid. Assume 
that imperfect information makes their idiosyncratic consumption 
preference unobservable to third parties. Then, a role for banks 
arises in insuring depositors against their liquidity risk, by 
transforming part of the deposit funds into illiquid investments. 
However, intermediation is subject to risk, since part of the 
bank's assets will be illiquid and promised allocations can only 
be made contingent on the stated and not necessarily true 
liquidity need of the individual depositor. 
Fear of insolvency can be self-fulfilling, providing an 
explanation for the existence of banking failures. If an exogenous 
event (sunspot) can co-ordinate the actions of depositors in 
withdrawing prematurely, before their consumption need arises, 
fire-sale prices from the premature liquidation of the bank's 
illiquid assets and the first-come first-served nature of banking 
justify the decision to run and, consequently, the failure of banks. 
Nevertheless, it is precisely this unpredictable nature of the 
panic view of bank failures in the Diamond and Dybvig model 
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that has received the most scrutiny over the years. From an 
empirical point of view Gorton's (1988) study of the US National 
Banking Era, followed by a number of other researches on the US 
banking sector, and Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
studying a large sample of countries in the period 1980-1994 
offer a convincing case against sunspot theory as an explanation 
of banking crises. From the theoretical point of view the 
inclusion of interim information regarding banks' portfolios has 
produced two effects. Goldstein and Pauzner (2000), following 
the work of Morris and Shin (1998) in currency crises, 
demonstrate how noisy information signals and uncertainty over 
other agents' actions can resolve the indeterminacy of multiple 
equilibria, leading to a unique outcome. And Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya (1988) demonstrate how interim information 
regarding the future state of a bank's assets, will lead to 
information-based bank runs if early withdrawal results to higher 
utility in comparison to low future consumption from a bad 
performing bank portfolio. 
Given the on-going controversy regarding the nature of 
bank failures, what recommendation can we make for policy 
makers? Unfortunately, policy related research has concentrated 
on either sunspot panics or information-based bank runs. The 
basic model of Chapter 3 tries to deal with this void in the 
literature. We construct a simple framework that is subject to 
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both types of failures, and in Chapter 4 we examine whether and 
how a policy of suspension of deposit convertibility should be 
implemented in such an environment. 
Suspension of convertibility has traditionally trailed 
serious problems in the banking sector. Sprague (1910) and 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) note as many as nine suspensions 
at the national or state level in the US between 1814 and 1933. A 
more recent example is that of Argentina announcing a partial, 
followed by full suspension in 2001, with significant 
consequences for depositors' welfare, resulting in domestic riots 
and regional contagion spreading to Uruguay and Brazil. 
It is an interesting policy because it is subject to a trade- 
off in the presence of sunspot panics and information-based runs. 
On the one hand, its ex-ante announcement can eliminate jumps 
between multiple equilibria, allowing only for the Pareto optimal 
bank state. Nevertheless, it may do so at a great cost if 
information-based bank runs prevail in the system. In that case 
suspension denies the possibility of premature liquidation, which 
may be an efficient alternative to bad performing assets. 
Furthermore, it eliminates the signalling property of suspension 
of convertibility to the depositors of banks beside the troubled 
ones, which reveals that the economy is not in such a bad state as 
they may have originally anticipated. Given this dilemma, we 
suggest that the best option for a policy maker is to express rules 
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that cover every possibility. If suspension is implemented in 
every case except when the troubled banks portfolios are 
dominated by liquidation, then sunspots are eliminated and the 
good properties of discretion with regard to information-based 
bank runs remain present. 
In our study of suspension of convertibility we explore 
another interesting research area of banking crises, namely 
contagion. We note that the literature has mainly concentrated in 
the role of interbank markets as the link justifying the spread of 
crisis, with a few notable exceptions. This observation and the 
empirical research suggesting informational updates as a central 
feature of contagion in the banking sector (an example being 
Aharony and Swary (1996)) motivate our choice of information as 
the propagation mechanism of crises. 
Nevertheless, suspension of convertibility may be useless 
in the presence of aggregate uncertainty over consumption 
timing. If the intermediary is unable to predict the aggregate 
number of early consumers, suspension may prevent closure of 
the troubled bank, but will result in over- or under-estimation of 
storage in the planning period with dear consequences for the 
efficiency of the system and depositors' utility. We show in 
Chapter 5, expanding the work of Wallace (1988) in a richer 
environment where the main addition is to take illiquidity of the 
productive technologies seriously, that partial suspension may be 
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welfare improving relative to full suspension. But the optimal 
solution in this environment is that of an interbank mechanism 
with borrowing and lending among banks. We follow the general 
framework of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) in exploring 
interbank co-operation, but for one objection to their work. 
Accepting that the sequential service constraint is a feature of 
banking contracts implies that contracts cannot be made 
contingent on the mass of withdrawals. In interbank market 
contracts this translates in common early consumption allocation 
promises made by all participating banks, which is part of our 
modelling but not a feature of the Bhattacharya and Gale 
contracting approach. 
Returning to our original question of why do financial 
crises take place, let us move on to foreign currency market 
crises. Similarly to banking sector crises, two explanations 
emerged to account for speculative attacks against exchange rate 
pegging. One has its roots in policy inconsistencies (Krugman 
(1979)), while the other blames sudden shifts in market 
expectations and multiple equilibria (Obstfeld (1986)). The 
former relates to crises in Latin American countries in the 1980s, 
while the latter is best applied to the UK experience with the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary 
System (EMS) in 1992. 
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The East Asian crisis of mid-1997, that was unpredicted by 
the existing models of crises, and the empirical work of 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), finding a strong link between 
banking and currency crises, sparked vigorous research on twin 
crises. The research concentrated on foreign investors 
participating in domestic technologies through domestic banks or 
domestic banks short-term borrowing from abroad. In Chapter 6, 
contrary to the existing literature that relies on forms of foreign 
inflows in order to explain twin crises, we turn our attention to 
the domestic depositor and the possible causation links between 
crises in the two financial sectors. We show that a strong banking 
sector may come under attack if speculators use their deposits to 
take advantage of opportunities in the foreign currency markets. 
Furthermore, a domestic bank run, driven by the weak 
performance of banks' portfolios, leaves speculators with assets 
that they may employ in an attack against the peg, which may not 
be subsequently successfully defended by the government, thus 
leading to a currency crisis. Suspension of convertibility presents 
a dilemma in this environment, assuming policy makers are 
sensitive to depositors' welfare. On the one hand the policy 
reduces the available funds for speculation in the foreign 
exchange market, while on the other hand it decreases 
consumption and thus depositors' welfare. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Banking Crises: Overview 
"A banking panic occurs when bank debt holders at all or 
many banks in the banking system suddenly demand that banks 
convert their debt claims into cash (at par) to such an extend that 
the banks suspend convertibility of the debt into cash or... act 
collectively to avoid suspension of convertibility by issuing 
clearing-house loan certificates". 1 In this Section, we review the 
research that has modified and extended the seminal contribution 
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) on the role of banks and on 
banking crises. 2 
The model of Diamond and Dybvig demonstrates the role of 
optimal liquidity provision by banks, which nevertheless 
Calomiris and Gorton (1991), p. 112. 
2 In depth discussions of the theory of bank runs are provided by 
Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). Systemic 
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generates bank failures due to multiple equilibria. A good 
equilibrium is associated with optimal insurance against 
depositors' idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, while a bad 
equilibrium is the result of panic from fear of excess withdrawals 
resulting in the premature liquidation of productive investments. 
We discuss the interesting, yet sometimes contradicting, 
policy recommendations suggested by Diamond and Dybvig for 
eliminating the Pareto dominated equilibrium. Suspension of 
convertibility is a mechanism that avoids panics in the two-period 
framework of Diamond and Dybvig, yet may not do so given more 
periods. It may act as a signal that a bank's portfolio is in a good 
state, thus preventing bank runs, yet it may destroy the 
demandable debt property of deposit contracts, which provides 
incentive compatible intermediation. 
Given aggregate uncertainty over consumption timing, the 
optimality of suspension of convertibility in eliminating the bad 
equilibrium is lost, and Diamond and Dybvig recommend a form 
of wealth redistribution associated with the policy of deposit 
insurance. After reviewing the work that has been done to justify 
the existence of the first-come first-served property of banking 
contracts, we discuss how the sequential service constraint 
prevents the implementation of deposit insurance and look at 
risk is discussed by Eisenbeis (1997), and bank regulation by Bhattacharya, 
Boot and Thakor (1998). 
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alternative solutions, like partial suspension of convertibility and 
interbank co-ordination. 
We then contrast the Diamond and Dybvig model of 
sunspot panics with frameworks, like that of Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya (1988), where information-based bank runs are 
responsible for banking failures. We take a look at objections 
raised with regard to the use of multiple equilibria as a possible 
explanation of bank failures and explore alternatives, like the 
panic aspect of interim information over banks' portfolios. 
Inter-bank markets and interim information also drive 
studies of contagion in the banking sector, which we review 
before considering the empirical evidence on banking failures. 
We pay particular attention on the controversy over the cause of 
failures, more specifically whether they are the result of 
unpredictable panics or deteriorating returns of bank held assets. 
2.1.1 Sunspot Panics 
The influential work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
following Bryant (1980), presented a microeconomic framework 
that illustrated two properties of the banking sector. Diamond and 
Dybvig demonstrated that bank deposit contracts can be optimal, 
matching maturity between assets and liabilities and providing 
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insurance to depositors against liquidity risks, but nevertheless 
lead to banking panics. 
Depositors are, ex-ante, uncertain about preferences over 
consumption periods. At the same time they face an environment 
in which long-term investments are highly productive, yet costly 
to liquidate. The risk over the timing of depositors' consumption 
preference motivates their demand for liquidity, and banks 
provide the freedom of cashing in at optional times by insuring 
them against their idiosyncratic risk and supporting a Pareto 
optimal equilibrium. 
To achieve this, banks essentially become maturity 
transformers that take liquid deposits and invest part of the 
proceeds in illiquid assets. "Banks are able to transform illiquid 
assets, by offering liabilities with a different, smoother pattern of 
returns over time than the illiquid assets offer". 3 In doing so they 
pool risk and enhance welfare, but also create the possibility of 
self-fulfilling bank runs, a second equilibrium of the game, which 
is inefficient. Under the `bad' equilibrium, short-term creditors 
suddenly withdraw their loans from a solvent borrower. This 
occurs because it becomes rational for each consumer to pull his 
money out, if he expects that the other investors will behave in 
the same way. Because of the illiquidity of the investment, the 
bank cannot honour all its liabilities if all agents present them for 
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redemption. If everyone decides to run we get a self-fulfilling 
panic. 
The nature of the model suggests that bank panics can be 
seen as random events, the result of multiple equilibria. The 
cause of the run can be anything, "a random earnings report, a 
commonly observed run at some other bank, a negative 
government forecast, or even sunspotss4, hence the term `sunspot' 
panics. 
An important drawback of the Diamond and Dybvig 
framework was that the liquid investment technology (storage) 
was completely dominated by the long-term illiquid one. This was 
the result of their assumption that early liquidation of the long- 
term productive technology resulted to a payoff equal to the 
initial investment in this technology, thus matching the service 
that storage provided. Cooper and Ross (1991) illustrate this 
characteristic and modify the model to study the importance of 
salvage value more carefully. They find that, in general, runs will 
occur for sufficiently large liquidation costs and when consumers 
are sufficiently risk averse. 
Another interesting problem of the Diamond and Dybvig 
model is highlighted in Postlewaite and Vives (1987). They argue 
that, strictly speaking, run equilibria in Diamond and Dybvig are 
3 Diamond and Dybvig (1983), p. 403. 
4 Diamond and Dybvig (1983), p. 410. 
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not equilibria at all, because consumers would not deposit their 
funds at the bank in the first place had they anticipated a run. 
Diamond and Dybvig overcome this problem by linking the 
equilibrium with some extrinsic random variable (sunspots), 
which correlates the beliefs of depositors. Then, as long as the 
probability of the run is sufficiently small, depositors will accept 
the contract offered by the bank. Alternatively, Postlewaite and 
Vives present a framework based on the Prisoner's Dilemma 
situation, in which there is a unique equilibrium involving a 
positive probability of a bank run. This equilibrium has the 
feature that it does not have to be conditioned on an exogenous 
event, such as sunspots. 
Alternatively, Cooper and Ross assume that bank runs 
occur with positive probability and analyse how the knowledge of 
the possibility of ex-post banking failures affects the design of 
optimal deposit contracts. They achieve this by considering the 
ex-ante optimal amongst two contracts, attaching an exogenous 
probability to liquidation, which acts as a proxy for panics. Our 
view is that, by doing so, the term panics may not be appropriate 
any more, and the banking failures are the result of runs, 
following the signal given by the exogenous event. The choice of 
contracts is between one that allows for runs and a run-proof 
alternative. They show that if the probability of a run is high, the 
banks will choose contracts that eliminate the possibility of bank 
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runs. If the probability of premature liquidation is low, the run- 
exposed contract is optimal. 
An important extension of the Diamond and Dybvig model 
is provided by Hellwig (1994). Hellwig points out that if the 
returns of long-term investments are given and the market rate of 
interest turns out to be high, it is possible that refinancing costs 
may exceed investment returns. He goes on to recognize that 
interest rate risk is not diversifiable, since it affects the economy 
as a whole, and that we should be concerned with its efficient 
allocation. He builds on Diamond and Dybvig to show that a 
transfer of risk to depositors is desirable and should accompany 
the insurance of the depositor's liquidity needs, an action that is 
not observed in the real world, where financial intermediaries 
bear a lot of interest rate risk. 
2.1.2 Suspension of Convertibility 
Diamond and Dybvig identified suspension of 
convertibility as a mechanism that can eliminate the Pareto- 
inferior equilibrium of the bank's demand deposit contract. Under 
a pre-announced policy of suspension of deposit convertibility, 
the government is obliged to suspend payments and prevent the 
premature liquidation of the long-term technology, following the 
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observation of depositors panicking and withdrawing from their 
banks. By doing so, the rationale behind panics is removed, since 
the depositor's allocations derived from the long-term technology 
are under no threat. If there are no credibility issues regarding 
the implementation of suspension of convertibility, the need to 
put the policy in use will never arise and the Pareto dominated 
equilibrium is eliminated. 
Note that this assumes that aggregate consumption demand 
is certain. If withdrawals are stochastic however (discussed in the 
following Section), suspension of convertibility may avert a bank 
panic but at the cost of optimal risk sharing, since some of the 
depositors will not be allowed to consume at their preferred time 
period. 
Engineer (1989) shows that in a four-period version of the 
Diamond and Dybvig model, the policy of suspending deposit 
convertibility is not as effective. In their paper, suspension 
ensures solvency of the bank, but does not eliminate the bank run 
equilibrium. Suppose that all consumers learn their type just 
before consumption. If a panic does take place, period-one 
consumers join the queue in the second period, resulting in an 
excess demand for withdrawal for that period. Non-first-period 
consumers may fear that they will turn out to be period-two 
consumers and that, given certain conditions, they may remain 
cashless, in which case it is optimal to withdraw in the first- 
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period. Bank run conjectures are self-fulfilling and runs may even 
be possible in cases where the bank can adjust, by using 
liquidation, to new withdrawal payments after observing a high 
number of withdrawals. 
Gorton (1985) turns to information-based bank runs5 and in 
an environment of incomplete information about the bank's 
investments, portrays a bank's suspension of convertibility as a 
signal to depositors that continuation of the long-term 
investments is mutually beneficial. With perfect information, 
bank runs would be optimal, since depositors would be trying to 
improve their portfolio positions. If depositors receive a noisy 
signal about their bank's portfolio returns, they may panic and 
cause unjustified bank failures. In that case, banks may signal 
depositors of the state of their investments by suspending 
convertibility, and not allowing premature liquidation when it is 
not beneficial to do so. 
Gorton's model can be contrasted with Calomiris and Kahn 
(1991) analysis that portrays demand deposits as a mechanism to 
provide incentive-compatible intermediation. In their view, 
liquidation of banks following bad signals concerning their 
portfolios is designed to place the portfolio's assets beyond the 
reach of the banker. This justifies the decision to take the 
suspension decision away from individual banks, since 
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suspension of convertibility would destroy the demandable-debt 
property of bank deposits. 
Selgin (1993) shows that bank suspension contracts may be 
a low cost alternative to deposit insurance given the absence of 
regulatory interference. He points out that the Diamond and 
Dybvig framework does not allow for bank checks or notes. He 
incorporates this possibility and assumes that following 
suspension, banks restrict payments on high-powered money, but 
continue to receive and issue bank debt, which is a close 
substitute to outside money. By doing so, he shows that 
suspending convertibility does not have to be associated with 
considerable welfare losses on the side of depositors due to 
consumption restrictions on outside money. In the absence of 
legislative interference (restricting bank debt issuance or 
imposing bank holidays with suspension of all bank activities) 
Selgin concludes that suspending convertibility may be a 
desirable alternative to deposit insurance. 
S See Section 2.1.4. 
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2.1.3 Sequential Service Constraint and Aggregate 
Uncertainty over Consumption Demand 
An important ingredient of the Diamond and Dybvig 
framework is the existence of a sequential service constraint. 
Given the first-come first-served rule and the illiquidity of the 
bank's long-term assets, if a panic was to take place the agents at 
the end of the line would suffer losses, receiving less than what 
was promised. In order to avoid incurring such losses, they will 
choose to step to the head of the line, causing the very event they 
imagined. 
Three issues arise regarding the sequential service 
constraint. Firstly, without the sequential service constraint, 
panics would not take place. The first-come first-served rule 
ensures that contracts with consumption payments contingent on 
the total number of agents in line are inconsistent. By preventing 
the allocation of the bank's resources on a pro rata basis, the 
possibility of bank panics remains present. 
As a consequence, a second issue is raised, since the 
absence of such an arrangement would result in a framework that 
would not reflect the history of banking. Banking panics are 
historically recurring phenomena and models of banks should 
account for these events. 
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Finally, the omission of the constraint would lead to the 
establishment of an efficient early credit market, inconsistent 
with voluntary participation in an illiquid banking arrangement. 
Jacklin (1987) emphasises this point. Note that a demand deposit 
economy provides better risk sharing than the market economy, 
but is vulnerable to bank runs. Jacklin asks the question of 
whether alternative arrangements could improve or match the risk 
sharing property of the demand deposit contract, while at the 
same time avoiding the risk element of bank panics associated 
with it. Jacklin demonstrates that dividend paying equity shares 
will dominate the demand deposit contract in the Diamond and 
Dybvig environment, unless the markets are incomplete in some 
important way, thus opening the model to the Fama (1980) 
critique, which questions the special role for banks in the 
economy. 
This has led to a number of explanations for the 
demandable debt finance of banks. In Jacklin demand deposits 
facilitate risk sharing utilizing trading restrictions included in the 
contract. Villamil (1991) combines features of the Diamond and 
Dybvig and the Townsend (1979) models and uses costly state 
verification to resolve the demand deposit/demand equity 
indeterminacy problem and rationalize debt contracts. Calomiris 
and Kahn (1991) show that demandable debt acts as a disciplining 
tool against moral hazard by bank managers. Some depositors 
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engage in costly monitoring of bank behaviour and withdraw their 
funds if they detect fraud or unacceptable high asset risk. The 
sequential service constraint is essential in their model to avoid a 
free-rider effect from depositors that do not incur the monitoring 
costs. Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), in an environment with 
risky long-term assets and interim information regarding their 
productivity, show that the choice between deposit contracts and 
traded equity contracts depends crucially on the risk of and 
information about available investments. 
Wallace (1988) addressed these issues by introducing a 
restriction as part of the economic environment. He provided a 
justification for the sequential service constraint by suggesting 
the spatial separation of agents. If consumers are assumed to be 
isolated, then they will be prevented from co-ordinating their 
withdrawal. Panics are still possible and there is no conflict with 
historical facts. Furthermore, banking can be seen as a substitute 
for market activity in a world where agents are isolated. In 
essence, Wallace's isolation imposes exogenous market 
incompleteness to the model. 
By investigating the nature and importance of - the 
sequential service constraint, Wallace's paper tries to resolve 
another problem of the original Diamond and Dybvig model. 
Diamond and Dybvig proposed suspension of convertibility 
as a mechanism that eliminates the Pareto dominated equilibrium 
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in their framework. 6 Nevertheless this policy is inefficient in the 
presence of aggregate uncertainty over consumption preference. 
Diamond and Dybvig argue that the alternative policy of 
government deposit insurance can achieve optimal risk sharing as 
a unique Nash equilibrium. Deposit insurance is portrayed as a 
redistributing tax, conditional on the proportion of early 
withdrawals, applied to early withdrawers and guaranteeing all 
promised allocations. Such a policy eliminates the incentive of 
late consumers to withdraw early and thus makes the use of the 
policy costless, since the credible promise of implementation 
ensures that the need for the policy will never arise. 
Wallace (1988,1990) identifies a flow in the design of 
deposit insurance. If the sequential service constraint, assumed 
throughout the Diamond and Dybvig model, is to be taken 
seriously the option of observing the total number of early 
withdrawers and subsequently deciding on the allocation to be 
distributed is not permitted. Even if the government can apply 
such a redistributing tax after the observation of all early 
withdrawals, there is no guarantee that agents will not have 
already consumed their withdrawals. Instead, Wallace suggests an 
alternative policy that imitates partial suspension of 
convertibility. He demonstrates that the best attainable solution 
6 We discuss this policy in Section 2.1.2. 
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to the aggregate uncertainty problem, although not first best, 
must form a contingency in the order of withdrawal. 
His solution however excludes the possibility of the 
formation of an interbank market. Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) 
reinterpret aggregate uncertainty as a problem faced among 
spatially separated intermediaries subject to privately observed 
shocks regarding early withdrawal demand. Given imperfect 
correlation, borrowing and lending among banks can be seen as 
insurance against these shocks. An important element in the 
formation of the interbank contract is the inclusion of incentive 
compatibility constraints to avoid the inherent moral hazard 
arising from the assumption that the liquidity shocks are 
unobservable. These second-best distortions prevent the inter- 
bank arrangement from achieving optimality.? 
Nevertheless, Bhattacharya and Gale's solution has a 
similar flaw to that of the deposit insurance policy of the 
Diamond and Dybvig model. The design of the contracts between 
depositors and banks, given participation in an inter-bank 
arrangement, does not respect the sequential service constraint. 
This is because the contracts specify early consumption 
Another interesting view on the purpose of interbank markets is 
given in Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994). They analyse a model of 
interbank coordination where banks face maturity uncertainty of their short- 
term investments. Similarly to Bhattacharya and Gale, information 
asymmetries result in a second-best interbank contract. 
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allocations contingent on the number of withdrawals. As a 
consequence, banks will be unable to provide the correct 
allocation corresponding to their true liquidity pattern to the first 
depositor in line, since they only learn their type by an 
observation made further down the queue. The first-come first- 
serve assumption implies that all banks must make one common 
early consumption allocation promise. 
2.1.4 Information-Based Bank Runs 
The main question regarding the model of Diamond and 
Dybvig arises in relation to the causes of panics. In other words, 
the sunspot-based model seems to lack a trigger mechanism for 
the panics, as we have already discussed. 
Adding to the research already questioning the existence of 
a run equilibrium in the Diamond and Dybvig model, a paper by 
Green and Leen (2000) suggests that we must consider alternative 
venues for explaining the observed bank failures of the real 
world. Green and Leen demonstrate, in an environment without 
and with a sequential service constraint and where the size of the 
population is observable by individual agents, that agents' 
dominant strategy is to tell the truth regarding their unobservable 
consumption preference, thus eliminating the banking panic 
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equilibrium. Note however, as they point out themselves, that 
their results would not hold in overlapping generations models, or 
if the size of the queue or the agent's order in the queue for 
withdrawals is not observable. 
An alternative view on the cause of bank failures offers a 
more clear rationale for their existence. This view tries to model 
runs triggered by fundamentals, in contrast to pure panics as 
suggested by the sunspot theory developed by Diamond and 
Dybvig. In Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), the long-term 
investment is risky, in the sense that it offers a variable return. 
Runs are the consequence of rational revisions in beliefs about 
the riskiness of the bank's portfolio performance. Depositors 
preference for early withdrawal cannot be supported by the 
bank's assets, leading to `information-based' bank runs. Note that 
when a run takes place it is the only equilibrium. 
A number of further differences with the Diamond and 
Dybvig model are also worth mentioning. Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya, following Jacklin (1987), make use of smooth 
preferences (utility over two time periods) unlike Diamond and 
Dybvig, who assume that agents have realized utility for either 
the first or the second period of the game (corner preferences). 
Furthermore, Jacklin and Bhattacharya assume additive square 
root utility for consumption, implying a relative risk aversion of 
less than one, and a totally illiquid long-lived asset. Diamond and 
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Dybvig, on the other hand, assume a relative risk aversion of 
more than one and total recovery of the investment if premature 
liquidation of the productive technology takes place. 
An important study of the Jacklin and Bhattacharya 
framework is that of Alonso (1996). Alonso considers alternative 
contracts that can possibly eliminate information-based runs. He 
notes that a contract could be written that makes allocations 
contingent on the interim signal received regarding the bank's 
portfolio returns. Just like Jacklin and Bhattacharya he chooses to 
abstract from such a possibility by constraining the possible 
design of contracts and asserts that ideally such a restriction 
should be justified by the explicit environment. Instead, Alonso 
concentrates on a contract that includes an incentive 
compatibility constraint that prevents information runs even in 
the worst possible state of fundamentals. He compares the ex-ante 
optimality of such a contract with a contract subject to runs to 
find that excluding the possibility of bank runs may not always 
be the optimal bank behaviour ex-ante. More specifically, if a 
low probability is attached to the bad state of the bank's portfolio 
returns, the total utility of a contract with runs* is only slightly 
affected and a run-proof contract, that alters all allocations 
considerably, might not be ex-ante desirable by the banks. 
Chari and Jagannathan (1988) emphasize the panic aspect 
of information-based runs. A portion of the depositors obtains 
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interim information about the true values of their bank's assets, 
while another portion does not receive the signal. Depositors of 
the latter portion can only learn about the state of the bank by 
observing the line of depositors withdrawing their funds. 
However they cannot distinguish whether there is a long line 
because of consumption needs or because informed depositors are 
getting out early. Panic is the result of their inference, which may 
be correct or not, that the bank is about to fail. This panic view is 
based on asymmetric information and a signal extraction problem, 
as the information is imperfectly revealed to depositors by the 
withdrawal decision of other depositors. However, an important 
drawback of their model is that the authors have abstracted from 
the important issue of the services that banks provide, by making 
all investors risk neutral, with the consequence that deposits are 
not needed to provide insurance. Note that suspension of 
convertibility is crucial for the existence of their bank contract, 
which yields superior allocations to the market equilibrium in 
terms of ex-ante expected utility, leaving however some 
individuals worse off ex-post than others. 
A different kind of panic-based bank rims is studied by 
Goldstein and Pauzner (2000). 8 Goldstein and Pauzner use the 
8A simpler version of their environment is studied by Morris and 
Shin (2000), whose purpose is to bring out the importance of this type of 
methodological analysis 
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same technique as the study on currency crises by Morris and 
Shin (1998a, b) to derive a unique equilibrium in contrast to the 
multiple equilibria of Diamond and Dybvig. Agents receive an 
interim noisy signal regarding the state of their bank's 
investments. The small error term in their information, in 
combination with the uncertainty surrounding other agents' 
actions, results in a unique threshold such that each agent that 
receives a signal below this will run to the bank. Note the panic 
element of this framework: runs occur even when the 
fundamentals are not sufficiently low to encourage an agent to 
run had he believed that others do not run. 
Another model that adapts the information-based view of 
bank failures is that of Allen and Gale (1998), who develop a 
framework in which bank runs take place when depositors learn 
that their bank's portfolio is performing badly. Allen and Gale 
demonstrate that bank runs can be first best efficient, as they 
allow efficient risk sharing between depositors. However, this 
result does not stand if liquidation costs are considered, which is 
studied by assuming that the return to storage by early 
withdrawing late consumers is lower than the return obtained by 
the bank. In that case they find that central bank intervention will 
be necessary to improve welfare. Furthermore, Samartin (2000) 
alters the model of Allen and Gale by introducing smoother 
preferences, following Jacklin (1987). The result is that a laissez- 
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faire response by the government is never optimal and that 
regulation is necessary and welfare improving. Samartin 
essentially restores the traditional view that bank runs are costly 
and should be prevented. Finally note that, as Allen and Gale also 
point out, their framework discards the assumption of first-come 
first-served-9 
More support for the information-based run view can be 
found in Agenor and Aizenman (2000). Agenor and Aizenman 
embed an information-based runs story in a costly state 
verification environment (developed by Townsend (1979)). They 
show that in the presence of financial sector inefficiencies, like 
verification and enforcement needs, bank runs are more 
vulnerable to economic fundamentals. Furthermore, they find 
that, given risk averse agents and risk neutral banks, deposit 
contracts can only provide partial insurance against 
macroeconomic shocks. 
9 We discuss the sequential service constraint in Section 2.1.3. 
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2.1.5 Contagion 
32 
Models of contagion in the banking sector, building on the 
framework of the Diamond and Dybvig model, have given weight 
to the role of the interbank system, following the work of 
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), as a form of propagation of bank 
failures. General introductions to the issue of contagious bank 
failures can be found in Temzelides (1997) and De Bandt and 
Hartmann (2000). We first review inter-bank based contagion, 
before having a look at two noticeable exceptions. 
Rochet and Tirole (1996) analyse interbank lending in the 
presence of moral hazard and peer monitoring among banks. They 
show how an interbank market solves the moral hazard problem 
between bank owners and bank-debt holders, but introduces 
contagion risk. Their model suggests that government 
intervention destroys peer monitoring among banks, given that 
banks' information about each other can be used efficiently. 
Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) make use of the Diamond 
and Dybvig framework to produce a model where financial 
connections among regions arise because depositors face 
uncertainty about the location they want to consume. Depositors 
that have to consume in a different location than the one where 
they deposited their money, will ask for withdrawal and 
transference of their allocations to their geographical 
Literature Review 33 
consumption area. Banks will create credit lines among them, in 
order to service these orders and to avoid liquidation of long- 
term investments. However, two equilibria arise in this case, even 
if all participating intermediaries are solvent. The credit-line 
equilibrium involves an efficient interbank arrangement, while 
the gridlock equilibrium results in contagious bank failures, the 
result of panic among depositors from fear of insufficient 
reserves and premature liquidation of investments. The case of an 
insolvent participant in the interbank arrangement is also 
discussed, taking into account a number of possibilities for the 
existence and direction of credit lines among banks. 
The role of geography and the pattern of linkages among 
banks in an inter-bank model are also explored in Allen and Gale 
(2000). In their model, the need for an interbank market emerges 
because of imperfectly correlated liquidity shocks across regions. 
In the case of higher than expected withdrawals in one of the 
regions participating in the interbank mechanism (a world state 
whose realization was assigned a zero probability in the planning 
period), financial contagion is inevitable. Allen and Gale study 
how the structure of claims will affect the spread of the 
contagion, and conclude that more complete (inter-linked) 
markets are likely to be more stable. 
Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (2000) also focus on the 
contagious risk that is associated with the insurance of banks 
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against liquidity shocks, but do so using incomplete information. 
They reject a fully contingent interbank market, where banks 
offer loans according to global liquidity supply, as unrealistic 
and instead focus on a clearing house that offers a fixed inter- 
bank lending rate. If one bank becomes illiquid and is not 
supported by the inter-bank market, a contagious bank panic may 
spread to an otherwise solvent system, because depositors may 
incorrectly infer that the inter-bank arrangement lacks sufficient 
liquidity. 
An interesting advance on the work of Bhattacharya and 
Gale on interbank co-ordination is provided by Koppl and 
MacGee (2001). They add asset risk in the analysis of the 
formation of borrowing and lending arrangements among banks 
and investigate its interaction with liquidity risk. The possibility 
of bank failures arises from bad performing assets and 
information received about them from depositors, unlike previous 
inter-bank research that focuses on uncertainty over liquidity 
demand. Note that in their model, asset shocks to a few banks do 
not lead to system wide crisis, which can stem only from general 
banking sector bad performance. 
Theoretical papers that break away from the traditional 
inter-bank propagation mechanism are those of Bougheas (1999) 
and Chen (1999). 
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Bougheas presents an overlapping generations model based 
on the information-based bank run view of Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya. In his model, banks hold positively correlated 
portfolios, which act as an updating mechanism among depositors 
of different banks. Bougheas shows that the insolvency of one 
bank in the system is not by itself a sufficient condition for the 
panic to spread the crisis to the rest of the economy. Instead, 
bank failures become contagious only when the depressed state of 
the economy signals that the asset returns across the banking 
system are positively correlated. 
Alternatively, Chen concentrates on the importance of the 
number of failed banks acting as a signal about the prospects of 
the banking industry. Chen assumes that depositors in some banks 
in the economy receive bank specific information about the health 
of their bank's portfolios. Following this interim information a 
number of bank failures might take place, which are observed by 
the depositors of banks for which no information is available. A 
panic might arise if the number of failures suggests that the 
macroeconomic conditions have worsened and banks' portfolios 
are under performing. Note that Chen terms as panic the decision 
made from depositors to react to early information (the number of 
failed banks) and not wait for more bank specific information. He 
then goes on to identify deposit insurance as a mechanism that 
Literature Review 36 
would eliminate panic and induce depositors to wait until bank 
specific information is available. 
2.1.6 Empirical Research on Banking Crises 
Empirical research has tried to address the nature of 
banking failures, given the existence of two competing theories: 
sunspot panics and information-based bank runs. The latter view 
has received the most support. 
Gorton (1988) examines seven panics during the US 
National Banking Era (1863-1914) and makes the case that these 
were not random events, as the sunspot theory would suggest, but 
instead can be explained by depositor responses to changing 
perceptions of risk due to cyclical downturns. He then argues that 
noisy information predicting recessions is the most fitting 
explanation of banking crises. This conclusion is further 
supported by Calomiris and Gorton (1991). 
Aharony and Swary (1983) study the three largest US bank 
failures since 1978, Swary (1986) studies the 1984 crisis of 
Continental Illinois and Karafiath and Glascock (1989) study the 
effects of the 1982 Penn Square Bank failure. They support the 
information-based view as an explanation of bank runs and 
contagion in the banking sector. 
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An interesting study by Aharony and Swary (1996) 
concentrates on five large-bank failures in the Southwest region 
of the US during the mid-1980's. They use observable proxies to 
find whether depositors used interim private information for their 
assessment of the riskiness of their bank's long-lived assets and 
their findings are also consistent with an information-based 
contagion hypothesis. 
Furthermore, Park (1991) shows that bank failures are 
contagious due to the lack of bank-specific information. 
Calomiris and Mason (1997) deal with the 1932 Chicago bank 
panic during the great depression and also find that asymmetric 
information between depositors and banks can precipitate banking 
failures. Saunders and Wilson (1996) study deposit flows of 163 
failed and 229 surviving banks in the US from 1929 to 1993 and 
find support for the view that a number of informed depositors 
distinguish among ex ante failing and non-failing banks. 
Schumacher (2000) turns to the Argentinean banking panic of 
1994, supporting the information-based theory approach and 
noting how suspensions of troubled banks have spillover effects 
on banks of similar characteristics. 
Thus, the empirical evidence largely suggests that an 
information-based approach seems more suitable for the study of 
banking failures and contagious panics in the banking sector. 
Note also the link between banking and currency crises, which we 
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further explored in the following Sections. Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) study a sample of 45 to 60 developing and 
industrial countries between 1980 and 1994. Their results are 
consistent with the information-based view and among their 
findings they note that vulnerability to balance of payments 
crises contributes to the likelihood of banking sector problems. 
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2.2 Financial Crises: Overview 
39 
A currency crisis can be defined as a shafp decline in the 
nominal value of a currency or a sharp depreciation. 
t° A large 
amount of research has focused on the reasons behind such crises. 
At the theoretical 
-level we can distinguish between three types of 
models. 
The first type, following Krugman (1979), identifies 
weaknesses in economic fundamentals as the cause of currency 
crises, making the maintenance of pegged exchange rate systems 
unsustainable and the subsequent crisis inevitable. This type of 
models was mainly developed over the 1980s to explain crises in 
Latin American countries. Following the speculative attacks on 
countries participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the 
European Monetary System in 1992-93, that took place despite 
sound fundamentals not justifying speculation, a second type of 
models emerged. 
The second type of models, based on Obstfeld (1986), 
focused on multiple equilibria and the self-fulfilling nature of 
10 This is a strict criterion that would not allow for cases where the 
currency came under severe pressure but the authorities successfully 
defended it. To capture these instances, we could add in the definition the 
cases where authorities are forced to intervene heavily in the foreign 
exchange market or raise interest rates sharply to absorb pressure. 
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currency crises. They noted that the willingness of the 
government to maintain an exchange rate peg is inversely related 
to the number of speculators attacking the currency. 
Consequently, the individual speculator faces increasing 
incentives to attack the currency as more speculators do so, and 
an attack may be launched, even if the fundamentals are not in a 
very bad state. An important contribution of these models was 
that they highlighted the difficulty in predicting speculative 
attacks. One of their weaknesses, namely that they rely on sudden 
changes in mood caused by unrelated events (sunspots) and 
resulting to jumps from one equilibrium to another, has been the 
subject of study by Morris and Shin (1998a, b). The indeterminacy 
of equilibria is removed by adding a small uncertainty in 
information about fundamentals, resulting in a unique 
equilibrium. 
Since the East Asian Crisis of 1997 and the empirical 
evidence provided by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) on the 
correlation between currency and banking crises, a growing 
literature has concentrated on twin crises. 
The literature on currency and on banking crises developed 
independently, nevertheless along similar lines as Marion (1999) 
observes. The two types of crises exhibit similar characteristics. 
Both types of attacks are against a price-fixing policy, whether 
this refers to a fixed price for foreign currency or a fixed 
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between deposits and currency. The exhaustion of reserves, be it 
foreign currency reserves or the bank's liquid assets, leads to the 
abandonment of the regime. Furthermore, both types of crises are 
the result of either multiple equilibria (sudden shifts in market 
expectations) or policy inconsistencies (trying to maintain the 
price fix despite bad fundamentals). 
We review the theoretical and empirical work that has been 
carried out on twin crises, and make the observation that models 
linking the two sectors of the economy have done so choosing 
only one of the possible ways to relate the crises. More 
specifically the standard approach utilises the existence of 
foreign capital in the domestic banking system, leaving other 
possibilities unexplored, for example the role of domestic 
depositors. 
2.2.1 Non-Financial Models of Currency Crises: First 
and Second Generation 
A convenient way of characterising currency crises models 
that do not involve the banking sector has been the distinction 
between first and second generation models, introduced by 
Eichengreen et al (1995). 
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First generation models, otherwise known as the standard 
or the traditional approach to currency crises, follow Krugman 
(1979), who extended the work of Salant and Henderson (1978) 
on schemes to stabilize commodity prices. These models direct 
attention to government policy inconsistencies between a fixed 
exchange rate commitment and the pursuit of domestic policies, 
such as monetising large fiscal and current account deficits. More 
specifically, they emphasize speculative attacks as runs on the 
foreign exchange reserves of the central bank. Macroeconomic 
policies inconsistent with the sustainability of the peg lead to a 
speculative attack in which rational market participants buy the 
foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, leading to the 
collapse of the currency regime. 
An important contribution of these models was to explain 
the currency attacks as rational and not the result of panic actions 
from the speculators. Furthermore they fitted the economic 
phenomena of the time, with stabilisation plans during the 1970s 
and 1980s widely failing in Latin American countries, due to the 
monetary and fiscal policies followed by those countries' 
governments and not because of some malfunction of foreign 
exchange markets. Note that the crises, though sudden, are 
deterministic events. They are unavoidable, given the policies 
followed, and in principle their timing is predictable. 
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As noted, first generation models point to unfavourable 
developments in some of the fundamental macroeconomic 
variables as the main cause of speculations and pressures on the 
currency. The limitations of this type of models became obvious 
with the 1992/93 exit of the United Kingdom from the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism, since there were no expansionary 
macroeconomic policies justifying the speculative attacks. 
Second generation models were developed, based on 
Obstfeld (1986). These models view currency crises as shifts 
between different monetary policy equilibria in response to self- 
fulfilling speculative attacks. Instead of focusing on government 
economic policies, the emphasis is on market expectations, 
multiple equilibria and herding behaviour of investors. Market 
speculators base their beliefs on the willingness of the 
government to resist pressure on the fixed exchange rate regime. 
When they perceive that conditions, such as high unemployment, 
compromise the government's willingness to defend the peg, 
speculators initiate their attacks. 
Second generation models differ from first generation 
models in that they offer no predictability of the crises. It has 
also been argued that they don't involve irresponsible 
government policies (other than insufficient commitment to the 
exchange rate peg) and thus they take the blame off the policy 
makers' shoulders. However, as Jeanne (1997) demonstrates, 
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multiple equilibria are only possible for only a specific range of 
fundamentals. Thus policy makers' responsibility is restored, 
since governments should try to avoid this range, for example by 
reducing exposure to short maturity of foreign debt. 
This type of models faced criticism because of the nature 
of multiple equilibria. The jump from the good to the bad 
equilibrium, where a currency run takes place, cannot be 
justified. Critical questions, like why did the attacks take place 
when they did or what policies should be followed to avoid them, 
are left unanswered. Morris and Shin (1998a, b) provide a 
solution, where incomplete information, portrayed as noisy 
signals about fundamentals and uncertainty over other agents' 
reactions result in a unique equilibrium. Specifically, they 
demonstrate that a switching point exists in fundamentals, below 
which an attack is certain and above which no attack takes place. 
Morris and Shin demonstrate this for a uniform or normal 
distribution of fundamentals, and Heinemann and Ming (2000) 
extend their work to a broader class of probability distributions. 
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2.2.2 Third Generation Models and Jeanne's 
Objection 
The 1997-98 East Asian crisis was quickly termed by 
economists as a new era of exchange rate crises. Perhaps the most 
disturbing aspect of the crisis was the fact that traditional crisis 
models did not predict it. Indeed inflation and unemployment did 
not constitute a problem, government deficits were low, capital 
inflows continued and interestingly credit ratings from all 
agencies were high. Most importantly financial intermediaries 
seemed to have been central players. Having to explain the new 
phenomena, a third generation of models had to be created or if 
not so, a reliable extension of the existing model types to be built 
in order to accommodate the characteristics of the East Asian 
crises. 
In the following Section we concentrate on models 
combining banking failures, as described by Diamond and 
Dybvig, with currency crises, following mainly the methodology 
of second generation self-fulfilling attacks. Other strands 
followed by the literature can be found in Radelet and Sachs 
(1998). 
We must point out that objections have been raised with 
regard to the decision to apply the term of third generation 
models to this type of models. Jeanne (1999) points out that in 
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second generation models the abandonment of the peg is the 
consequence of the incentives that the policymaker is faced with, 
when considering whether or not to devalue. Under this view, any 
variables entering the objective function of the policy maker can 
qualify as economic fundamentals influencing the speculators' 
decision over the government's reaction to a speculative attack. 
Thus, models stressing the significance of the health of the 
banking sector, which are explored in the following Section, can 
only qualify as extensions or sub-cases of the older types of 
currency crises models. 
2.2.3 Twin Crises Models 
The literature that extends the Diamond and Dybvig model 
to an open economy framework has concentrated in the 
importance of flows of capital in the banking sector originating 
from foreign investors or lenders. There have been two ways of 
introducing this foreign intervention in the domestic economy. 
One way is to assume that foreign investors have to use domestic 
intermediaries to participate in domestic technologies. The other 
assumes that the domestic banking sector can borrow from the 
international community and has to repay in some future date. We 
first consider research that concentrates on these sources of 
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foreign capital inflows and financial instability, before we 
examine another type of twin crises models that emphasises the 
cross-border contagion aspect of financial crises. 
Perhaps the technique of combining banking with currency 
crises that has received the most attention is that of Chang and 
Velasco (1998a). In this type of papers, foreign borrowing from 
abroad is introduced, altering the budget constraints of the 
domestic banks. In the framework of Chang and Velasco, a shift 
to pessimistic expectations by foreign creditors induces them to 
stop lending and prevents them from rolling over the domestic 
banks' short-term debt. The liquidity of the banks is reduced and 
their vulnerability to a panic is increased. 
Foreign borrowing has been used by Chang and Velasco to 
study alternative exchange rate regimes and government policies 
in the case of twin crises, the international illiquidity of domestic 
financial systems and the importance of the maturity of external 
debt of banks. 
Chang and Velasco (1998a) embed the maturity 
transformation story of the banking sector in a general 
equilibrium macroeconomic model, which can operate under a 
number of regimes. The combination of flexible exchange rates 
and a lender of last resort is found to dominate all other policy 
regimes in their framework. In the last Section of their first paper 
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they also discuss the availability of international capital, a 
subject which becomes more central in their second paper. 
In Chang and Velasco (1998b) illiquidity is defined as a 
situation in which the financial system's potential short-term 
obligations exceed the liquidation value of its assets. They argue 
that the illiquidity problem can be aggravated by financial 
liberalization and point out that domestic banks become 
particularly vulnerable if their foreign loans are of short 
maturity. The financial system can greatly magnify the effects of 
small external changes, like world interest rates or 
competitiveness, resulting in costly financial distress. Moral 
hazard is also considered as a factor increasing the fragility of 
the banks. 
A third study by Chang and Velasco (2000) follows Cooper 
and Ross, and allow for banks to take the possibility of self- 
fulfilling runs into account in the design of their contracts and 
portfolio. " For low probabilities of runs, the intermediaries 
choose contracts that are subject to illiquidity and bank runs. By 
allowing for short and long term loans, Chang and Velasco show 
that the term structure of interest rates emerges endogenously and 
that short term debt is less expensive than long term debt. The 
11 Chang and Velasco alter the usual assumption of the banking 
literature that the probability of runs is effectively zero. For more on this 
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intuition behind this result is that following a crisis long term 
debt can be completely defaulted, unlike short term debt that will 
be partially honoured. They also observe that the maturity 
structure of foreign debt will depend on attitudes towards risk. 
Two effects come into play in reaching this result. Short term 
debt may be cheaper than long-term, but in the case of a banking 
panic depositors total welfare decreases because international 
short-term creditors also panic and liquidate their investments. 
Chang and Velasco find that high risk aversion implies portfolios 
with at least some short-term debt. 
The link to an exchange rate collapse in the framework of 
Chang and Velasco is the recognition of two mutually 
incompatible objectives, the stabilization of the banking system 
and the preservation of the exchange rate peg. A Central Bank 
may try to keep interest rates from rising or provide lender of last 
resort funds in order to fight a bank crisis, but then the agents 
may use the additional domestic currency to buy reserves. With 
the depletion of the foreign exchange reserves, the currency 
regime collapses and we have twin crises. Note that these studies 
concentrate on sunspot panics and do not allow for risky 
investments. 
assumption see Section 2.1.1, Postlewaite and Vives (1987), Cooper and 
Ross (1991) and Alonso (1996). 
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Takeda (2001) alters the Chang and Velasco model where 
domestic banks borrow from abroad, by allowing for the return of 
the long-term technology to depend on the random state of the 
world. However, note that Takeda does not consider the 
possibility of information based bank runs in the sense of Jacklin 
and Bhattacharya. More specifically he makes use of Goldstein 
and Pauzner (2000) techniques by introducing noisy signals, 
regarding interim information on fundamentals, in order to derive 
a unique equilibrium in which economic fundamentals determine 
whether a currency and financial crisis will occur. Bad signals 
force depositors to coordinate their actions and cause a run, while 
good signals have no repercussions. The main finding of their 
study is that capital inflows may increase the probability of crises 
when the return on domestic investment is lower than 
international interest rates. 
Allen and Gale (2000) also extend their previous paper on 
optimal banking crises, which also features a risky asset, to an 
international context to study optimal currency crises. 12 
Following Chang and Velasco's research, they open up their 
economy by introducing an international bond market, where the 
domestic country can borrow from foreign lenders. International 
bonds replace the storage technology and liquidity is obtained for 
12 Comments on their basic set-up, Allen and Gale (1998), can be 
found in Section 2.1.4. 
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early consumers by borrowing from foreign lenders. Allen and 
Gale then examine different set-ups, regarding bank debt and 
central bank monetary policy, and their consequences, regarding 
optimal risk sharing among depositors and the transfer of the 
long-term asset's risk to the risk neutral international bond 
market. They make recommendations with respect to advanced 
industrial economies and emerging markets (the main difference 
being that industrial countries can issue debt in their own 
domestic currency, unlike developing countries) and study the 
role of an international organization like the International 
Monetary Fund or the influence of U. S. Federal Reserve in 
financial crises. They conclude that large exchange rate 
movements are desirable, in the sense that they allow risk sharing 
with the international market, and that in some, but not all, cases 
an international lender of last resort can prevent costly 
liquidations and financial contagion. 
An alternative view on combining the banking. and currency 
sectors of the economy in producing financial crises, is also 
based on foreign capital inflows. It stresses the importance of 
foreign investors participating in domestic investments through 
domestic financial intermediaries. 
Unlike Chang and Velasco, Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) 
highlight the interactions between capital flows and the twin 
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crises, by pointing out that intermediaries, allowing more 
flexibility and offering more liquid -assets, improve the 
attractiveness of the economy in the eyes of foreign investors. 
Intermediation has two main effects. On one hand it can increase 
the capital inflows in the economy, while on the other hand it 
may generate runs, amplifying initial shocks that otherwise would 
not have generated crises. In this situation, the function of 
intermediation produces strong capital movements and exchange 
rate overreaction. Furthermore, the expectation of an exchange 
rate collapse exacerbates the financial fragility of the 
intermediaries by reducing the return of their investments in the 
event of runs. 
Foreign investors participating in domestic technologies 
through domestic financial institutions are also the link to 
international markets in the work of Diamond and Rajan (2000). 
The authors observe that short-term foreign debt has been 
associated with high financial fragility and ask which way 
causation actually runs. Unlike the traditional view, that blames 
short-term debt for causing crises, they believe that short-term 
debt is the consequence of illiquid or unhealthy financial systems 
and not the direct cause of crises. More specifically, they show 
that liquidity creation or the low quality of domestic investments 
result in the more frequent use of short-term financing. They 
warrant against banning short term debt, an action which may 
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enhance the system's stability but could have significant 
consequences for credit creation. Note that, as the authors point 
out, their model is not of an open economy with a fixed exchange 
rate, but can still be used to gain insights for financial crises. 
Goldstein (2002) offers an interesting paper on strategic 
complementarities between groups of depositors in the domestic 
banking system and speculators in the foreign currency market. 
Just like in Diamond and Dybvig, the incentive of the individual 
depositor to withdraw early is higher the more withdrawers do 
SO. 13 Just like in Obstfeld, the incentive of the individual 
speculator to attack the currency is higher the more speculators 
do so. 14 The authors go one step further by linking the incentives 
of bank depositors to withdraw with the incentives of foreign 
exchange market speculators to attack the currency. They 
consider foreign agents holding deposits with domestic banks, a 
domestic asset yielding output in domestic and foreign currency 
and banks making promised allocations in foreign currency. If 
speculators are to attack the peg successfully, depreciation will 
result in fewer resources for the domestic banking system, 
13 In Diamond and Dybvig the source of complementarities is the lack 
of liquidity in the short term, while in Goldstein complementarities are 
achieved by assuming that the long term return of the available investment 
is a decreasing function of early withdrawals, due to increasing returns to 
scale in aggregate investment. 
14 Because the reserves available for the government to defend the 
peg decrease, thus raising the cost of defending the currency regime. 
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making it also optimal for the foreign depositors to run on banks. 
Furthermore, if foreign depositors are to run on banks, they 
indirectly reduce the foreign reserves that the government has, 
and it therefore becomes optimal for speculators to attack the 
peg. The probability of one type of crisis increases as the 
probability of the other type increases, and a vicious cycle results 
in a destabilizing environment with correlation among currency 
and banking crises. 
Note the repetitive remark regarding the twin crisis models 
that we have reviewed in this Section, that they rely on foreign 
capital flows to produce the link between the banking and the 
currency sectors. Either foreign investors or borrowing from 
abroad have been considered, leaving other venues, like the role 
of domestic depositors, unexplored. 
Furthermore, as Miller (1998b) points out, the foreign 
capital from abroad can be used to demonstrate cross-border 
contagion. We could have foreign banking crises generating 
currency crises domestically. If the foreign banks are important 
extenders of credit to the domestic country or if foreign investors 
have invested in the domestic country, a banking crisis abroad 
could result in the repatriation of capital, causing a currency peg 
collapse in the domestic country. This reinterpretation modifies 
the models of twin crises we reviewed so far to international 
financial contagion mechanisms. Stopping foreign lending or the 
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roll over of the domestic banks' short term debt results in turn in 
domestic banking sector crisis, and the contagious financial flu 
can go on spreading across the open economies. 
Another interesting cross-border contagion venue is 
domestic banks lending to domestic companies that are highly 
exposed abroad or with currency mismatched portfolios, where 
more assets than liabilities are denominated in terms of the 
devaluing foreign currency. In this case we would observe a 
currency crisis abroad resulting in a domestic banking crisis. 
Miller (1998a) building on Garber and Grilli (1989) 
considers one of these cross-border cases. 15 Consider a large 
home country and a small foreign one, which pegs its currency to 
the domestic one. When domestic banks invest abroad, a domestic 
bank run will repatriate foreign capital, which may cause a 
depletion of the foreign country's reserves and force a 
devaluation of the foreign currency. Devaluation will then render 
domestic banks insolvent. While in Garber and Grilli bank 
solvency problems occur when the forced early liquidation of 
long-term securities causes a drop in asset values, in Miller's 
paper solvency problems arise when the forced repatriation of 
foreign investments causes a devaluation of the foreign currency 
15 Garber and Grilli, in a paper before the East Asian Crisis, studied 
the possibility of bank runs and contagion in open economies. Nevertheless, 
Literature Review 56 
and thus a drop in the domestic currency value of assets 
denominated in foreign currency. In effect, domestic bank runs 
cause a speculative attack on the foreign currency and are self- 
justified. 
2.2.4 Empirical Research on Twin Crises 
Empirical research has mainly concentrated on either 
banking crises or currency crises, with only a few exceptions 
associating the two. In fact, the empirical study of links between 
banking and currency crises can only be found in Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) and Glick and Hutchison (1999). 16 
Kaminsky and Reinhart study 20 countries for the period 
1970-1995, where the selected countries are small open 
economies, with a fixed exchange rate, crawling peg or band. 
Their study encompasses 26 banking crises and 76 currency crises 
and they find that more than 25 percent of the banking crises 
happen within one year of the currency crises. Glick and 
they ignored the possibility of currency risk and did not explore the issue of 
twin crises. 
16 Studies on the importance of financial liberalization for financial 
crises, not directly related to the phenomena of twin crises but closely 
associated to the field, include: Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), 
Rossi (1999) and Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche (2000). 
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Hutchison analyse 90 industrial and developing countries for the 
period 1975-97, with 90 banking and 202 currency crises 
episodes, while they identify 37 twin crises. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart conclude that a banking crisis helps 
predict a future currency crisis, the converse not being true. They 
find that the collapse of the currency deepens a banking crisis, 
activating a vicious spiral and they point to common causes 
behind banking and currency crises. They also note that weak and 
deteriorating fundamentals were typical prior to crises, and 
significantly worse fundamentals accompanied twin crises in 
comparison to isolated banking or currency crises. Their study 
shows no apparent link between currency and banking crises prior 
to 1980s, and they suggest that the financial liberalization of 
those years resulted in linkages between the crises. 
Glick and Hutchison complement these results by stressing 
that banking crises are a good leading indicator about the 
possibility of currency crises, with the link not holding in the 
opposite direction. They also point out that the twin crises 
phenomenon is concentrated in financially liberalized emerging 
market economies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Basic Model: Sunspot Panics and 
Information-Based Bank Runs 
3.1 Introduction 
Our basic model is a hybrid combining the environment of 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and of Jacklin and Bhattacharya 
(1988). Diamond and Dybvig, following Bryant (1980), made an 
important contribution to the theory of banking, by creating a 
microeconomic model that captures two functions of the banking 
sector. By specifically addressing the issues of maturity matching 
between assets and liabilities, and the provision of insurance to 
depositors against liquidity risks, they show that bank deposit 
contracts can be optimal and yet lead to banking sector panics. 
Bank panics, according to Diamond and Dybvig, can be 
seen as random events, the result of multiple equilibria. The 
cause of a run can be anything, "a random earnings report, a 
commonly observed run at some other bank, a negative 
government forecast, or even sunspots" (p. 410), hence the term 
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`sunspot' panics. ' Alternatively, information-based bank runs, 
such as in Jacklin and Bhattacharya, offer a more clear rationale. 
Runs are caused by rational revisions in beliefs about the 
riskiness of the bank's portfolio performance. 2 While in Diamond 
and Dybvig bank runs occur because depositors collectively 
choose a Pareto-dominated equilibrium, in Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya interim information about the bank's investment in 
the risky long-lived assets causes depositors to prefer early 
withdrawal, a demand that the bank cannot support with its 
assets, leading to `information-based' bank runs. 3 
1 In Diamond and Dybvig banks are vulnerable to runs because of the 
existence of multiple equilibria. Postlewaite and Vives (1987) present an 
example based on Prisoner's Dilemma, where a bank run can exist as a 
unique equilibrium with positive probability. This equilibrium has the 
feature that it does not have to be conditioned on an exogenous event, such 
as sunspots. 
2 Alonso (1996) makes the banks fully rational, in the sense of 
allowing them to design their contracts with the knowledge that bank runs 
can take place. In this environment, banks can design run-preventing deposit 
contracts. However these may not be profit maximising, and the banks may 
choose contracts with the property that runs will occur with positive 
probability. 
3 Chari and Jagannathan (1988) emphasise the panic aspect of this 
type of runs. A portion of the depositors, uninformed about the true values 
of their bank's assets, can only learn about the state of the bank by 
observing its queue for withdrawals. However they cannot distinguish 
whether there is a long queue because of consumption needs or because 
informed depositors are getting out early. They may then infer (correctly or 
not) that the bank is about to fail and withdraw. 
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In the model presented here we make use of the interim 
information structure of Jacklin and Bhattacharya, while 
following Diamond and Dybvig in assuming corner preferences 
for the consumers, as they either care about early or late 
consumption. This provides an environment where sunspot panics 
and information based bank runs co-exist. To this framework we 
add Cooper and Ross's (1991) extension with respect to the early 
liquidation of the bank's illiquid investments. 4 By doing so, we 
demonstrate the important role of banks in providing liquidity, a 
feature that is not clearly brought out by the original Diamond 
and Dybvig model. Furthermore, we take the sequential service 
constraint seriously by assuming the spatial separation of agents 
in the economy. 5 This constraint makes contracts with 
consumption payments contingent on the total number of agents 
Diamond and Dybvig consider the role of liquidity in their model, 
but their liquid investment technology (storage) is completely dominated by 
the illiquid one. This is because they assume that early liquidation of the 
long-term productive technology results to a payoff equal to the initial 
investment in the technology, thus matching the service that storage 
provides. Cooper and Ross modify the model to study the importance of 
salvage value more carefully. 
S No justification for the existence of the sequential service 
constraint was originally given in the model of Diamond and Dybvig, until 
Wallace (1988) suggested the spatial separation of agents. Calomiris and 
Kahn (1991) also noted that the first-come first-served rule warrants 
explanation, after comparing this property with the analogous situation of 
bankrupt firms, but recognised it as a rule and explained it as compensation 
for those who choose to invest in information and as a tool that eliminates 
the resulting free-rider problem. 
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in queue inconsistent. Without the first-come first-served 
assumption, panics would not take place and the model would not 
reflect the history of banking. Its omission would also lead to the -- 
establishment of an efficient early credit market, inconsistent 
with voluntary participation in an illiquid banking arrangement. 
6 
Diamond and Dybvig's paper, although discussing the sequential 
service constraint, did not fully explain or respect it when 
considering the policy of deposit insurance as an answer to 
uncertainty over the aggregate level of early withdrawals. 7 
Allen and Gale (1998) present a model with similar 
characteristics in order to study financial crises. They adapt the 
information-based view of bank runs, however discard the 
assumption of first-come first-served, and at the same time study 
the consequences of liquidation costs indirectly, by assuming that 
the return to storage by early withdrawing late consumers is 
lower than the return obtained by the bank. In our model, we 
respect the sequential service constraint, and study the 
consequences of liquidation costs directly, by considering the 
salvage value of long-term illiquid investments. 
6 Banking can be seen as a substitute for market activity in a world 
where agents are isolated. Without isolation, the outcome obtained by the 
intermediary can also be obtained by the credit market and therefore there is 
no role for banks. See Jacklin (1987). 
We study the possibility of aggregate risk over consumption timing 
in Chapter 5. 
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We begin by presenting a slightly altered version of the 
Diamond and Dybvig model of liquidity insurance. We then 
present our model, which includes a number of modifications in 
order to address problems ignored by the original presentation of 
Diamond and Dybvig. 8 In particular, we stress the advantage of 
our model in offering an environment where sunspot panics 
coexist with information-based bank runs. 
3.2 Liquidity Insurance and the Diamond and Dybvig 
Model 
Consider an environment where people live for three 
periods (time T=O, which is the planning period, times T=1 and 
T=2, which are the consumption periods). There is a continuum 
of ex-ante identical agents whose measure is normalised to one. 
Agents are endowed in the planning period with one unit of the 
single commodity that exists in this economy. They maximise 
utility of consumption, but are uncertain about their consumption 
timing. With probability r they derive utility from early 
consumption in period T=1, and with probability (1-; r) they 
8 In our model, both sunspot panics and information-based bank runs 
exist, we allow for low salvage values of the long-term technology and take 
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prefer late consumption in period T=2. Their utility function 
u(c,. ), where c,. denotes consumption in date T, is assumed to be 
increasing, strictly 
- 
concave and twice continuously 
differentiable. 
The good can either be left in storage at no cost or be 
invested in a long-term technology that yields R>1 in the last 
period of the model, but returns only one unit if liquidated 
prematurely in an earlier period. 9 
Under autarky agents can store their individual 
endowments or invest them in the long-term technology. Note 
that this provides no insurance against their intertemporal 
preference shock. They will maximise the following expected 
utility in ex-ante terms: 
UD&D 
= )ZU(C +P(1-7r)u(C2) (1) 
where p: 51 is a discount factor, subject to the following 
constraints: 
c, =1-I+I 
c2 =1-I+IR=1+I(R-1) 
(2) 
the sequential service constraint seriously. 
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where I denotes the proportion of the good invested during the 
planning period in the long-term technology. Since the premature 
liquidation of the long-term technology yields the same amount 
as storage, it is optimal for the agents to invest everything in the 
illiquid yet productive technology (I=I) and liquidate in the 
unlucky outcome that they are early consumers. 
10 
A bank, by pooling together investors' resources can 
provide insurance against depositor's preference shock. 
Consumers become depositors by surrendering their inherited 
units of goods to the bank and the bank promises a non-stochastic 
consumption profile corresponding to the solution of the 
following program: 
UB &n 
_nu(c1)+P(1-n)u(ci) (3) 
subject to: 
We could also represent storage as a liquid asset with constant 
returns to scale that takes one unit of good in period T and converts it into 
one unit of good in period T+1, where T=0,1. 
10 In Appendix 3.1, we show that in this specific environment a 
market economy (where agents are permitted to trade) achieves the same ex- 
ante utility as autarky. A small modification can however change our results 
significantly. If the premature liquidation of the long-term technology 
returns less than storage, the market economy Pareto dominates the autarky 
allocation. 
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=1 =1-I 
arc +(1-; r)c2 =1 (4) (1-r)c2 
=IR R 
where the solution (c,, c2) can be interpreted as a deposit 
contract. 
The optimal allocation satisfies the following first order 
condition: 
u'(c, ) 
_ 
pR or c2 >CI (5) 
u'(c2 ) 
ensuring that late consumers will never want to imitate early 
consumers. In other words the contract offered by the bank is 
incentive compatible (the incentive constraint is not binding and 
has no impact on the optimal allocation). 
It is immediately obvious that the banking contract 
performs at least as well as autarky, since the consumption 
bundle (c,, c2)=(1, R) is feasible and incentive compatible. 
However the bank can do even better than this in terms of ex-ante 
expected utility. Assuming a relative risk aversion greater than 
. 
one we get: 
u'(1) > pRu'(R) (6) 
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showing that the outcome of autarky can be improved by 
increasing period T=1 consumption and decreasing period T=2 
consumption: 
c, >1 and c2<R (7) 
With this model Diamond and Dybvig made an important 
advance in the theory of banking by providing a micro-economic 
model of maturity matching and insurance providing against 
agents' uncertain liquidity preference. Furthermore they showed 
how this Pareto optimal mechanism can be subject to banking 
panics, the result of multiple equilibria. 
Under the `good' equilibrium, the one we have been 
considering so far, the bank maximises the consumer's welfare 
and provides optimal liquidity insurance. Under the `bad' 
equilibrium late consumers decide to withdraw early imitating the 
early consumers. This occurs because it is rational for each 
consumer to pull his money out, if he expects that the other 
investors will behave in the same way. Because of the illiquidity 
of the long-term investment, the bank cannot honour all its 
liabilities if all agents present them for redemption, and given the 
existence of a sequential service constraint (first-come first- 
served), if a panic was to take place the agents at the end of the 
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queue would suffer losses, receiving less than promis ed. 
" In 
order to avoid incurring such losses, they will choose to step to 
the head, of the queue, causing the very event they imagined. If 
everyone decides to run we get a self-fulfilling panic. 
Our work deviates from that of Diamond and Dybvig in 
three important ways. Firstly, they consider risk in terms of an 
illiquid long-term asset. By introducing uncertainty over its 
return we will also have to consider the possibility of 
information-based runs, thus complicating policies like 
suspension of deposit convertibility that could eliminate sunspot 
panics. We consider such issues in Chapter 4. Furthermore, 
Diamond and Dybvig assume that the proportion of early 
consumers is known with certainty at the aggregate level. We 
study the possibility of aggregate uncertainty over consumption 
time preference in Chapter 5. Finally the Diamond and Dybvig 
model concentrates in a domestic economy. We study the 
implications of the addition of a currency market in Chapter 6. 
" We raise again Cooper and Ross's concern over the true illiquidity 
of the long-term technology in Diamond and Dybvig's model. Although 
Diamond and Dybvig discuss the issue of illiquidity in their model, storage 
is completely dominated by the `illiquid' technology, whose premature 
liquidation yields the same result as storage. Cooper and Ross argue that 
Diamond and Dybvig's model demonstrates the insurance aspect of banking, 
but not the bank's role in providing liquidity. In our basic model we 
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3.3 General Framework 
Like Diamond and Dybvig our model has three periods 
(T=O, 1,2) and a continuum of agents whose measure is 
normalized to one, each endowed with one unit of good at T=O. 
These agents are ex-ante identical, and each faces a privately 
observed, uninsurable risk of being impatient (cares only about 
consumption in T=1) or patient (cares only about consumption in 
T=2). The liquidity shock is independently and identically 
distributed: with probability ;r they are early consumers, with 
(1-7r) late. Their types are revealed to them in period T=1. 
Consumption goods can be stored from one period to the 
next at no cost. Alternatively, and similarly to Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya, there is a long-lived productive technology, whose 
return is a random variable. At T=O, with probability 0 the return 
in T=2 is low R,, and with probability (1-0) it is high Rh. 
In contrast to Jacklin and Bhattacharya and in accordance 
with Cooper and Ross, we attempt to capture the irreversibility of 
this long-term investment by assuming that each unit of 
liquidation in T=1 yields only (1-r), where v =[0,1]. 12 Diamond 
incorporate Cooper and Ross's modifications to demonstrate this important 
aspect of intermediation. 
12 We will need to impose some restrictions on the parameter T as 
we progress with the analysis of the model (see footnote 17). 
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and Dybvig assumed z=0, thus ignoring early liquidation costs, 
while Jacklin and Bhattacharya at the other extreme assumed 
z =1, a zero return and thus complete irreversibility. 
One option is for agents to live in autarky. The ex-ante 
expected utility of an agent choosing autarky will be: 
UA 
-xu(CI)+A1-ir)IOu(C21) +(1-U)U(C2h)] (8) 
subject to: 
C, =1-I+(1-a)I 
c21=1-I+ IR, 
c2, =1- I+ IRh 
(9) 
Under autarky, and given our assumption of an illiquid 
long-term technology, this contract can lead to the inefficient 
premature liquidation of the economy's investments, since it fails 
to provide insurance against the agents' inherent uncertainty over 
their consumption timing. '3 
13 A market economy can offer better allocations than autarky (see 
Appendix 3.1). For a comparison between market outcomes and deposit 
contracts see Jacklin (1987), who observes that some form of market 
incompleteness is required for explaining the existence of banking, and 
Jacklin and Bhattacharya, who study the choice between deposit and equity. 
Jacklin and Bhattacharya show that non-traded deposit contracts may or may 
not be preferred to traded equity type contracts depending on the riskiness 
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Following Diamond and Dybvig, banks will design optimal 
contracts to provide insurance against agents' liquidity shock. We 
assume a sequential service constraint, which implies that 
contracts with consumption payments contingent on the total 
number of agents in line are inconsistent. To justify the 
constraint, we follow Wallace in assuming spatial separation of 
agents. If consumers are assumed to be isolated, then they will be 
prevented from co-ordinating their withdrawals. '4 
Consider program P, which solves for the first best: 
MaxUp 
=mc(cI)+P(1-'r)[Ou(c21)+(1-O)u(c2h)} (10) 
c, I 
subject to: 
MCI =1-I 
(1-n)c2, 
= 
IR, 
(1- 7r)c,, = IRh 
(11) 
of the underlying assets and on the nature and availability of information 
about these assets. 
1' From a historical point of view, this was interpreted by 
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) as a large number of geographically separated 
banks in the US due to prohibitions of interstate banking. Wallace's 
suggestion about the spatial separation can then be used to explain the 
shock needed to cause sunspot panics. As Chari (1989) points out the source 
for such variations in the demand for currency can be the agricultural 
community in the countryside. The nature of the banking system in the US 
Basic Model: Sunspot Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs 76 
where p<_1 is the discount factor, I is the amount invested in the 
risky illiquid technology, c, is the consumption promised to early 
consumers and c21, c2h the consumption allocated to late 
consumers conditional on the realized return of the long-term 
investment. 
P provides the solution for the case when the consumer's 
type is publicly observable in T=1. Alternatively, it may be that 
the consumer's type is not observable, but under specific values 
of the exogenous variables a patient consumer would have no 
incentive to run. That is when the following expression is 
satisfied: 
(c21)+(1-©)u(c2h)zu(cl) (12) 
If this expression is not satisfied, it will have to be added 
to P as an incentive compatibility constraint. " 
It is also important to make sure that the technology 
considered is efficient, productive and thus desirable for 
investment by the consumers: 
with reserve pyramiding would then cause country banks to behave as 
individual depositors withdrawing their reserves from city banks. 
15 This will not be necessary for our model as we claim shortly. 
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Ou(R, ) + (1- O)u(Rh) > u(1) (13) 
The expected utility from investing in the risky technology 
must be greater than that obtained from storage. 
3.4 The Contract 
Cl-,, 
Let the utility function take the form u(c) =, I- Y 
representing preferences with a relative risk aversion parameter 
y. We follow Jacklin and Bhattacharya in restricting the 
parameter to 0: 5 y <1. 
Also, following Jacklin and Bhattacharya, we give the 
following characteristics to the bank's contract: if R= Rh the 
bank pays a promised return c2, and if R=R, it pays 
RYRh 
of this 
promised return. The modified optimisation problem P looks like 
this: 
-r I-r 
MaxU, 
=lrC' + p(1-n)A'2 (14) 1-y 1-y 
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where A=(1-O)+O(R! )'-T, subject to: Rh 
7XI 
n c1ýýrc +ýl R 
)c2 
-1=0 (15) 
2= RhI h (1 ) 
which is the budget constraint of this program. 
We will now introduce an important assumption about the 
exogenous variables in this model. We assume A(pRh)'-'' >1 for 
y <1. This implies that we do not need to consider the incentive 
compatibility constraint. Even more importantly it ensures that 
we are not forcing the risk-averse consumers to accept a contract 
built on a technology that they would otherwise choose not to 
invest in. These claims are considered in Appendices 3.2 and 3.3 
respectively. 
The first order conditions are: 
7tcl-r 
-itzt=0 
P(1- r)Ac2-r 
-A 
(1- r) 
=0 pARhc2rr = ci-r Rh 
(16) 
(1-; r)c2 
-1=0 etc, + Rh 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget 
constraint. 
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Solving we get: 
1 
Cl 
_ 
7r +(1-7r)(PARti)y Rh 
(17) 
C2 = (PARK )" cl 
which form the basis for the contract between the bank and the 
depositors. 16 
16 We need to impose the following restriction on the parameter z: 
=c, 
(PARK)/ 
Rh 
This is necessary in order to ensure that the choice between storage 
and the long-term technology is not trivial. If the premature liquidation of 
the investment was to yield more than the bank's promised allocation for 
period T=1, storage would be completely dominated. 
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3.5 Sunspot 
Bank Runs 
Panics and Information-Based 
Suppose that suspension of convertibility is not available. 
As in Diamond and Dybvig, sunspot panics exist under such a 
contract. Banks are maturity transformers that take liquid 
deposits and invest part of the proceeds in illiquid assets. In 
doing so they pool risk and enhance welfare, but also create the 
possibility of self-fulfilling bank runs, a second equilibrium of 
the game which is inefficient. Because of the illiquidity of the 
long-term investment, a bank cannot honour all its liabilities at 
par if all creditors suddenly withdraw their loans. Under the `bad' 
equilibrium, it becomes rational for each creditor to pull his 
money out from a solvent borrower in T=1 if he expects that the 
other investors will behave in the same way. Given the existence 
of a sequential service constraint, if a panic was to take place the 
agents at the end of the line would receive less than promised due 
to low salvage values from premature liquidation. In order to 
avoid incurring such losses, they will choose to step to the front 
of the line, causing the very event they imagined. The bank's 
assets do not match demand and the bank fails and shuts down. 
Consumers' expectations prove to be self-fulfilling and the 
possibility of inefficient sunspot panics arises. 
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Diamond and Dybvig identified the suspension of 
convertibility as a mechanism that can eliminate the Pareto- 
inferior equilibrium of the bank's standard demand deposit 
contract. The implications of this policy for our specified 
environment are studied in Chapter 4. 
In this model sunspot panics coexist with information- 
based runs. At T=1 agents receive information and update their 
probability assessment for R =R1 from 0 to 9"'. 
17 This revised 
probability may make patient consumers to prefer the payment 
intended for impatient consumers. Define: 
' (18) (1-B)+9(' )-Rh 
17 This informational update can be the source of a significant 
problem with the design of the bank contract. Jacklin and Bhattacharya 
assumed that the bank is not aware of the possibility of bank runs due to 
interim updates in information regarding the return of the long-term 
investment. If banks were fully informed, they could design a contract to 
prevent runs by incorporating the worse possible informational update. 
Alonso (1996) took up the task of solving for this scenario. He showed that 
these run-proof contracts are possible, but not necessarily optimal ex-ante. 
Alonso demonstrated that banks may sometimes choose contracts subject to 
runs and the rationale behind such behaviour is that to let an event with 
very low probability (the receival of the worse possible information) to 
affect the whole allocation (as would happen in the design of a run-proof 
contract incorporating the low probability worse possible information 
scenario) might be worse in ex-ante utility terms than the contract that 
allows for runs. We demonstrate that Alonso's results stand in our 
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We want to find the critical value 9 above which patient 
consumers will choose to misrepresent their type. This will 
happen when: 
CZ1-r C't-r Ä< 
1-y 1-y 
implying: 
(19) 
I-rr -1 (L, 
-) 
''r 
-1 
I 
c2 (PARK )9>_ (20) 
(Rh)'-'-1 (R`)'-r-1 
Rh h 
Proof that 0 is above 0 is given in Appendix 3.5. 
environment in Appendix 3.4 and, for our analysis, we restrict theta values 
accordingly to exclude cases where run-proof contracts are optimal. 
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3.6 Review of The Model's Timing and Information 
Availability and Structure 
At this point it is worth reviewing the basic model's timing 
and the information availability and structure, since these 
assumptions are crucial for the models in each of the Chapters 
that follow. 
Decisions are made during time periods T=O and T=1. 
During time period T=O, the bank offers a contract which defines 
an agreement between a depositor and the bank. 
18 According to 
this contract, the depositor who accepts must give up his 
endowment of the good in period T=O in exchange for a riskless 
amount of period T=1 goods or a high but risky amount of period 
T=2 goods. Period T=2 goods are the product of an investment 
whose performance expectations are shared among all agents in 
the model. 
During the transition from period T=O and T=1 nature 
determines each depositors' type (either early or late 
18 Note that although each consumer faces a privately observed, 
uninsurable risk of being impatient (with probability 7r) or patient (with 
probability (1- 7v)), at the aggregate level this uncertainty is resolved. A 
proportion 7, of the continuum of ex-ante identical consumers whose 
measure is normalised to one, will derive utility by consuming in the first 
period, while a proportion (1-; r) will derive utility by consuming in the 
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consumption) and reveals it to each individual depositor and 
noone else (other depositors or the bank). Nature also produces 
an update regarding the state of the investment, revealed to both 
the bank's depositors and the bank. 
Early consumers will attempt to withdraw with certainty in 
period T=1, since they derive utility from consuming in period 
T=1 only. Whether they will be successful in obtaining a 
consumption allocation depends on the late consumers' decision 
and on the policies followed by the government. The crucial 
decision of late consumers is whether to withdraw in period T=1 
and store until consumption in period T=2 or withdraw and 
consume in period T=2. Their decision depends (a) in the case of 
sunspot panics on their belief about other late consumers' 
reaction and the policy followed by the government, while (b) in 
the case of information based bank runs it will depend on the 
informational update that nature produces regarding the risky 
investment during the transition from period T=1 to T=2. 
This structure is common in all Chapters. Whenever we 
need to add to the information structure or the decision process 
(for example by allowing for many banks or taking into account 
the possibility of currency crises) we will do so explicitly in the 
context of the relevant Chapter. 
last period of the model. This property is common knowledge and allows a 
bank to provide insurance against the consumers' liquidity shock. 
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3.7 Discussion 
The influential work of Diamond and Dybvig argued that 
bank contracts can be optimal and nevertheless lead to costly 
panics. The original model did however suffer from a number of 
difficulties related to its hypotheses. 
Cooper and Ross pointed out that although the banks in 
Diamond and Dybvig's paper did provide insurance to agents 
against the unlucky outcome of being an early consumer, they did 
not provide liquidity to the economy. We incorporate the changes 
introduced by Cooper and Ross in order to make the investment 
choice between storage and the long-term illiquid technology a 
non-trivial one. 
We also assume the spatial separation of agents in the 
economy and pay particular attention in respecting the sequential 
service constraint, also known as the first-come first-served 
constraint, which stems from this assumption. Diamond and 
Dybvig were criticised by Wallace for violating this constraint 
while studying deposit insurance, a policy to battle uncertainty of 
early withdrawals at the aggregate level. We study aggregate 
uncertainty of consumption timing in Chapter 5 and assume the 
spatial separation throughout our study. We also avoid writing 
contracts contingent on the number of early withdrawals, as this 
would be a clear violation of the sequential service constraint. 
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Perhaps the most important feature of our basic model is 
the co-existence of sunspot panics and information-based bank 
runs. If we accept that both types of banking crises are possible 
(see Section 2.1.6 for the empirical evidence on this subject), 
then any policy considerations must be based on a model that is 
capable of illustrating aspects of panics and runs. In Chapter 4 
we study suspension of convertibility and its desirability in such 
an environment. 
In Chapter 6 we offer an extension to the Diamond and 
Dybvig model that opens up the domestic economy model by 
adding a currency market. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) 
document the simultaneous occurrence of balance of payments 
and banking crises and point to the importance of their joint 
study. Nevertheless, their empirical study offers no light on the 
direction of causation. Our results highlight that the trigger of 
twin crises can originate at either part of the economy. 
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Appendix 3.1 
Consider the possibility of trade in the Diamond and 
Dybvig environment, by opening a financial market in T=1. Late 
consuming agents can now trade the good that they left in storage 
for the rights to the long-term technology that the early 
consumers hold. Similarly, early consuming agents can trade their 
rights to the long-term technology in exchange for the good that 
was left in storage by the late consumers. Let P denote the price 
attached to the rights of one unit of good in period T=2. 
Ex-ante identical agents will maximise the following 
expected utility: 
vID&D 
_ 
(c1) 
+ P(1- nT)u(c2) (21) 
subject to: 
c, =1-I +PIR 
c2=1PI +IR 
(22) 
The equilibrium allocation for the market economy in this 
variant of the Diamond and Dybvig model is c, =1, C2= R, 
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P=1 
. 
19 Note that the market allocation is the same as the autarky 
R 
one, since the premature liquidation of the long-term technology 
yields the same return as storage, making the choice between 
11 
storage and productive technology under autarky trivial. 
If we alter the autarky case to consider lower possible 
values for premature liquidation of the long-term technology we 
get considerably different results. Let each unit of liquidation of 
the long-term technology in T=1 yield only (1-z), where 
zE [0,1] 
. 
20 
Under autarky agents now maximise ex-ante utility as given 
by (1) subject to the following constraints: 
c, =1-I +I(1-z)<-1 
c2 =1-I+IR=1+I(R-1)_R 
(23) 
19 To see why the price P of one unit of T=2 good in period T=1 (thus 
the price of the long-term technology in T=1) is 
R, 
consider the two 
possible alternatives. If >R then the long-term investment dominates the 
storage option and early consumers will be offering the long-term 
investment for sale but there will be no buyers, making the price to fall to 
P=O. Similarly, if P< 
I, 
no one will invest in the long-term investment 
in period T=0 and when consumers try to buy it in period T=I the price will 
soar to P=oo. 
20 We also make this assumption in our basic model. Note that 
Diamond and Dybvig assumed r=0, thus ignoring early liquidation costs. 
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In this case the allocation under a market economy is 
Pareto superior to autarky, since there is no inefficient premature 
liquidation of the illiquid long-term investment. Nevertheless, the 
market economy is not Pareto optimal, unlike the allocation 
achieved under banking arrangements. See Freixas and Rochet 
(1998) for a detailed exposition. 
Appendix 3.2 
The expression that needs to be satisfied for a viable 
contract is A 
12 i-r 
> 
Cl t-r 
. 
From the first order condition in 
YY 
expression (17) we have that c2 =(pAR, )yct. 
Plugging the one expression into the other gives 
A(pRh)''" >I for y<1. This is the assumption used so that the 
need for including incentive compatibility constraints will not 
arise. Notice that this assumption occurs naturally as we show in 
Appendix 3.3. 
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Appendix 3.3 
Let us consider the constraint imposed more carefully. We 
do this for y<1: 
A(PRh )'-r >1 
where A=(1-6)+6(R')`-'. If we substitute for A: Rh 
(24) 
[(1-0)+0(R& )1-r](PRh)'-r >1 
h 
(25) 
[(1- 0)Rh'-r + 0R, 1-r ] p'-r >1 
Now also consider when the available technology will be 
preferred to storage by the risk-averse investors: 
-r ýr 1y 
L(1-D)Rý' +0 R! ]p>1-PpC(1-9)Rti'-r+0R, ' ]>1 (26) 
YYY 
That is the expected utility derived from investing in the 
risky technology must be greater from the utility from storage. 
As p approaches one then expressions (25) and (26) 
converge. Thus the assumption made ensures that the technology 
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is not forced on the risk-averse consumers by the design of the 
contract, but it is seen as productive, efficient and an investment 
that they would choose to invest in. 
Appendix. 3.4 
We follow Alonso in assuming that the interim 
informational update takes the form of a signal s indicating the 
return of the long-term technology through an updated probability 
of a low return O. 
Let O= z9, + (I 
- 
z)02 
, 
where 0, >02. In other words, in 
period T=0 it is known that with probability z the interim 
information will update the probability of a low return to 9, (i. e. 
s =1), while with probability (1- z) the interim information will 
update the probability of a low return to 02 (i. e. s=2), where the 
signal s =1 corresponds to the worse possible scenario. 
Just like Alonso and Jacklin and Bhattacharya we assume 
that the contract cannot be conditioned on s. The run-proof 
contract will then satisfy the optimisation problem as given by 
(14), subject to the budget constraint (15) and the additional `no- 
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'ýr 
-r 
run even in the worse case scenario' constraint A, 
c2 
? 
c1 
, 1-y 1-y 
)'-'. where A, =(1-6, )+6, (R, 
b 
Since 9, is the worse possible informational update, the 
inclusion of this constraint in the maximization program ensures 
that late consumers will never prefer the early consumer's 
allocation over theirs and will never cause an information-based 
bank run. To differentiate between the solutions of the two 
contracts, we attach the capital letter A as subscript to the 
solutions of the run-proof program. 
The true ex-ante utilities of these two contracts, given the 
above information structure, will be: 
r I-r I-r t-r 
UTP 
=(1-z) mac' +P(1-7r)A2 ýZ +z ;r CL 
I-r 
+P(1- r)(27) 1-y 1-y 1-y 1-y 
for the contract subject to runs, where A2 =(1-82)+92(RL )I-' and 
h 
CL =1- I+ (1- r)1 (we assume that the interim update is received 
by all agents, in which case the bank will expect an information- 
based bank run, will liquidate all investments and will distribute 
all funds equally among all depositors), and: 
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-r 1-r t-r 
l-r 
UTA =(1-Z) irýlA +P(1-n')A2 2A +z 7v +P(1-7r)A, 
ýZA 
1-y 1-y 1-y 1-7, 
(28) 
for the run-proof contract. 
Comparing the true ex-ante utilities we can derive the 
critical information level O above which the true ex-ante utility 
of the contract subject to runs is higher than the true ex-ante 
utility of the run-proof contract: 
UrP >UTA 
t-r I-r t-r l-r 
aZ CL + P(1- Z) C` > CIA + P(1-, r)AJA C2A (29) 1-y 1-y 1-y 1-y 
(7t + p(1-, r))cL'-r 
_ IA1-r 
-1 1-r 
a6'' > 
P(1-lr)c2A 
R t-r 
-1 
F R 
where A, '' (1- ©, '') + 9, '' (R, )ý-r Rh 
This result matches expectations since a high 9, '' implies a 
low probability z of the worse possible outcome materializing. In 
that case, the run-proof contract, which allows a very low 
probability event to affect the whole allocation, will be worse in 
ex-ante utility terms compared to the contract subject to runs. To 
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allow for contracts subject to runs in the text, we need to assume 
that 6>_6, `'. 
To provide a numerical example let 0=0.5,01 = 0.9, z=0.2, 
n=0.5, y=0.5, p=0.9, Rh =2, R, =0.5 and r=0.3. In that case, 
the run-proof contract offers allocations c, =0.75 and c2 =2.49 by 
investing I= 0.62, and achieves a true expected ex-ante utility of 
UTA =1.93. Alternatively, the contract subject to runs offers 
allocations c1 = 1.05 and c2 =1.91 by investing I=0.48, distributes 
CL =0.86 in case of an expected information-based run and 
achieves a true expected ex-ante utility of U. =1.97>U7-A, 
satisfying the assumption A(pRh)'-'' =1.006>1. 
Appendix 3.5 
Notice that 4= 
A-1 To prove that 6>0, substitute for 
(RI )'-T 
Rh 
0 and 0: 
(CL )1-r 
-1 C2 
> 
A-1 
(RL )I-r (RI 
Rh Rh 
(30) 
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leading to the necessary and sufficient condition: 
- 
c2'-r) cl'-r 
1-y 1-y 
(31) 
which is satisfied, since our initial assumption of A(pR, )'"' >1 for 
r<1 is derived from this condition. This is shown in Appendix 
3.2. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Suspension of Convertibility: 
Contagion and Policy Dilemmas 
4.1 Introduction 
Suspending deposit convertibility can be seen as a violation 
of a bank's contractual obligations to holders of its demandable 
debt. Recent events in Argentina (December 2001) illustrate this 
argument. When faced with an increased number of withdrawals, 
the Argentinean government imposed a partial, followed by full, 
suspension of convertibility, a measure that was greeted with 
fierce criticism, questioning its legality, leading to riots, violence 
and a procession of presidents- for-a-day. t 
In this Chapter we use the basic model laid out in Chapter 
3 to study economic arguments for and against suspension of 
1 Such suspensions at the national or state level occurred in the US 
in August 1814, Fall 1819, May 1837, October 1839, October 1857, 
September 1873, July 1893, October 1907 and March 1933, according to 
Sprague (1910) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963). 
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deposit convertibility. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have shown 
that such a policy, when stated explicitly and in advance, can 
eliminate bank failures from random withdrawal risk, termed as 
sunspot panics. Nevertheless, in an environment vulnerable to 
information-based runs a strict rule of suspension may not be 
optimal. Imposing such a restriction removes the advantage of 
discretionary liquidation of the long-term technology, which may 
be desirable if future returns are expected to be low, and 
eliminates the signalling property of suspension, which may limit 
contagion to the rest of the banks in the economy. 
2 
Since suspension of convertibility is subject to such a 
trade-off, policy makers should turn to the empirical evidence 
studying the causes of bank failures before deciding on the 
implementation of such a strict rule. We offer an alternative 
solution to this dilemma, by exploiting the middle ground 
between discretion and rules. We show that discretion based on 
rules may be the optimal policy independent of the empirical 
studies' conclusions. 
2 We also ask whether the crisis is solitary or systemic, what is the 
interest of the depositors, what should be the speed of reaction, and deal 
with issues of confidentiality, and concerns about interference with the 
market forces, matters that are central to the resolution of banking crises 
according to the Bank of England Handbook in Central Banking (Latter 
(1997), p. 25). 
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Suspension of convertibility is central to the issue of bank 
runs and panics. Diamond and Dybvig identified suspension of 
convertibility as a mechanism that can eliminate the Pareto- 
inferior equilibrium of the bank's standard demand deposit 
contract. 3 Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), by restricting 
withdrawals to specific proportions also make this assumption 
indirectly. 4 
Engineer (1989) shows that in a four-period version of the 
Diamond and Dybvig model, the policy of suspending deposit 
convertibility is not as effective and may not eliminate the bank 
run equilibrium, which can occur even if the bank can adjust new 
withdrawal payments after observing a high number of 
withdrawals. Gorton (1985), in an environment of incomplete 
information about the bank's investments, portrays a bank's 
suspension of convertibility as a signal to depositors that 
continuation of the long-term investments is mutually beneficial. 
Selgin (1993) shows that bank suspension contracts may be a 
This assumes that aggregate consumption demand is certain. If 
withdrawals are stochastic however, a bank-run will be averted but optimal 
risk sharing will not be achieved. We study uncertainty over consumption 
timing at the aggregate level in Chapter 5. 
4 In Chari and Jagannathan (1988) suspension of convertibility is 
crucial for the existence of their bank contract and in yielding superior 
allocations to the market equilibrium in terms of ex-ante expected utility, 
leaving however ex-post some individuals worse off than others. 
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low-cost alternative to deposit insurance given the absence of 
regulatory interference. 
In terms of welfare, following an information-based bank 
run, we find that the early liquidation of the long-term 
technology may be the best reaction if the future value of the 
bank's investments is expected to be extremely low. However, if 
a strict rule of suspension of convertibility is followed by the 
government, such optimal reaction may not be an option. This 
leads to considerable losses to depositors and would explain the 
bad reputation of suspension of payments. 5 
We also choose to abstract from the inter-bank market as 
the medium of contagion, in order to study information as a 
propagation mechanism of banking crises. 6 In recent years, an 
emerging empirical literature has focused on the nature of 
contagion. The evidence generally supports the information-based 
approach to panics, and we consider a number of these studies in 
Section 4.4. 
s Such losses motivated the violent events in Argentina in 2001 and 
led to the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913. 
6 Theoretical papers on the benefits of inter-bank markets and the 
diversification of stochastic liquidity risk include Bhattacharya and Gale 
(1987), Bhattacharya and Fulgieri (1994) and Chari (1989). Theoretical 
papers on contagion through inter-bank links include Rochet and Tirole 
(1996), Freixas et al (2000), Allen and Gale (2000). An alternative approach 
on inter-bank co-ordination, with stochastic liquidity shocks coexisting with 
asset risk shocks, is presented in Koppl and MacGee (2001). 
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Theoretical papers that break away from the traditional 
inter-bank propagation mechanism are those of Bougheas (1999) 
and Chen (1999). Bougheas presents an overlapping generations 
model based on Jacklin and Bhattacharya, where bank failures 
become contagious only when the depressed state of the economy 
signals that the asset returns across the banking system are 
positively correlated. Chen, alternatively, concentrates on the 
importance of the number of failed banks acting as a signal about 
the prospects of the banking industry. Chen's analysis is similar 
to ours in two ways. We both assume that the timing of revelation 
about the health of long-term investments is different for 
different banks, although they all receive a privately observed 
signal within the intermediate period, after investment decisions 
have been made, but before full maturity of their projects is 
reached. Furthermore, we both term as panic the decision made 
from depositors to react to early information (the number of 
failed banks in Chen's model, a bank run and the government's 
reaction in our model) and not wait for more bank specific 
information. 
We show how the government's reaction, given a choice of 
suspending deposit convertibility, to an information-based bank 
run, sends a crucial signal to the depositors of the rest of the 
banks in the economy regarding the state of their banks' 
investments. Under a rule of suspension of convertibility, such 
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signalling is unavailable and contagious panic may cause the 
failure of solvent banks. 
Given a rule of suspension of convertibility, sunspot panics 
are eliminated, but no early liquidation of bad performing assets 
is allowed (even if it is optimal to follow such a strategy), and no 
signals regarding the state of the economy's investments can be 
sent to panicking depositors of other banks in the economy (even 
though this may mitigate contagion). Regarding the optimality of 
a rule of suspension, the answer depends on the empirical 
evidence on the causes of bank failures. If sunspot panics 
dominate the banking sector, a rule of suspension is optimal. 
Otherwise discretion should be applied. We offer an alternative 
policy, that is not contingent on the conclusions offered by 
empirical studies, by setting up rules for a discretionary policy to 
be implemented explicitly and in advance. 
Building on the basic model of Chapter 3, we present the 
advantages (elimination of sunspot panics) and drawbacks (first 
in terms of welfare and then in terms of contagion control) of the 
unconditional suspension of convertibility rule. This is followed 
by a consideration of the available empirical evidence on sunspot 
panics and information based bank runs in an attempt to offer a 
solution to the dilemma that this trade-off presents, before we put 
forward our suggestion for optimal policy making. 
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4.2 Rules vs. Discretion: Welfare Comparisons 
Under a policy of suspension of deposit convertibility, the 
government is obliged to suspend payments following the 
observation of a run or panic to a bank. This eliminates the 
possibility of sunspot panics, but has two important drawbacks 
following an information-based run. It removes the advantage of 
discretionary liquidation of the long-term technology, which may 
be optimal for the depositor's welfare (studied in this Section), 
and eliminates the signalling property of suspension, which may 
limit contagion to the rest of the banks in the economy (studied 
in Section 4.3). 
Using the basic model of Chapter 3, we consider and 
compare the ex-post welfare of depositors under the two possible 
states. If no suspension takes place, the bank will fail by 
liquidating its long-term investments in order to make payments 
to all depositors withdrawing. If suspension of deposit 
convertibility is in place, early liquidation of the illiquid long- 
term investments is not allowed and the bank is kept alive by 
forbidding excess withdrawals in period T=1. 
We first analyse the case where the government does not 
suspend deposit convertibility when an information-based run 
takes place. In that case full liquidation of the long-term illiquid 
technology takes place and the proceeds are distributed to 
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withdrawing depositors in an equal basis. The ex-post utility 
level achieved is: 
UNSoc L 
-r 1-y 
1-r 
p(1-7r) 
C 
1-y 
(32) 
where CL=1-I+(1-z)I. 
If alternatively the government suspended deposit 
convertibility following the receival of the informational update 
0N >9 and the information-based run, liquidation of the long- 
term illiquid investments would not be allowed. As late 
consumers run to the bank because of their preference for the 
early consumer's allocation, they give up their rights to the 
period T=2 promised allocations. We assume that under this 
scenario, all available resources for distribution in the last period 
of our model are distributed equally among early consumers who 
received nothing in period T=1 and late consumers withdrawing 
in T=2, that is a total of (1-; r) consumers. 7 Early consumers 
receive no utility from this allocation. 
7 Just like in normal times of no runs, (1-; r) consumers withdraw in 
period T=2, but, unlike normal times, the composition of this mass changes 
in the case of a run. Instead of only late consumers, the mass now consists 
of early and late consumers. 
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To derive the ex-post utility level under suspension of 
convertibility consider the following: For the ;r people receiving 
cl in period T=1, a proportion ;r of them will be early consumers 
and (1-7r) of them will be late consumers. From the (1-, r) people 
receiving c2 with probability (1-9') and 
R` 
c2 with probability 
h 
B", (ir-; c2) will be early and (1-; r)-ir(1-7r) will be late. Thus: 
l-r 1-r 
Usoc 
= Ir 2C 
cl 
y+ 
Pn(l 
- 
7c) 
C cl 
y+ 
P(1- Ir) 2 A" 
C12 
1-r 
Y 
(33) 
ý-r 
where AN =1-0N +O 
R 
Rý 
We can now find the critical value of information 6 below 
which suspension of convertibility is optimal and thus 
UNSoc <Usoc. Let A =1-0 +9(Rrh )'-r and substitute for Usac: 
UNSoc < USOC 
(34) 
ae< 
B-1 
(RI )I-r 
-1 Rh 
where: 
Suspension of Convertibility: Contagion and Policy Dilemmas 107 
'-r 
c 
1-r 
UNSoC 
-[7i2 
Cl 
Y+ 
p7r(1-7r)1I 
YI B 
=-r 
(35) 
P(1- ; r)2 C2 
Y 
For 0 "' >9 the optimal reaction to an information-based 
run is to avoid suspension of deposit convertibility. This result 
matches expectations, since it is sensible to suspend 
convertibility when the investments are worth saving (low values 
of bad information), while for worse information and lower 
expected returns from the investments, the liquidation value is 
preferred. 
The government will act in the interest of the depositors of 
the bank that is about to fail, and its reaction will be crucial for 
the future of the bank. Our findings suggest that, for lower values 
of bad information, suspension of convertibility will be preferred, 
since the portfolio investments are in a relative good state and it 
is worth avoiding their premature liquidation. This is achieved by 
keeping the bank alive. For higher values of realized 0' the 
optimal policy will be to avoid suspending deposit convertibility, 
thus allowing the early liquidation of the long-term investments 
and the failure of the bank. This follows from the belief that the 
portfolio investments are in a bad state and not worth saving. 
However, under an explicit and pre-announced rule of 
suspension of convertibility the option of liquidation is not 
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available. Thus, when considering information-based runs, our 
ex-post welfare analysis suggests that a discretionary approach to 
suspension of convertibility would be optimal. 
4.3 Information-Based Contagious Panics 
We now study the possibility of contagion, the effect of 
suspending deposit convertibility on the economy, the optimal 
speed of the government's reaction and issues of confidentiality. 
We particularly point out the importance of suspension of 
convertibility as a signalling mechanism to the depositors of 
banks in the rest of the economy. We show that, if discretion is 
followed, suspending convertibility may save the local region 
from contagious panic effects, associated with an assumed 
positive correlation in the returns of investments in the region. 
Suppose that banks in the economy diversify risk by 
investing in a number of investment projects. Portfolios exhibit 
ex-ante the same return and risk characteristics and there exists a 
positive, yet not perfect, correlation in the returns of portfolio 
investments. Furthermore, assume that the timing of information 
revelation about portfolio investments' returns is different for 
different banks, although all banks receive a privately observed 
signal within the intermediate period, after investment decisions 
Suspension of Convertibility: Contagion and Policy Dilemmas 109 
have been made, but before full maturity of their projects is 
reached. 
The depositors of the rest of the banks in the economy, 
observing the run in one bank, will update their beliefs about the 
return of their own banks' portfolios, since they know that 
investments in the economy are positively correlated, and will 
have to make a decision about making their own withdrawals. 
They will base their decision on how bad they believe the 
information received about the portfolio investments of the bank 
that is experiencing the run was, and how closely correlated their 
bank's investments are to the one that is failing. 
Consider the process that the late consumers of the rest of 
the banks in the economy use to make their choice between early 
and late withdrawal. Assume initially that they observe the exact 
updated information (Os' z 9) that caused the run in the bank in 
trouble, and that they know the exact correlation of returns (r) 
between their bank and the one that is experiencing the run. 
Then, the updating mechanism, which will be used to revise the 
probability of a bad return from their previous belief 0 to the 
updated value U, is: 
0 
=r©N (36) 
Suspension of Convertibility: Contagion and Policy Dilemmas 110 
With perfect information, depositors will be able to revise 
efficiently the probability of a low return for their bank's long- 
term investment and decide whether to run or not. They will 
compare this value to the critical value above which they would 
prefer the allocation intended for early consumers. 
We now drop the assumption that they observe the exact 
signal that caused the run in the bank in trouble. From their 
knowledge of the occurrence of a bank run, depositors of the rest 
of the banks in the economy can make an important inference. 
The information received by the depositors of the troubled bank 
must have induced them to update their probability of a bad 
return from their bank's investment above the critical value 
9 
given by (20). Thus, the value of the realized ON must lie 
somewhere between 0 and I. The updating mechanism takes the 
following form in this case: 
4'=r JqONdO1 
0N 
-e 
(37) 
where we assume that ON can take any value over the interval 
[0,1] and rj stands for the conditional probability attached to the 
possible values of ON, given that it lies inside the above interval. 
Depositors will compare this value to the critical value 
above which they would prefer the allocation intended for early 
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consumers and decide whether to run or not. We call their 
decision to withdraw, under the given circumstances, contagious 
panic, as it will be based not on information about their own 
bank's specific returns, but on the observation of a run in another 
bank. 
Due to this uncertainty in the decision making process of 
the depositors, we argue that the government's reaction to the run 
will send an important signal about the health of investments in 
the economy, crucial in determining the spread of the contagion. 
8 
If the government reacted by suspending deposit 
convertibility, depositors could safely assume that this was done 
because the long-term investment was in a relatively good state 
and was worth saving from early liquidation. 
9 As we showed 
earlier in this Section, this will be the case when ON <j, 
8 Unlike the depositors of other banks, we assume that the 
government learns the exact state of the portfolio of the bank under attack. 
This is a reasonable assumption, since it is normal for authorities to gain 
access to the balance sheets of banks in trouble, before decisions regarding 
intervention are made. 
9 We assume that the government will not suspend convertibility to 
influence and avert depositors of other banks in the economy from 
withdrawing early, but will only suspend if it finds it optimal and in the 
interest of the troubled bank's depositors to do so. We make this choice, 
because in a longer horizon model with repeated interactions, consistency 
would become important, and such behaviour would be inefficient and 
undesirable. Furthermore we could assume that the responsibility of 
suspending deposit convertibility could be assigned to an independent body, 
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changing the higher limit of the possible values that ON may take. 
Note that 9 is less than one. The updating mechanism is 
transformed in the following way: 
_ 
BNB 
6"=r fi7'0 "d6" 
oll=e 
(38) 
where 9" can take any value over the interval [0,0] and rý 
stands for the conditional probability attached to the possible 
values of ©", given that it lays inside the above interval. 
The consequence is that 9" < U'. Suspension of 
convertibility has the effect of lowering depositors' beliefs about 
the probability of a low return for their banks' long-term 
investments. Thus, contagion by panic, in an economy where a 
positive correlation of asset return exists, is minimized by the 
observation of suspension. 
Depositors of banks with portfolio investments of a high 
positive correlation to the investments of the bank that is 
experiencing the run will choose to withdraw immediately. 
However, depositors of banks with lower degrees of correlation, 
will face greater uncertainty about their bank's portfolio returns 
and the observation of suspension of convertibility will become 
not constrained by political considerations and focusing on the long-term 
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important in their decision making. Such a reaction by the 
government will signal a relatively good state of the investments 
of the bank under attack, and thus they may choose not to run, 
since there is a high probability that their bank's portfolio is in a 
good state. Thus, the reaction of the government to a bank run 
becomes crucial to the decision making process of the depositors 
of other banks, and may save the economy from a contagious 
panic. 
The speed of the government's reaction becomes crucial as 
well. If the government decides to suspend deposit convertibility, 
the announcement of such a policy should take place 
immediately, in order to affect the beliefs of depositors as early 
as possible. Without this information, depositors may believe that 
the portfolio investments of their banks are in a worse condition 
than they may actually be, and this may result to more panics 
against solvent banks in the economy. 
Issues of confidentiality are also relevant to our analysis. It 
could be argued that the government should make available 
information on the exact state of the troubled bank's portfolio 
investments, and allow all banks with low portfolio returns to 
fail. However the bank runs are not caused by expectations that 
banks will not honour their contracts. Instead late consumers 
choose to withdraw early and misrepresent their type, because 
stability of the banking system. 
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they find that ex-post they prefer the allocation promised to early 
consumers. For this reason, the government has the right to 
secrecy in 
, 
order to prevent such runs. Nevertheless, if the 
information to be made public suggested a state of the 
investments better than the one that would be inferred by the 
simple observation of a suspension of convertibility, it may be 
optimal to allow public access to all information about the bank 
experiencing the run. 
4.4 Optimal Policy 
Since an explicitly pre-announced rule of suspension of 
deposit convertibility presents such serious drawbacks in an 
environment where information-based bank runs are present, its 
implementation should depend on the probability that such events 
take place in the real world. 
Despite the importance for policy making of answering the 
question on the causes of bank failures, not much empirical work 
has been done in the field. Deposit behaviour has been studied by 
Park (1991), Saunders and Wilson (1996), Calomiris and Mason 
(1997) and Schumacher (2000). Park shows that bank failures are 
contagious due to the lack of bank-specific information and that 
depositors make withdrawal decisions based on the condition of 
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the banking system as a whole. Calomiris and Mason also find 
that asymmetric information between depositors and banks can 
precipitate a general run of banks. Saunders and Wilson results 
are consistent with the presence of a significant number of 
informed depositors who distinguish among ex ante failing and 
non-failing banks. Schumacher, just like the previous studies, 
supports the information-based theory approach, while also 
noting the importance of spillover effects that the suspensions of 
troubled banks have on similar banks. 
Aharony and Swary (1996) undertake an empirical study on 
contagious bank failures, which further supports our view that the 
failure of one bank will have an important impact on banks that 
are perceived by depositors as having similar portfolios to the 
one held by the failed bank. They use three observable bank 
characteristics as the interim private information that depositors 
may use for their assessment of the riskiness of their bank's long- 
lived assets: the geographical distance of the solvent bank's 
headquarters from the headquarters of the failed banks (a short 
distance suggests a high similarity of loan portfolio composition), 
the size of solvent banks (similar size indicates similarity in the 
type of business in which banks engage) and the capital ratio (as 
a proxy for solvency). Studying five large-bank failures in the 
Southwest region of the US during the mid-1980's, their findings 
(distance and capital adequacy negatively related to the 
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magnitude of the contagion effect, whereas size positively 
related) are consistent with an information-based contagion 
hypothesis and motivate our choice for this particular channel of 
contagion. 
Aharony and Swary (1983), Swary (1986), Karafiath et al. 
(1991) also make use of bank stock returns to make inferences 
about the causes of bank contagion. These studies largely support 
the information-based view of bank runs, which meets further 
approval by Gorton (1988), Calomiris and Gorton (1991) and 
Donaldson (1992), that stress the importance of economic shocks 
for banking crises. 
Despite the evidence pointing to an information-based view 
of the banking sector panics, policy makers must remain cautious 
regarding their decisions. We offer an alternative to the extremes 
of having a strict rule or pure discretion when considering the 
policy of suspension of deposit convertibility. 
Suppose that the government makes explicit ex-ante that 
for all runs and panics there will be an immediate suspension of 
convertibility, but for one exception to this rule. If the future 
profits of the troubled bank are predicted to be extremely low, 
liquidation will be allowed and the bank will fail. 
Sunspot panics are eliminated, and discretion can be 
followed in the case of an information-based run. If liquidation of 
the long-term investment is optimal, which will be the case when 
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the illiquid investment is predicted to yield low returns in the 
future, the bank will be closed down. If future returns are 
expected to be relatively good, suspension takes place and a 
signal that it is worth keeping long-term investments and banks 
alive is sent to depositors across the economy. In our view, this is 
the optimal policy regarding suspension of convertibility and has 
the additional advantage that it is not contingent on the policy 
makers' beliefs on the causes of bank failures. 
4.5 Discussion 
The question on the cause of banking panics and runs is an 
empirical one and remains largely unanswered. This uncertainty 
would suggest that policy makers have to consider the importance 
of both sunspot panics and information-based runs. In this model 
we consider an environment where sunspot panics and 
information-based runs may co-exist, while we respect the 
sequential service constraint and we take into account the 
importance of liquidation costs. We find that the existence of 
suspension of convertibility as a policy, although it has the effect 
of eliminating the random withdrawal risk that causes sunspot 
panics, it may not be optimal in an environment vulnerable to 
information-based runs. Imposing such a restrictive rule removes 
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the advantage of discretionary liquidation of the long-term 
technology, which may be optimal if future bank profits are 
expected to be low, and eliminates the signalling property of 
suspension, which may limit contagion to the rest of the banks in 
an economy. 
By comparing the ex-post depositors' utilities with and 
without suspension following an information-based run, we find 
that a pre-announced explicit rule of suspension is not always 
optimal. We show that suspension of convertibility is optimal if 
the evaluation of future bank profits is relatively optimistic, 
while for worse information about portfolio returns full 
liquidation should be allowed. Furthermore, suspending deposit 
convertibility in a world of policy discretion and where banks 
share similar portfolio-return characteristics could lessen the 
contagious effect of panics, by signalling a low value of bad 
information. 
If we 
- 
accept that both sunspot and information-based 
banking crises are possible, then this model would suggest that 
the ex-ante commitment to suspension of convertibility can be too 
restrictive and should receive more thought, since its welfare 
implications depend on the type of the crisis. 
We offer an alternative solution to the trade-off problem 
that the rule of suspension of deposit convertibility presents, a 
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solution that is independent of the empirical evidence on the type 
of bank failures. 
A discretionary policy of suspension of deposit 
convertibility may be the best option if based on specific pre- 
announced rules. The ex-ante announcement of suspension of 
convertibility in all instances, except than when the bank's future 
expected returns are predicted to be extremely low, would 
eliminate the rationale of sunspot panics and would allow 
liquidation of long-term investments when this is optimal 
following an information-based run. Suspension following an 
information-based run would also lessen the contagious effect of 
panic, by signalling a not-so-bad state of the economy's 
investments. 
An interesting extension to this model would be to study 
the structure of correlation knowledge among banks. Allen and 
Gale (2000) consider the structure of interregional claims among 
banks for their study on contagion. We could study the 
importance of similar structures, using our method of analysis. 
Disconnected and incomplete structures would then become 
crucial for determining the spread of an information-based 
contagion panic. 
It would also be interesting to compare the costs and 
effectiveness of suspension of deposit convertibility versus 
deposit insurance in mitigating contagious panic in the banking 
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sector. Deposit insurance emerges as a mechanism to remove the 
incentive for early withdrawal under bank panics caused by 
asymmetric information about the condition of banks. Calomiris 
and Masson (1997) note that if the risk of solvent banks failing 
under an asymmetric information panic is not high, then a federal 
safety net might not be desirable. They identify inter-bank 
cooperation as a mechanism for reducing the risk of failure of 
solvent banks. In this Chapter we have shown that the 
announcement of suspension of convertibility can have a similar 
effect. Thus such a policy could also present an alternative to 
costly deposit insurance and would be worth investigating. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Aggregate Uncertainty about Consumption 
Time Preference: In Search of the Optimal Solution 
5.1 Introduction 
One basic function of banks is to provide consumers with 
liquidity insurance. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show how 
intermediaries can facilitate agents' uncertainty over the timing 
of their future consumption needs by the provision of deposit 
contracts. In addition, they demonstrate how these contracts can 
be both optimal and lead to banking panics. 
In an environment where long-term investments are illiquid 
(in the sense that in the event of early liquidation only fire-sale 
prices are obtainable), agents with inherent uncertainty about 
consumption time preference turn to banks to insure against the 
unlucky outcome of being early consumers. When backed by a 
policy of suspension of convertibility, the deposit contracts 
offered by the intermediaries provide optimal risk sharing, 
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without the possibility of sunspot panics. ' However, the 
intermediaries' insurance provision and the panic-free 
environment that the suspension of deposit convertibility ensures, 
crucially depend on the assumption that at the aggregate there is 
no uncertainty, meaning that the time pattern of aggregate 
consumption is predictable. 
In this Chapter we ask what happens when uncertainty over 
the timing of consumption is not eliminated at the aggregate 
level. 
We show that Wallace's (1988) result that contracts with 
consumption allocations contingent on the order of withdrawal 
can do better in terms of ex-ante utility when compared to 
contracts that do not form such dependencies remains valid even 
in a richer environment, that includes storage possibilities and 
fire-sale prices following the premature liquidation of 
investments in long-term technologies. 2 We also note that such 
contracts arc subject to inefficiencies, since they involve either 
excess storage, premature liquidations or a combination of the 
two. 
'Nevertheless suspension of deposit convertibility does not 
eliminate information-based bank runs. See Chapter 4. 
= This result depends on the assumption that it is impossible to form 
an inter-bank arrangement. If inter-bank coordination is possible, a contract 
based on borrowing and lending among banks will be the optimal solution to 
the aggregate uncertainty problem under the conditions set in our 
environment. 
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Furthermore, following Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), we 
study the design of inter-bank cooperation contracts, under which 
borrowing and lending takes place between participating banks in 
order to resolve aggregate uncertainty over the proportion of 
early withdrawals. In contrast to Bhattacharya and Gale's paper 
we choose to respect the first-come first-served constraint and we 
show that in our environment this borrowing-lending solution is 
the best feasible arrangement and is not subject to second-best 
distortions, arising due to binding incentive compatibility 
constraints. We also note that, in contrast to Wallace's solutions 
as laid out in our richer environment, an inter-bank arrangement 
does not face excess storage or premature liquidation 
incfficicncics. 
Diamond and Dybvig identify the possibility of aggregate 
risk and try to resolve the issue by considering government 
deposit insurance. Despite the proportion of early consumers 
being stochastic, they argue that such a policy will achieve the 
optimal risk sharing as a unique Nash cquilibrium. The 
mechanism they identify can also be described as a tax. This tax 
is applicd to carly withdrawcrs cx-post, aftcr the proportion of 
early consumers has been observed, and redistributes wealth so 
that all allocation promises are guarantced credibly. This 
redistribution of wealth eliminates late consumers' incentive to 
withdraw early, and it provides the first-best risk sharing 
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arrangement. The implementation of the policy is costless, since 
the need for it will never arise in the first place if it is credible. 
Nevertheless, the design of this mechanism is flawed. 
Wallace stresses that such an ex-post arrangement ignores the 
sequential service constraint assumed throughout the rest of the 
Diamond and Dybvig model. 3 The sequential service constraint, 
also known as the first-come first-served condition, requires that 
the bank service withdrawers in the order and at the time of 
arrival at the bank's counters. In doing so, the option of 
observing the total number of early withdrawers and subsequently 
deciding on the allocation to be distributed is not permitted. The 
redistributing tax associated with deposit insurance necessitates 
the observation of the proportion of early withdrawers and this 
contingency is not feasible if the sequential service constraint is 
to be taken seriously. Even if the government can tax depositors 
after withdrawals, there is no guarantee that depositors have not 
already consumed. Wallace goes on to show that the best 
arrangement that can be achieved in the presence of aggregate 
uncertainty must form a dependency of early consumption in the 
order by which early withdrawcrs approach the bank. He points 
out that he docs not providc the first-bcst solution to the 
1 Sec Section 2.1.3 on why the sequential service constraint is a 
realistic and essential part of the mechanism that produces sunspot panics 
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aggregate risk problem, but simply demonstrates that contracts 
with this dependency-property dominate all other feasible 
arrangements. 4 
Bhattacharya and Gale provide an alternative solution to 
the aggregate risk problem, by re-interpreting the economic 
environment facing early withdrawal risk. Consider a number of 
spatially separated intermediaries subject to privately observed 
shocks regarding the proportion of early withdrawals they face. 5 
If we assume that these regional liquidity shocks are imperfectly 
correlated, we can design an inter-bank co-ordination mechanism 
to insure all participating members. 6 Since the investment 
decision of each member-bank is unobservable, central to the 
and on how Wallace (1988) was the first paper that addressed the issue by 
assuming the spatial separation of agents in the economy. 
Wallace (1990) illustrates this dependency for a special case of 
aggregate risk. In an environment where a small amount of aggregate risk is 
limited to a group of early withdrawers who appear last in the queue, he 
shows that partial suspension is the best feasible arrangement: when the 
late-to-show-up group want to withdraw, they get less than those who 
withdrew earlier. 
Chari (1989) interprets this as community risk, where the source of 
variation in the demand for money could be explained by shocks faced by 
the agricultural community in the countryside. 
11hattacharya and Fulghieri (1994) analyse a model of inter-bank 
coordination where banks face timing uncertainty in the return on their 
short-term investments. Theoretical research on inter-bank coordination has 
also concentrated on contagion through inter-bank links. Papers include 
Rochet and Tirolc (1996), Freixas et al (2000), Allen and Gale (2000). 
Discussions on such arrangements are provided by Calomiris (1990), Gorton 
(1985) and Williamson (1989). 
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design of such a contract is the inclusion of incentive 
compatibility constraints to avoid the inherent moral hazard. 
Bhattacharya and Gale show that these second-best distortions 
restrict the inter-bank arrangement and prevent it from achieving 
the optimal result. 
Nevertheless, Bhattacharya and Gale's system of borrowing 
and lending among banks has a similar flaw to the one 
demonstrated by Wallace for the Diamond and Dybvig model. The 
sequential service constraint has not been taken seriously in the 
design of the inter-bank arrangements, which specify promised 
early consumption allocations contingent on the total withdrawals 
faced by the individual bank. 
When the first depositor will show up for withdrawal, the 
bank will be unable to determine which consumption allocation 
best suits its liquidity pattern, since the total number of early 
withdrawals can only be determined by an observation to be made 
further down the qucuc. Respecting the sequential service 
constraint in an intcr-bank arrangement necessitates one common 
early consumption allocation promise by all banks, regardless of 
tlicir unforcsccn carly withdrawal ratc. 
In our cnvironmcnt, contrary to Bhattacharya and Gale's 
results. we find that intcr-bank coordination can supply the 
optimal contract under the restrictions imposed by the sequential 
scrvicc constraint. 
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We first lay out the general framework of our economy. 
Just like in the basic model of Chapter 3, the Diamond and 
Dybvig model of the bank's provision of liquidity has been 
altered to respect the sequential service constraint and take 
salvage value of the long-term illiquid investments into account. 
However, we choose to abstract from the possibility of 
information based runs, as this would only complicate the nature 
of the offered contracts without adding further insight to the 
issue in study. We present and compare three distinct contracts, 
trying to resolve uncertainty over the proportion of early 
withdrawals. The Late Full Suspension contract (Section 5.3) 
corresponds to Wallace's contract of non-contingency on the 
order of withdrawals. The Early Partial Suspension (Section 5.4) 
forms such a dependency in our richer environment. The Inter- 
Bank Coordination contract (Section 5.5) alters the Bhattacharya 
and Gale model to respect the sequential service constraint. 
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5.2 General Framework 
We use a similar framework to that of the basic model of 
Chapter 3. We alter the Diamond and Dybvig model to include 
the possibility of low liquidation values for the long-term 
technology (see Cooper and Ross (1991)) and take the sequential 
service constraint seriously in the design of contracts (see 
Wallace). 
One difference in comparison to the basic model is that the 
long-term technology is not risky in terms of the return it yields 
in period T-2.7 To include this feature would only complicate the 
three alternative solutions to the problem of aggregate 
uncertainty, without adding anything to our analysis (see 
Appendix 5.4 for more on this issue). 
In the basic modcl we assumcd, just like in Jacklin and 
Bliattacharya (1988), that there is a long-term productive 
tcchnology, whosc rcturn was a random variablc. At T=O with 
probability 0 the return in T-2 was low R,, and with probability 
(1-0) it was high R.. We now rcvcrt to a similar asset to the one 
postulated in Diamond and Dybvig by assuming a long-term 
7 Thus the information structure related to the risky long-term 
investment is no longer relevant in this Chapter. 
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technology that yields R>l in the last period of the model. 8 But, 
unlike Diamond and Dybvig and in the spirit of Cooper and Ross, 
we retain the basic model assumption that this investment 
opportunity is truly illiquid, thus each unit of liquidation in T=1 
yields only (1-r), where rE[0, l]. 9 
We further introduce the possibility of random withdrawals 
at the aggregate level. In the basic model ex-ante identical agents 
faced a privately observed, uninsurable risk of being impatient or 
patient consumers. With probability ;r they derived utility from 
early consumption in period T=1, and with probability (1-ir) they 
preferred late consumption in period T=2. 
In this Chapter we assume that banks can not predict with 
certainty the proportion of consumers that will demand the 
allocation promised for distribution in period T=1. Suppose that 
with probability ý the proportion of early consumers will be gr,, 
$A crucial difference between our and Diamond and Dybvig's model, 
other than the fire-sale prices resulting from the premature liquidation of 
the long-term technology, is the existence of storage. 
We also impose the following restriction on the parameter z: 
(1-r)Sc, 
where C, stands for the bank's period T-I allocation promise to depositors 
under each of the contracts we present in this Chapter. This is necessary in 
order to ensure that the choice between storage and the long-term 
technology is not trivial. If the premature liquidation of the investment was 
to yield more than the bank's promised allocation for period T-1, storage 
would be completely dominated. 
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while with probability (1-c) this proportion will be ßr2, where 
1C2 > Irl 
. 
We compare three distinct contracts. 1° Note that all of them 
involve some type of suspension of convertibility. This ensures 
that these contracts do not face the possibility of sunspot panics, 
which would make any comparison trivial, due to the 
impossibility of assigning a probability to such bank failures. " 
10 We also describe and compare autarky against these models in 
Appendix 5.1. For ease of exposition of this Chapter's results, Appendix 5.3 
presents two more possible, yet sub-optimal in terms of ex-ante utility, 
contracts. The first one considers a contract written for the highest possible 
number of early withdrawals (it2), implying the storage of goods from 
period T-1 to T-2 if the low proportion of early consumers arises. In 
contrast, the second contract is based on the lowest possible number of 
early withdrawals (Zlt ), allowing for the liquidation of the long-term 
technology if the high proportion of early consumers arises. 
11 Note that information based runs, although not studied in this 
Section, are still possible. Thus these contracts do not appear unrealistic in 
a world that does experience banking system 
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5.3 Late Full Suspension of Convertibility: A Non- 
Contingent Contract 
The late full suspension of convertibility case involves 
writing a contract that respects the sequential service constraint, 
takes advantage of storage, investment and liquidation options 
and is not contingent on the position of withdrawers in the queue. 
We present the equivalent contract under Wallace's 
assumptions of no storage or costly liquidation in Appendix 5.2 
and point out its main differences with the model presented here. 
Late full suspension of convertibility is imposed after ire 
withdrawals in pcriod T=1, assuring all late consumers that their 
allocations arc not in risk of being prematurely liquidated and 
thus avoiding the possibility of sunspot panics. The reason for 
labelling this policy late suspension, is because it comes into 
effect after it2 and not it, withdrawals of c,, unlike the early 
partial suspension studied in the following section. This 
characteristic's consequences arc further explained after the 
analysis of the carly partial suspension policy. 
We solvc for contracts that respcct the following 
conditions: 
xrzc, ZSz, r, c, 
L5I (39) 
Aggregate Uncertainty about Consumption Time Preference 134 
where S stands for the proportion of the good surrendered by 
depositors to the bank in T=1 and left in storage, I for the part 
that is invested in the productive, yet illiquid long-term 
investment and L for the part of that investment I that is 
prematurely liquidated in T=1. Storage can be greater or equal to 
what is needed to cover withdrawal demand fully in the case of 
low withdrawals, and less or equal than withdrawal demand in the 
case of high withdrawals. Liquidation must be less or equal to the 
full investment made in the planning period. 
The ex-ante expected utility under late full suspension of 
convertibility will be: 
1-r ý-r 
MaxUFS 
4r1 C, 
+p(1- r1)+(1-0 ) z2 Cl +P(1-7r2)ýzz (40) 1-y 1-y 1-y 1-y 
subject to: 
5+1=1 
7r, cl 5S 
+(1-r1)c21 
-1 (41) (1-; r1)c21 =1R+(S-; t1c, )=ý I =ý'c' R-1 
7r c +1-1 7r2c, =S+L(1-=L 2] (1-z) 
(1-, r2)c22 =(1-L)R 
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Part of the available good in the planning period is left in 
storage (S). If there is a low proportion (; ri) of early 
withdrawers, any excesses in storage (S - n, c, ) will be carried 
forward for consumption in period T=2. This excess in storage 
and the return from what was invested (RI) will be distributed to 
the remaining depositors (1- r1) in period T=2. If a high number 
(ice) of depositors withdraw early, then part of the investment in 
the productive long-term investment may be liquidated (L) at 
fire-sale prices (1-r) to meet excess withdrawal demand (; r 2c, ). 
This premature liquidation comes at the cost of consumption for 
the late consumers, but forms part of the initial contract that 
ensures an allocation for late withdrawers high enough so that no 
panics arise. 
Note that 'r, c, <_1-I is not binding and does not have to be 
included in the maximization program. Plugging L and I in the 
last of the constraints given by (41), yields the following budget 
constraint: 
(Bir, +; r2 )c, + B(1- 7r, )c21 + (1- ßr2 )c22 
(1 
Rz) =1+ B (42) 
where B=1-(1-z)- r R-1 R-1 
The first order conditions of this program are: 
Aggregate Uncertainty about Consumption Time Preference 136 
, 
/, ýZ'1 , /, 
(01r, +(1-Y')lr2)Cl_Y -/ý, (Bir, +7t2)0 
(Y' 
t +-0)Tz )c 
-r 
( 
2) 
oP(1- icl )C21 - ýB(1- ýc) =0ýA= ý1 (43 ) 
(1- z) 
=0A= 
(1- q$)PRczz-r 
(1- q)P(1- ýz )czz-r -., (1-'cz) R (1-7) 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget 
constraint. 
Solving we get: 
1+B 
c, __ 
Biz, +; c2 +B(1-ir, )K, +(1-, r2)(1 RZ) K2 
C21 = K, c, 
C22 = K2c, 
where: 
(44) 
_y _ 
Op(Bn, + n2) ' Ký 
B(q57r1 +(1-0, rz) (45) c) [(1_)PR(Bri +7r2) K2 
_ (1- z)(q r1 + (1- cb)ir2 )
forming the basis for the contract offered by the bank to the 
participating depositors. 
This contract will be incentive compatible (there will be no 
incentive for late consumers to misrepresent their type and 
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withdraw early due to their preference for the allocation promised 
to early withdrawers) iff: 
1-r 1-7 
1-y 1-y 
1-r 1-r 
C22 
> 
Cl 
1-y 1-y 
(46) 
If these constraints are not satisfied we will have to make 
the necessary inclusions in the maximization problem. " 
Three important remarks should be made about the late full 
suspension of convertibility contract. Firstly, it respects the 
sequential service constraint by imposing one common early 
allocation promise by the banks, not contingent on the total 
number of early withdrawals. The second feature is that the 
contract is not contingent on the order of withdrawals (it is not 
contingent on the position of the withdrawer in the queue). 
Finally, the program involves inefficiencies in the form of 
carrying forward excess good in the case of a low proportion of 
early withdrawals, and of premature liquidation of the productive 
technology in the case of a high proportion of early withdrawers. 
12 But, as we will see later on, for the purpose of this study, we can 
restrict our analysis to parameter values such that these constraints are not 
binding without any consequences. 
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5.4 Early Partial Suspension of Convertibility: An 
Order-Contingent Contract 
The early partial suspension of convertibility contract is 
similar to the late full suspension one in the sense that the 
sequential service constraint is respected and full advantage of 
all available options (storage, investment, liquidation) is 
allowed. 13 Unlike the late full suspension case we now allow for 
allocations to be contingent on the order of withdrawals (but not 
on the total number of withdrawals). 
The program we solve for in this Section is termed early 
partial suspension of convertibility because the bank restricts 
distributions to CL <c, after r, (<; r2) early withdrawals of 
allocation c, have taken place, until full suspension after another 
('r2 
-'r, ) early withdrawals. The assumption 7c, <'r2 justifies the 
terms early and late applied to the two contracts. The reason for 
making this distinction explicit is explained when we compare the 
two contracts after the analysis of the early partial suspension 
policy. Note that suspension also ensures, just like in the late full 
suspension contract, that no sunspot panics are possible. 
13 Just like in the full suspension case we consider contracts that 
respect the following two conditions: 
7Z'2cl >S; 
-> 
ir1c1 
L<1 
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Consider the following program under early partial 
suspension of convertibility: 
ý-r L2II-r 
Max UPS + P(1- ir, ) j 1-y 
-y (47) 
+(1-41) 1I1 
C1 
+(1r2 
-7r, )C` +P(1-, r2)C22 
1-y 1-y 1-y 
subject to: 
S+I=1 
ir, c, <_ 1-1 
(1-ý71 )c21=IR+(S-7r, c, )=I =ir1c, +(1R 1)c2, 
-1 (48) 
7r, c, +('r2 -; c, )cL =S+L(1-r)=L-; 
r, c, +(; t2 
-; c, )cL +I -1 
(1- z) 
(1-ice)c22 =(I-L)R 
The storage, investment and liquidation decisions are 
similar to the case of full suspension, only this time (n2 
-'r, ) 
withdrawers (last in the queue) will receive the alternative 
consumption bundle CL, and not c,. 
Just like in the case of late full suspension, note that 
iz, c, : 51- 1 is not binding and does not have to be included in the 
maximization program. Plugging L and I in the last of the 
constraints given by (48), yields the following budget constraint: 
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(B; 
r1 +; r1)c1 +B(1- n1 )c21 +(it2 Irl )cL +(1-Z2 )c22 
(1 
Rz) =1+B (49) 
-- 
where B=1 
(1 z) 
R 
-1 . 
The first order conditions are: 
(g1ri +(1-q5)'t)c1 7 -A(B; r, +n, )=0 A= Bl+1 
OP(1- ß, B(1- ý1) =O => A, = 21-r B (50) 
(1-q5)(r2 
-2V1)cc-r -1%(7r2 -'r1)=0 (1-q5)cL-r 
(1 (1 
O)P(1-'[2 )c22 1- i1(1- n2) R 
Z) 
=0=- 
()PRc22-r 
(1- () 
where A, is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget 
constraint. 
The contract offered under Early Partial Suspension makes 
the following allocation promises: 
_ 
1+B 
(1+B)ir, +B(1-ic, )M, +('r2 
-'r, )M2 +(1-; r2) R M3 (51) 
c21 =M, c, 
CL = M2c1 
C22 =M3c, 
where: 
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[c5P(Bý1)1't 
M, =B 
M2 
= 
[(1- b)(B + 1)]i 
(1-O)pR(+1) 
M3 
_ (1- r) 
(52) 
The incentive compatibility constraints, guaranteeing that 
late consumers will not prefer the consumption bundles allocated 
to early consumers, are: 
1-r C21 t-r 
ZC, 
1-y 1-y 
Cl 1-7 CtI-r 
1-y 1-y 
C22 
1-r 
> 
Cl 
1-r 
1-y 1-y 
1-r CZ, 1-r 
> 
CL 
1-y 1-y 
1-r C22 CL 
I-r 
Z 
1-y 1-y 
(53) 
If these conditions are not satisfied we will have to make 
the necessary inclusions of the binding constraints in the 
maximization problem. 14 
14 See footnote 1 1. In particular, notice that 
1-r 1-r C22 
> 
CL pR Z1 is not binding since (1- z) S 1. This ensures that 1-y 1-y (1-z) 
the cost imposed by the premature liquidation of the long-term technology 
Aggregate Uncertainty about Consumption Time Preference 142 
Just as we did for the late full suspension contract we note 
that the early partial suspension contract respects the sequential 
serviced constraint and involves inefficiencies in the form of 
excess storage in the planning period or premature liquidation of 
productive investments. However, unlike the late full suspension 
contract, this contract is contingent in the order of withdrawals. 
It is worth noting that the full suspension contract involves 
paying out more of the good in T=1 than the partial suspension 
contract, which would appear as a paradox given their labelling. 
However this is an issue related to the timing of the suspension, 
making the terms early and late an essential addition to the 
description of these policies. The late full suspension contract 
suspends payments after 'r2 withdrawals of the allocation c,, 
unlike the early partial suspension, which partially suspends after 
only 1r, <ir2 withdrawals of c,, before fully suspending payments 
after a further 'r2 -1r, withdrawals of the allocation CL* 
The late full suspension case can be re-interpreted as a sub- 
case of the early partial suspension one, since CL can take the 
value c,. This also implies that any deviation of the form CL #c, 
as a solution to the early partial suspension contract will be ex- 
on the allocations of patient consumers cannot be the cause of sunspot 
1-r 
C 
I-r 
panics. If the premature liquidation was to result in 
C22 
>- - the 1-y 1-y 
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ante utility maximising and will dominate the late full suspension 
contract. We use a numerical example to demonstrate that such 
deviations are possible and that they provide higher utilities than 
contracts that do not make allowances for CL ßc1. 
Given that inter-bank arrangements are prohibited by 
exogenously imposed factors, we now present a numerical 
example that compares the performance of late full versus early 
partial suspension contracts. We wish to prove that Wallace's 
result that contracts that form dependencies in the order of 
withdrawals by allowing for the consumption allocation of the 
last (ire 
- 
7c, ) withdrawers to take the form CL # c, are ex-ante 
welfare maximising when compared to contracts that don't allow 
for such contingencies. 
Consider a contract written under the following conditions: 
ý=0.7, r1 =0.7, lr2 =0.9, y=0.5, R=2.7, (1-z)=0.3 and p=0.9. 
Under late full suspension of convertibility the contract 
offered takes the following values: c, =0.69, c21 =3.93, c22 =9.91. 
The storage, investment and premature liquidation plan is as 
follows: S=0.61, I=0.39 and L=0.02. The ex-ante utility 
achieved is UFS= 2.18. 
Under early partial suspension of convertibility the 
promised consumption bundles are: c, = 0.82, CL = 0.15, c2, = 3.80, 
possibility of panics would arise. 
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c22 =9.6. The corresponding allocations of the available good 
in 
the planning period are: S=0.58, I=0.42 and L=0.06. The ex- 
ante utility achieved is UPS =2.21, achieving a better result than 
full suspension and proving that optimal deviations of the form 
CL # c, do take place. '5 
Is Our example respects the constraints set out by the following 
expressions: (39), (46) and (53). Expression (39) sets natural restrictions on 
the possible sizes of storage and liquidation. Expressions (46) and (53) 
require some further comments, since they represent the incentive 
compatibility constraints under full and partial suspension. The aim of our 
study is to prove that optimal deviations of the form CL # C, do take place. 
To achieve this we can restrict our search to contracts where these 
constraints do not bind. To solve for contracts where the constraints bind 
would be a tedious exercise that would not enhance our understanding of the 
main issues. 
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5.5 Inter-Bank Arrangements 
Following Bhattacharya and Gale we study the 
implementation of a borrowing-lending mechanism across 
heterogeneous intermediaries to insure depositors against 
variations in their liquidity requirements. Unlike the two 
contracts described so far in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 the inter-bank 
model does not involve inefficient excess storage or early 
premature liquidation. For this reason we would expect it to be 
the optimal arrangement. 
However, due to second-best distortions, this optimal 
arrangement could be unachievable. Bhattacharya and Gale show 
that the private, and not publicly observed, shocks in terms of the 
proportion of depositors wishing to make early withdrawals result 
in a free-rider problem, with intermediaries under-investing in 
the liquid asset (storage). This results to second-best distortions, 
since incentive compatibility constraints must be included in the 
programming of a viable contract. 
Nevertheless, we demonstrate that in our environment the 
inter-bank mechanism is optimal and incentive compatible. 
Note that, unlike Bhattacharya and Gale, we choose to 
include a sequential service constraint, which rules out the 
possibility of contracts contingent on the proportion of early 
withdrawals. This implies that the consumption allocation 
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promised to early consumers must be common among all banks. 
Yet, we allow for contingency on the order of withdrawals. 
The inter-bank_ contract subject to the first-come first- 
served constraint is derived from the following optimisation 
program: 
I-r 1-r 
1-y 1-y (54) 
-r º-r t-r 
+(1-ý) ýrIC' +(irz-it, )c` +P(1-ir2) i 1-y 1-y 1-y 
subject to: 
Olr, c, +(1-OX, c, +(1-O)(, r2 -7c, )cL =1-I 
0(1-7r, )c12 +(1-q5)(1-? [2)c22 =1R 
(55) 
; rj c, + 0)[; r, C, + (; rZ - lrl )cL + 
(1- 
R 
)c22 
-1 
Storage will have to provide enough to cover 'r, early 
consumers of 0 banks and nZ early consumers of (1-0) banks. 
Note that we allow for order contingency by letting the last 
(ire 
- 
it, ) withdrawers of the (1-q) banks to receive cL. The 
return of the long-term investment will have to match 
withdrawals of (1-, r1) late consumers of 0 of the banks and 
(1-ice) late consumers of (1-0) banks. 
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The first order conditions are: 
b, rtc«-r +(1-Or, c1 -A 07r, +(1-0), ri] =0=A=c, 
(1- 0)(2rz 
-'ri )cL-r - A(1- q)(n2 ;r, =: > 
'to('-ýc, ) 
=0=> A, = Rc -r 
(56) 
RP ýz 
A(1- OX, 
- 
7r2) 
_ 
(1-ß)P(1- 2r2 )cu-r 
-=0= pRc22-r R 
By combining the first two and the last two of the first 
order conditions we get: 
c, = CL (57) 
Cl2 = C22 
From now on we let ct2 =c22 =c2. Solving we get: 
1 
Cl = 
Ry [[lrl +(1-0)1C21+1o(1-lr1)+(1-0)(1-'c2)](PR (58) 
C2= (pR)yc, 
implying that pR z1 is the sufficient and necessary condition in 
order for the following incentive compatibility condition to be 
satisfied: 
1-r 1-r 
C2 ? Cl (59) 
1-y 1-y 
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This constraint states that the expected utility from 
consumption in period T=2 must be preferred by late consumers 
to withdrawal in T=1 and storage until consumption in T=2. 
We term banks with a low proportion of early withdrawers 
Type I, and banks with a high proportion of early withdrawers 
Type II. In order to study the incentive compatibility constraints 
set up to prevent banks from misrepresenting their types, it is 
useful to reinterpret the environment as one of borrowing and 
lending among banks. 
Table 5.1: Aggregated Transfers at T=1 
Type I Type II Total 
Storage: 0(1-1) + (1-- q)(1- I) 
Consume: qn, c, + (1- q)ir2c, 
Excess/ 
Shortage: 
q5(l-I)-OT, c, + (1-cb)T2c, 
-(1-0)(1-I) = 0 
Extra that Type I holds in T=1 is passed on to Type II. 
Aggregate Uncertainty about Consumption Time Preference 149 
Table 5.2: Aggregated Transfers at T=2 
Type I Type II Total 
Invest: SIR + (1- O)IR = IR 
Consume: 'ri )c2 + "r2)c2 = IR 
Excess! 
Shortage: 
0(1-lr, )c2 
-SIR + (1-O)IR-(1-0)(1-, r2)c2 = 
i 
0 
Extra that Type II holds in T=2 is passed on to Type I. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2, give us the aggregated (the total of 
banks, distinguished only by type) transfer of funds between 
Type I and Type II banks. Note that all banks store and invest the 
same amounts in the planning period T=O. In period T=1 Type II 
banks have a shortage of funds, while Type I banks have an 
excess of funds. In period T=2 Type I banks have a shortage of 
funds, while Type II banks have an excess of funds. Therefore in 
period T=1 Type II banks will borrow from Type I, and by 
repaying in period T=2 they will cover the shortage of funds that 
Type I banks are subject to. 
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Table 5.3: 
Individual Bank Transfers at T=1 
Type I Type II 
Storage: (1-I) (1-I) 
Consume: 7r, C, 2rZC, 
Excess/ 
Shortage: 
(1-I)-ir, cl 'r2c1 
-(1-I) 
Table 5.4: 
Individual Bank Transfers at T=2 
Type I Type II 
Invest: IR IR 
Consume: (1-ir, )c2 (1- r2)c2 
Excess/ 
(1-2r, )c2 
-IR IR -(1-n2)c2 
Shortage: 
Alternatively, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the needs for and 
transfers of funds imposed by the inter-bank arrangement on 
individual banks. Note the relationship with the previous two 
tables. We can get the results for the individual banks by dividing 
the aggregated quantities by the mass 0 of Type I and (1-0) of 
Type II banks. 
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Let us now consider the possibility of banks breaking this 
inter-bank arrangement. If Type II banks decide to misrepresent 
their type and pass as Type I banks, they will have to give away 
(1- I) 
-; ric, in period T=1 in exchange of receiving (1- nt, )c2 - IR 
in period T=2. Thus they will pretend to be Type I iff: 
t-r t-r 1-r t-r 
; r, p(1-lr2)C2 
C' 
+('r2 
-n, )O+p(1-r2) 
c2 (60) 
1-y 1-y 1-y 1-y 
where c2 = 
(1-'r' )02 16 
(1-lr2) 
Note that this misrepresentation implies that (ßc2 
-'c, ) of 
the early consumers will receive nothing for consumption. This 
poses two problems. Firstly, in Diamond and Dybvig based 
models the bank is interpreted as a collective of consumers. 
Therefore such a decision, implying zero utility for some 
members, would be unlikely. Moreover, given the specification of 
our utility function and a zero allocation for (ßc2 
-7r, ) of the early 
consumers in the case of cheating, even a small consumption 
increase in the proportion (; r2 
- 
ir, ) of depositors that otherwise 
receive nothing, would dominate in terms of utility the increase 
16 cZ is derived by observing that (1-7[1)c2 funds (that should under 
normal circumstances be available for a Type I bank) will be available for 
distribution among (l 
- 
7r2) withdrawers in period T=2. 
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in utility that late consumers derive from the bank's 
misrepresentation. 
17 
Consider next the possibility of a Type I bank imitating a 
Type II bank. In this case the bank will receive a subsidy in 
period T=1, but will have to give away part of its funds in period 
T=2. The bank will misrepresent its type iff: 
1-7 t-r i-r i-r 
ý, c +p(1-ßt, )12 <1' +p(1- r1)12 q 
YYYY 
c2 <(1-lrZ)C2 +(ir2 -ir')C' p (61) 1ic, 
C2: C, 
where c2 = 
(1-'r2)c2 +7r2c, 
-1[, c, 
- 
(1-lr2)c2 +(r2 
-; r, X is 
1 
-7t, 1 -7V, 
Since pR Z1 we have from (58) that c2 >c,. Thus the above 
expression cannot be satisfied and the incentive compatibility 
constraint given by (61) is not binding. 
The implication of this result is that in our environment, 
where (unlike Bhattacharya and Gale's model) we choose to 
" This is because, given our utility function specifications, the 
marginal utility of consumption goes to infinity as consumption becomes 
zero. 
18 C2 is the sum of (1-'r2)c2, what the bank will be left with after 
giving away the Type II bank's loan return, and ; r2c, 
-'ICI the excess 
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respect the sequential service constraint, the inter-bank 
arrangement is not subject to second-best distortions and is the 
optimal arrangement, given the constraints imposed by the first- 
come first-served condition. 
Notice that this contract does not involve inefficiencies 
like the late full and early partial suspension contracts. There is 
no excess storage in the planning period or premature liquidation 
of the long-term productive technology. Thus, unless there are 
exogenously imposed restrictions on the formation of an inter- 
bank market, lending and borrowing among banks dominates the 
contracts presented in the previous Sections. Consider the 
numerical results of the inter-bank contract under the parameters 
set out in our comparison of the late full and early partial 
suspension contracts. t9 
Under inter-bank arrangements the contract offered takes 
the following values: c, =0.78, C21 = C22 = C2 = 4.60. The storage, 
investment and premature liquidation plan is as follows: S=0.59, 
1=0.41 and L=O. The ex-ante utility achieved is U, 8 =2.27, 
dominating the contracts offered under late full and early partial 
suspension. 
wealth in period T=1 that was carried forward using storage, all divided by 
(1- 7r, ) 
, 
the remaining proportion of consumers in period T=2. 
19 Let b=0.7,7tl =0.7,22 =0.9, y=0.5, R=2.7, (1-r)=0.3 and 
p=0.9. 
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A note must be made regarding the policy of suspension of 
convertibility that should complement the inter-bank 
arrangements. If no premature liquidation of the long-term 
technology is allowed, the rational of panics is removed, since 
late consumers' allocations face no threat. 
5.6 Discussion 
Diamond and Dybvig's attempt to resolve the random 
withdrawals problem using a policy they termed as deposit 
insurance came under criticism by Wallace, who demonstrated 
that it did not respect the sequential service constraint, a 
condition necessary and central to their exposition. 
We make the observation that the same criticism applies to 
Bhattacharya and Gale's solution to the uncertainty problem over 
the timing of future consumption needs. Bhattacharya and Gale 
designed an inter-bank coordination model, but did not take the 
sequential service constraint seriously in doing so. 
In their environment they show that the inter-bank 
arrangement is subject to second-best distortions that limit the 
optimality of the contract. In this paper we respect the first-come 
first-served rule and find that borrowing and lending between 
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banks is the optimal arrangement, subject to the restrictions that 
the sequential service constraint imposes. 
We also ask the question of what alternative options exist 
if, for reasons exogenous to our environment, an inter-bank 
coordination mechanism cannot be established. Wallace showed 
that contracts that form a dependency in the order of withdrawals 
dominate contracts that do not allow for such contingencies. 
Nevertheless, he does so in a simplistic environment of no 
storage or costly liquidation for the productive technology. We 
alter these conditions to introduce storage possibilities and 
inefficient premature liquidation of the long-term technology and 
prove that his results hold even in richer environments. 
All the contracts examined assume some form of 
suspension of convertibility, making them immune to sunspot 
panics. It could be argued that this result is unrealistic, since 
banking crises are a feature of the real world. We point out that 
although suspension of convertibility is effective against sunspot 
panics, it offers no solution to information-based bank runs. 
Though the purpose of this Chapter did not involve the study of 
information-based runs in an environment with aggregate 
uncertainty about consumption time preference, we identify this 
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as an issue for future research and demonstrate 
its complexity in 
Appendix 5.4.20 
The study of inter-bank arrangements under such a set-up 
would also highlight the interaction of risk sharing among banks 
at two levels, liquidity provision and insurance against non- 
performing portfolios. Koppl and MacGee (2001) take up such a 
study, but disregard the problem of the sequential service 
constraint by assuming that the problem of aggregate uncertainty 
exists only at the planning period and that this uncertainty 
disappears before any withdrawals or consumption take place. 
20 In particular, we demonstrate that the introduction of portfolio 
uncertainty is straightforward for the inter-bank arrangement (and observe 
that under some environments it becomes subject to second best restrictions) 
but is more perplex for the late full and early partial suspension cases. 
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Appendix 5.1 
Consider the autarkic solution under this environment of 
uncertainty over the probability of being an early consumer. The 
ex-ante expected utility of an agent living under autarky will be: 
MaXUA 
_ 
1-r 1-r I-r '-r 
ýý C' +p(1-7r, )C2 
]+(1-0) 
ýz Cl +P(1-7r2)C2 (62) 
1-y 1-y 1-y 1-y 
1-r 1-r 
_[01ý +ý1-b), r2ICl Y +P[O(1-2r, 
)+(1-0)(1-n2)112 
Y 
subject to 
c, =1-1+(1-z)I 
cZ =1-I +IR 
(63) 
With probability hic, +(1-q5)7r2 the agent's consumption will 
be derived from storage and premature liquidation. Ideally, in 
this case, all would have been left in storage. With probability 
ý(1-ýc, )+(1-ý)(1-ßr2) consumption will consist of the return of the 
productive technology and what was left in storage. Ideally, in 
this case, all would have been invested in the long-term 
technology. 
Note that the following restriction applies: 
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0<_I<_1 (64) 
Investment cannot be negative or higher that the resources 
available. If 1=0 or I=1 we get the following ex-ante utilities: 
tr 
UA, f_o -[cnt -+"(1-0)'r2] 
1 
1- 
R '"' 
(65) 
UA, 1-1 =[[(1-7tt)+(1-O)(1-7z2)1 1- Y 
In terms of the numerical example, given that b=0.7, 
; r, = 0.7, ; r2= 0.9, y=0.5, R=2.7, (1-z)= 0.3 and p=0.9, autarky 
achieves the low ex-ante utility of U., =1.52, with investment in 
the productive technology I= 0. 
Appendix 5.2 
In Wallace storage is non-existent. There is only one type 
of technology, where for every unit invested in the planning 
period it returns R, in period T=1 and, if kept until period T=2, it 
yields R, R2. 
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The program that respects the sequential service constraint 
but does not make allocations contingent on the order of 
withdrawals is: 
1-r 1-r i-r 
MaxUW ; r, 1ý +p(1-7[, 
) l21 +(1-ý) 7r2 C1 +p(1-7L2) 122 
Y1 YYY 
(66) 
subject to: 
; r, c, =(1-K)R, 'r1c, 
+(1-r1)c2, =1 (67) (1-n, )c2, 
=KR, R2 R, R, R2 
and 
; r2c, =(1-L)R, ; r2c, 
+(1-ýz)czi =1 (1-, r2)c22 = LR, R2 R, R, R2 
(68) 
where all the available good is invested in the technology in the 
planning period and (1-K), (1-L) stand for the quantities 
withdrawn in period T=1 under 'r1 and ; r2 early consumers 
respectively. 
If we modify this program to fit our environment with 
storage and costly premature liquidation, we maximise (66) with 
respect to: 
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; r, c, =1-I 
=> Icc' +(1-n1)c21 =1 (69) (1-; r, )c21 = IR 'R 
'r2c, =1-I 
=> ;tc +(1-zrz)c22 =1 
-2r2)c22 =1R sR 
(70) 
which is of course not possible to achieve, since it requires . 
ýclc, 
=1-I=7r2C,. 
In our model, since c, is the result of a decision made in 
the planning period T=0 and given the low returns of the long- 
term technology following liquidation, storage is the optimal 
supplying source of income for consumption in T=1. But the 
period T=0 choice of how much to store cannot be made 
contingent on the period T=1 realization of the proportion of 
early withdrawals. In the simpler environment of Wallace, c, is 
the result of pulling out in T=1 from the only existing 
technology, accepting a lower return that dominates storage and 
not liquidating at fire-sale prices. Unlike our model, in Wallace's 
environment this withdrawal from the only available technology 
can be made contingent on the proportion of early withdrawals, 
since the decision is enforced in period T=1 and not in the 
planning period (as storage would necessitate). 
This has also important implications for the policy he 
identifies as Partial Suspension of Convertibility. In his model 
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this policy does not involve inefficiencies like carrying forward 
of goods from period T=1 to T=2 (resulting from excess storage 
in period T=0) or premature costly liquidation of the long-term 
technology (to cover shortages in period T=1, the result of under- 
storage in period T=1). 
His policy of Partial Suspension of Convertibility, given 
that storage is non-existent and there is only one type of 
technology as described earlier, would involve making period 
T=1 consumption depend in the order that people withdraw. The 
expected utility of the contract he describes is: 
(c + 6)ý-r 
Uwpsc (--) 
-o 91 + P(1-, c, ) C211-r 1-y 1-y (71) 
1-7 
+(1-0) 7C1 +(7I2 
--r, 
) +P(1-; c2) 22 
I-y 1-y 1-y 
subject to: 
'c, (c, + E) = (1- K)R, ßr1(c1 + c) 
+ 
(1- nI )c21 (72) (1-; r, )c21 = KR, R2 R, R, R2 
and 
; 71 (Cl +c)+(, r2 
-; r, )(c, -c) = (1-L)R1 
(1-; t2 )c22 = LR, Rz 
K, (c, +E) 
+(ice -7r, )(cI -e) +(1-7rz )C22 
(73) 
R, R, RI R2 
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If the derivative of (71) with respect to c evaluated at 
r=0 is positive, then the Partial Suspension contract yields 
higher ex-ante utility than the contract that is non-contingent on 
the order of withdrawals. 
Differentiate (71), after plugging in c21 and c22 from (72) 
and (73), with respect to c and let E=0: 
Ir1c1-r 
_(1-q5)(r2 -; r1)ct-r -gpr1R2Di-r -(1-O)P*7r2R2D2-r (74) 
where c,, c21 and c22 are given by the optimisation of (66) with 
respect to (67) and (68), and: 
11__ ]RIR2 
D2 = 
1- 
Rd' 
R, RZ 
1-ßr2 (75) 
Differentiate (66), after plugging in C21 and c22 from (67) 
and (68), with respect to c, : 
O; r, ci-r 
- 
(1- 0)rzc1_r 
- 
gpi1R2D, -r 
- 
(1- OAT 2 R2D2-r = 0':: * 
- 
OPir1R2Di_r 
- 
(1- O)P, 2R2D2-r = (1- 0)n'2ci-r -Or, c, "r 
(76) 
Substituting from (76) into (74) we get: 
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+(1-O) r2ct-r 
-O r1ci-r (77) 
2(1-q)7[1cl-r >0 
This implies that, in the environment examined by Wallace, 
there are positive c for which the Partial Suspension Contract 
yields higher ex-ante utility than the best contract that is non- 
contingent on the order of withdrawals. 
Appendix 5.3 
For ease of exposition of this Chapter's results, we 
consider two interesting contracts that can resolve the aggregate 
uncertainty problem, but which are nevertheless sub-optimal to 
the solutions presented in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. The first case 
considers a contract written for the highest possible number of 
early withdrawals (n2), implying the storage of goods from 
period T=1 to T=2 if the low proportion of early consumers 
arises. In contrast, the second contract is based on the lowest 
possible number of early withdrawals (; r, ), allowing for the 
liquidation of the long-term technology if the high proportion of 
early consumers arises. 
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Consider a contract based on the highest possible number 
of early withdrawals. This solution is inefficient in the sense that 
if the low proportion of early consumers materialises, the 
contract resorts to unproductive storage to carry forward the 
excess good of period T=1 for consumption in the last period. 
The problem faced by a representative agent in period T=1 
is: 
Maxus =ý 
[7r1 
cý 
+ p(1- 7r1) Ces +(1-0) 
[r2 
c11-r 
+ p(1- ýz) C2 
t-r 
1-y 1-y 1 
-y 1-y 
(78) 
subject to: 
'r2 CI 
-( z) z (1-ir2c, )R (79) (1-, rz )C2= IR R 1- 7rz 
and: 
(1-; l, )czs =IR +[(1-I)-gr, c, I'c2s =(1-; r2c, 
)R+(; rZ ; r, )c, (80) (1-; r, ) 
Note that if there are only ir, withdrawals in period T=1, 
the consumption cgs in T=2 will consist of the return of the long 
term-technology and any leftovers carried forward from period 
T=1, the result of excess storage in the planning period. 
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By plugging (79) and (80) in (78) and differentiating with 
respect to c, we get the following first order condition: 
It 
loc, + (1- O»r21cý-r 
- 
(1- O)P(7r2R) (1- ; TZc, )R 
; r2 
r 
(81) 
+m7r2 
-; r, -Ir2R) 
(1-; r2c, )R+(; r2 
-; r, X 
=0 1-7r1 
which we can solve to get c,. Note that c2 and c25, as given by 
(79) and (80), are both functions of c,. 
The Incentive Compatibility Constraints for this contract 
are: 
I-r I-r CIS Cl 
1-y 1-y 
C2-r Z C11-r 
1-y 1-y 
(82) 
So we must ensure that the expected consumption in period 
T=2 is preferred by late consumers to withdrawal in period T=1 
and storage until consumption in period T=2. If the constraints of 
(82) are not satisfied, they will have to be included in the 
maximisation program for the benchmark contract. 
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The second contract is based on the low proportion 'r, of 
early withdrawals. It is inefficient in the sense that if the high 
- _: proportion of early consumers arises, the contract requires the 
inefficient liquidation of the productive and illiquid long-term 
technology. 
An intermediary chooses consumption bundles to maximise 
the expected utility of the representative depositor in period T=O: 
I I-r i-r 
MaxUL =c 2r, 
C, 
+ p(1- 'r, )1 
1-y 1-y 
-r '-r El-' 
(83) 
+(1-ý) 91 c' +(it: 
-it1)CL +P(1-it2) zL 1-y 1-y 1-Y 
subject to: 
7t, c, =1-1 (1-, r, )c2 
- (1-ir, )c2 
=IRýý'c' 
+R 
-1 (84) 
and: 
(ice 
- 
it, )cL = L(1- T) 
n, c, + 
(n2 
- 
2t, )cL 
+ 
(1- Btx )c2L 
=1 (85 ) (1 
- 
ire )c2L = (I 
- 
L)R (1- T) R 
where c. is the consumption allowance resulting from the early 
liquidation of the long-term technology, distributed to the excess 
withdrawers of period T=1. This inefficient early liquidation 
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leaves C2L <c2 for consumption by the rest of the consumers in 
period T=2. 
The first order conditions are: 
O"rlcl-r +(1-c)r, c, -r 
-Air, -u; rl =0pC, -r _A, + p 
(1-0)(; r2 
- 
; ri )cL-r 
_p2- ; rý) (1- T) =O 'C* (1- 0)(1- r)cL-r = JU 
OP(1- 7r1)c2-r 
- ýi 
(1 R 
') 
=Oq%= OpRcz-r 
(86) 
-r 
(1 (1-ß)P(1-'tx)0zc 
-P 
R i) 
=0a p=(1-O)PRcu-r 
where A and p are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
budget constraint given by (84) and (85) respectively. 
Combining the second and fourth of the first order 
conditions of (86) we get: 
(1- r)cL-r = pRc2L-r p C2L = ipR Z 
ycL (87) 
By plugging (87) in (85): 
'r, c, +Bcß =1acL =B (88) 
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pR y 
+ 
1- r 
where B= 
'T2 - 1r, 
1-z R 
From (84) we have: 
_ 
(1-'r, c, )R 
c2 1-7r' 
(89) 
Plug A and p from the last two first order conditions of 
(86) in the first one: 
ci-r _ 0pRc2-r + (1- q)(1- t)CL-r q 
- 
-r 'r 
cl-r -qpR 
(1 
1ý 
ý)R +(1-0)(1-T) 1-ý c1 
(90) 
B 
which we can solve to get c,. Note that c2 and CL given by (89) 
and (88) are both functions of c,, and c2L given by (87) is a 
function of CL. 
The Incentive Compatibility Constraints for this contract 
are: 
C2-r 
Z 
Cl I-r 
1-y 1-y 
I-r 
Z 
Cl I-r C2L 
1-y 1-y 
I-r I-r 
c2ý CL 
1-y 1-y 
(91) 
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The first two constraints state that the expected utility from 
consumption in period T=2 must be preferred by late consumers 
to withdrawal in T=1 and storage until consumption in T=2. The 
remaining constraint is needed to ensure that even in the case of 
inefficient liquidation, there is no scope for late consumers to 
misrepresent their type and cause a bank run. If the conditions set 
out in (91) are not satisfied they will have to be included in the 
maximisation program. 
The first contract of this Appendix forbids the premature 
liquidation of the long-term technology, while the second forbids 
excess storage in period T=1. The programs described in Sections 
5.3 and 5.4 do not impose such restrictions and will thus 
dominate any contracts that do. 
Appendix 5.4 
Consider the introduction of a risky portfolio for the inter- 
bank coordination program. We now revert to the assumptions of 
the basic model of Chapter 3, where there is a long-term 
productive technology, whose return is a random variable. At T=O 
with probability 0 the return in T=2 is low R,, and with 
probability (1-0) it is high Rh. 
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The relevant maximisation program is: 
MaxU, =0 , TI 1- +p(1-2rý)A 
ýý21-y 
] 
1- YY (92) 
ý-r 
C -r C 
i-r 
+(1-0) ýr, +(7rz-7r, ) L +p(1-; r2)A zz 1-y 1-y 1-y 
1-r 
where A=1-4+4 
Rr 
, 
subject to: 
k 
gir1c, +(1-q$)i71cl +(1-q)(1r2 -lr, )cL =1-I 
0(1-ir, )cI2 +(1-0)(1-i72)c22 =IRS, 
(93) 
+c' 
+ 0) ffici + (; r2 
- 
; r, )cL + 
(1- R2 )c22 
hh 
The first order conditions are: 
Or, C, -' +(1-Or, C, -' 
-A[q$7, +(1-Or, I =0 A =c1-r 
(1-0)(lr2 
-T, )cL-' - %(1-q)(ir2 -; r, )=0= %=cL-Y 
OP(1-'r, )Ac12-r 
- 
A0(R r1) 
=0.. = pRhcIz (94) Rh 
(1- 0)P(1- ßr2 )Ac22_r 'Z(1- R(1-ßc2) =0ýý=R C22 Ph h 
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By combining the first two and the last two of the first 
order conditions we get c, =CL and C12 =c22. From now on we let 
c12 =C22 =c2. Solving we get: 
1 
cl = 
[OZI +(1-0)'rz]+kl-7r1)+(1-0)(1-7r 2)](PARK) 
' 
R (95) h 
C2 = (pARh )y c, 
The expression that needs to be satisfied for a viable 
contract is: 
C" -y 
> 
C"-" A 
1-y 1-y (96) 
Plugging expression (25) in (24) gives A(pRh)'-r >1 for 
r<,. Just like in the basic model, this is a sufficient condition 
for non-binding incentive compatibility constraint. 
This assumption occurs naturally as we show in Appendix 
3.3. It exists so that we do not impose the long-term technology 
on risk-averse agents. 
The incentive compatibility constraint that relates to Type 
II banks misrepresenting themselves can be ignored for the 
reasons we have pointed out in the case without portfolio risk. 
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The relevant incentive compatibility constraint for Type I banks 
is: 
ý t-r c1-, y 
+p(1B +(1-6) 2 
1-y 1-y 1-y 1-y 1-y 
(97) 
where: 
(1-1I2)C2 +(r2 
-ý1)c1 
ý2 (1-ir, ) 
R (98) (1-7r2)R1 C2 +(ir2 
-; r1)C, 
h 
`2 (1-; r, ) 
Consumption in the last period includes a part that depends 
on the performance of the portfolio and a part that does not. If 
this constraint is not satisfied it will have to be included in the 
maximisation program, and then the solution would be subject to 
additional restrictions and not first-best optimal, unlike the case 
without portfolio risk. 
Let us now turn to late full and early partial suspension 
under a risky long-term technology. We will only consider the 
late full suspension case, as our aim is to demonstrate the 
problems posed by the task of introducing portfolio risk. 
The maximisation program under late full suspension in 
this environment will be: 
Aggregate Uncertainty about Consumption Time Preference 173 
rr t-r 
MaxUý + p(1-ýt, )F 
C21 
1-y 1-y (99) 
i-r t-r 
+(1-0) irz cý +P(1-Zz)G L2 z 1-y 1-y 
subject to: 
S+I =1 
7r, c, -ý 1- I 
(1-; r, )c21 =IRh +(S-, r, c, )=1='r, Cl 
+(1-; r, )ci, 
-1 
Rh-1 
; c2c, =S+L(1-r)ýL= 7r2c, 
+1 
-1 (100) (1- r) 
(1- tr2 )c22 = (I - L)Rh 
R i-r 
G=1-4+D Rr 
F=1-4+0 
IR, + (S 
-' C) 1-r 
IRA + (S 
-; r, C, ) 
By introducing a risky portfolio in the late full suspension 
model, we observe that the solution to this maximisation is 
complicated by the inclusion of F, that specifies the consumption 
allocation to type I banks under the bad and good states of the 
return of the long-term technology. Although solutions can be 
found by the use of mathematical software, we judged that this 
would unnecessarily complicate and would not add significantly 
to the analysis of this Chapter. 
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The incentive compatibility constraints to be considered 
under this contract are: 
t-r 1-r 
F Czi ý ci 
1-y 1-y 
1-r I-r 
G'22 >cI 
1-y 1-y 
(101) 
If these constraints are binding they will have to be 
included in the full suspension maximisation program. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Twin Crises: Focusing on the 
Role of Domestic Depositors 
6.1 Introduction 
The rapidly growing literature on twin crises, that attempts 
to explain the correlation between banking and currency crises, 
has emphasized the role of foreign capital flows into the domestic 
banking system in order to link the two sectors of the economy. 
Either foreign investors become depositors in domestic banks or 
domestic banks take up loans from foreign creditors, essentially 
two sides of the same coin. In this Chapter we describe an 
alternative explanation for financial crises that focuses on 
domestic depositors and not on the participation of foreign agents 
in the domestic economy. 
We find that a stable banking sector might come under 
pressure if the foreign currency market, under a policy of a 
pegged exchange rate, presents opportunities to domestic 
depositors for speculation. Furthermore, an unstable banking 
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sector will lead to speculation against a pegged exchange rate 
regime, which may or may not subsequently collapse. 
We also observe that suspending deposit convertibility in 
the banking sector may decrease the demand for foreign currency 
in the event of a currency crisis, but will also decrease the 
welfare of depositors that are unable to obtain their bank savings. 
If the government cares only about the currency regime and 
ignores depositors' welfare, suspension of convertibility may be 
optimal. If the government is sensitive to the events in the 
banking sector a dilemma may arise regarding the implementation 
of deposit convertibility suspension. 
Our work in this Chapter has also been motivated by the 
recent events in Argentina (2001). As many economists pointed 
out, Argentineans at some point in time simply stopped wanting 
to use the country's currency and preferred to hold dollars 
fearing possible abandonment of the currency regime. As it was 
put in an FT article: "Trying to get Argentineans to use the peso 
is like forcing them to watch black and white television when 
what they really want is colour". ' The government in a desperate 
attempt tried to avoid the collapse of the currency board in place, 
initially by partially and later on by fully suspending deposit 
convertibility in the banking sector. This lead to mass marches of 
1 
`Argentina: Close to anarchy' appearing on the 4th of February, 
2002, in the Financial Times. 
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protesters angered by the loss of their savings and a number of 
successive governments struggling for order. In our model we try 
to capture the currency preference reversal by domestic 
depositors and the reasons backing it, the rationale behind the 
government's imposed suspension of deposit convertibility and 
the losses in depositors' welfare that resulted in riots. 
Non-financial models of currency crises have been 
categorised as `first' and `second' generation models, following 
Eichengreen et al (1995). Subsequent of the crisis in East Asia a 
third generation could be added, although this is a matter of 
dispute (see Jeanne (1999)). 
First generation models were launched by Krugman (1979), 
followed by a much cleaner paper by Flood and Garber (1984) 
and extended by a number of other authors. These papers attribute 
the loss of reserves leading to the collapse of a fixed exchange 
rate system on the domestic credit expansion related to the 
monetisation of fiscal deficits. Inevitably investors will launch a 
speculative attack on the currency, when this falls below a 
critical level, in their effort to avoid capital losses. Crisis in 
Mexico in 1976, Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Mexico in 1980's 
could be attributed to fiscal irresponsibility. 
Second generation models are based on Obstfeld (1986). 
The currency crisis is the result of multiple equilibria and self- 
fulfilling rational market expectations. A run is based on the 
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logic that the government may choose not to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate if faced with an attack on the currency peg. In this 
case the fundamentals must be weak, in order to give signs of 
conflict in the policy that the rational government may follow. A 
typical example of such a crisis would be the 1992 sterling crisis, 
where the investors speculated on the willingness of the UK 
government to support the fixed rate. 
The two generations of currency crises models failed to 
explain the East Asian crisis, which lead to the design of a 
number of new theoretical models. 
2 Noticeably, a number of 
authors concentrated on Kaminsky and Reinhart's (1999) 
observation that balance of payments and banking crises occur 
simultaneously, in developing third generation models. 
Trying to merge the two sectors of the economy, authors 
extended or combined the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of 
banking crises with first or second generation currency crisis 
2 Looking at pre-crisis budget balances of the East Asian countries, 
first generation models are discredited, with minor deficits or even 
surpluses being the case. Radelet and Sachs (1998) provide further evidence 
of why in the case of the Asian crisis we cannot rely on a story of the 
government's misbehaviour generating the crisis. Furthermore, the typical 
measures of weak macroeconomic indicators in the East Asian countries did 
not justify such a jump in equilibria as the second generation models would 
suggest-at least without turning our attention to financial turmoil, with the 
banking sector contributing to the currency crisis. See Radelet and Sachs. 
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models. 3 In doing so, they chose one of two ways 
in achieving 
their goal. 4 
._ 
One type of models concentrates on foreign investors 
becoming depositors in domestic banks. Representative examples 
are Goldfajn and Valdes (1997), Diamond and Rajan (2000) and 
Goldstein (2002). The other type of models involves domestic 
banks taking up loans from foreign creditors. A number of 
authors have adapted this view including Chang and Velasco 
3 Jeanne debates on whether the recent theoretical developments do 
really form a third generation of models. Instead of the categorization we 
have been using here (first and second generation models), he supports a 
different type of terminology. The first generation remains essentially one 
category, as the Krugman-Flood-Garber intellectual framework. However, 
following Obstfeld's work, second generation models are given a different 
definition and the name 'escape clause'. The escape clause approach, 
according to Jeanne, offers a more holistic view of currency crises, in which 
each speculator has to figure out how the broad economic conditions, 
including the expectations of other speculators, influence the policymaker's 
decisions over the exchange rate. The devaluation is the consequence of the 
incentives the policymaker is faced with, when considering whether or not 
to devalue. In this approach, the only condition that a variable must satisfy 
to qualify as an economic fundamental is to directly or indirectly enter the 
objective function of the policy maker. So we may extend the set of 
fundamentals to include `softer' variables, such as the reputation of the 
policy maker or the health of the banking system. In this sense, third 
generation candidates like the models based on the Diamond and Dybvig 
set-up simply fall under the escape clause category. 
Garber and Grilli (1988), in a paper before the Asian crisis studied 
the possibility of bank runs and contagion in open economies. Nevertheless, 
they ignored the possibility of currency risk and did not explore the issue of 
twin crises. 
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(1998a, 1998b, 2000), Allen and Gale (2000) and Takeda (2001). 5 
Of course both types are simply different sides of the same coin: 
foreign capital flowing into the domestic banking sector. 
In this Chapter we follow a different approach to financial 
crises from the rest of the twin crises models in the literature. We 
place emphasis on the domestic depositor and ask how his faith 
on the banking sector's health and the currency peg's viability 
will affect his actions. We consider a banking sector based on 
Diamond and Dybvig, with modifications to respect the 
sequential service constraint (Wallace(1988)) and to include 
information-based bank runs (Jacklin and Bhattacharya(1988)), a 
productive technology dependent on fundamentals and illiquidity 
of investments (Cooper and Ross(1991)). We open up this 
economy, following Obstfeld, and consider the interactions 
between the foreign currency and the banking sector in producing 
twin crises, as well as the results of a policy of suspension of 
deposit convertibility. 
We first present the environment of our model, followed by 
the banking contract offered under these conditions. We then 
open up the economy and describe the fixed exchange rate policy 
s Miller (1998a) studies another interesting case, where a domestic 
bank run can cause speculative attacks on other currencies, through 
domestic banks investing abroad and repatriating foreign capital if they face 
a run. Miller (1998b) explores further the possibility of such cross-border 
twists. 
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followed by the government. Next we study financial crises under 
banking stability and banking instability, followed by the results 
of a policy of suspension of convertibility An the banking sector. 
We further qualify and discuss these results, in a separate 
Section, before we offer our concluding remarks. 
6.2 General Framework 
We alter the basic model's environment (Chapter 3) by 
introducing an extra time period, an extra type of consumers, an 
extra type of investment and a foreign exchange market. 
There are four time periods, the planning period T=0 and 
the consumption periods T=1,2,3. There is a continuum of ex-ante 
identical agents whose measure is normalised to one and can be 
one of three distinct types. Type I agents prefer consumption in 
period T=1, type 2 in T=2 and type 3 in T=3. Let ; r;, n2 and ;r 
denote the probabilities of being type 1, type 2 and type 3 
correspondingly. Their types are revealed to them in period T=1. 
In addition to storage, we have two investment 
opportunities available in the planning period. The first 
technology is a medium-term risk-less technology that yields 
R>1 units of the good at period T=2 for each unit invested in 
Twin Crises: Focusing on the Role of Domestic Depositors 184 
period T=O. The second technology is a long-term risky 
technology that yields a random return R at period T=3 for each 
unit invested at the planning period, where E(R)>R. At TO, 
with probability 0 the return in T=2 is low R,, and with 
probability (1-0) it is high Rk. To capture the irreversibility of 
the medium and the long-term investments we assume that each 
unit of liquidation of these technologies in T=1 yields only. 
(1-r), where TE[0,1]. 6 
Furthermore, we allow for the long-term technology to 
depend on the state of the economy captured by the state of 
fundamentals, z, uniformly distributed over the unit interval 
zE [0,1]. There are two possible states, SE (s,, s2). Under state sl 
the risky technology will yield R. with certainty. Under state s2 
the return of the risky technology depends on the state of 
fundamentals. More specifically, there exists a state of 
fundamentals z' such that if z <_ z' then the return of the risky 
technology will be R, and if z>z' then the return will be Rh. 
Given that the state of fundamentals is uniformly distributed, the 
above implies: 
6 This is done in accord to Cooper and Ross. We will need to impose 
some restrictions on the parameter r as we progress with the analysis of the 
model. 
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0= prob(S = s2 )z' (102) 
1-0= prob(S=s, )+ prob(S=s2)(1-z') 
3'i 
*. 
where prob(S=s, ) denotes the probability that the state of the 
economy is s, and prob(S = sz) =1- prob(S = s, ) denotes the 
probability that the state of the economy is s2.7 
After agents' types are revealed and before T=1, agents 
receive a signal about the state of the long-term technology. 
Before T=2 all agents also learn the state of fundamentals. 
Finally, we introduce a foreign exchange market to the 
domestic economy, by allowing the exchange rate in the absence 
of government intervention to depend on the state of 
fundamentals, z. We denote the exchange rate as f (z) and 
assume that this function is strictly increasing so that a high state 
of fundamentals corresponds to a "strong currency". 
We assume that the probability that the state of the economy is S2 
is very small. The reason for this assumption is made clear in the following 
footnote. 
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6.3 The Banking Contract 
Following Diamond and Dybvig, banks will design optimal 
contracts to provide insurance against agents' liquidity shock. 8 
The contracts specify allocations according to the order of 
withdrawals. Withdrawers in period T=1 receive cl, withdrawers 
in period T=2 receive c2. Following Jacklin and Bhattacharya, the 
bank pays a promised return c3 to withdrawers of period T=3 if 
R 
=R. and 
YRh 
of this promised return if R =R,. 
The optimisation program yielding these consumption 
allocations is: 
1-r I-r 1-r 
MaxUB 
=it, 
cl 
+ p; r2 C2 + p2(1-ic, 
-n2)Ac3 (103) 1-y 1-y 1-y 
8 We follow Jacklin and Bhattacharya and Alonso (1996), in 
assuming that that the banking contract cannot be conditioned on the signal 
S. We also make use of Alonso's result that a contract that makes sure that 
there will be no misrepresentation by agents even if the interim information 
is very negative may not be optimal in terms of ex-ante utility. This result 
can be explained by pointing out that to let an event (S = s2) with very low 
probability to affect the whole allocation (as we would do in designing a 
run-proof contract) might be worse in ex-ante utility terms than the contract 
that allows for runs. Furthermore, we assume that the banking sector 
designs contracts non-contingent on the expected state of the foreign 
exchange market. 
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where A=(1-9)+0( 
R' )'-', subject to: 
ti 
; t, c, =1-M-I 
'r2c2 = RM 'r1c, + 
ýR Z+ (1- nR ; cZ)c, 
=1 (104) 
(1-; r1 
-7r2)c3 =RuI 
RH 
which is the budget constraint of this program and where M 
signifies investment in the medium-term technology, while I 
stands for investment in the long-term technology. 
The first order conditions are: 
ß'c1-r 
-2, r1 =0=, %=cl-r 
-r pJr2c2-r R=0A= pRc2 
piC3Ac3-r 
- ii 
R3 
=0 ii, = p2ARtic3-r 
ti 
(105) 
where % is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget 
constraint. 
Solving we get: 
1 
;t +lr +ý (p2ARh) 2R, Rh 
c2 = (pR) ' c, 
i C3 
_ 
(p ARti )'' 
(106) 
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which form the basis for the contract between the bank and the 
depositors. 9 
We impose the following assumption about the exogenous 
variables in this model, in the same manner as we did for the 
basic model of Chapter 3. We assume A(p2Rti)'"7 > (pR)`'' >1 for 
y <l 
. 
This ensures that we are not forcing the risk-averse 
consumers to accept a contract signed on a technology that they 
would otherwise choose not to invest in. It also implies that we 
do not need to consider the following incentive compatibility 
constraints: 
A 
-r 
Z C"-" C' 
1-y 1-y 
17 1-r 
A C' z "2 
1-y 1-y 
(107) 
9 We need to impose the following restriction on the parameter r: 
(1-r)s ty 
-c, 
;r+ (1- Yr) 
(PARh) y 
Rh 
This is necessary in order to ensure that the choice between storage 
and the long-term technology is not trivial. If the premature liquidation of 
the investment was to yield more than the bank's promised allocation for 
period T=1, storage would be completely dominated. 
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The first constraint states that type 3 agents face no 
incentive to misrepresent their type and claim the allocation 
assigned to type I agents. The second one regards the incentives 
of type 3 agents withdrawing in period T=2 as type 2 agents. 
These results are fully explained in Appendices 6.1 and 6.2. 
The incentive compatibility constraint associated with type 
2 agents' incentives to withdraw in period T=1 is: 
c21-r Z Cl 
I-r 
1-y 1-y (108) 
I 
Since c2 = (pR)7 c, 
, 
pR >1 is enough to ensure that it is not 
binding. 
Note that the states SE (s,, s2) associated with the return of 
the long-term technology, are assigned a new meaning under this 
banking contract. Under state s, the banking sector is stable, 
since the long-term technology's return will be Rh with certainty. 
Under state s2 the banking sector is unstable, since the return of 
the risky technology depends on the state of fundamentals and 
information-based bank runs may arise. We gain further intuition 
on this transition of the long-term technology's property to the 
banking sector in the following Sections, where we study 
financial crises. 
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6.4 Foreign Exchange Market and Government 
Intervention 
The exchange rate in the absence of government 
intervention depends on the state of fundamentals, z. We now 
assume that at T=0 the government pegs the interest rate at e', 
where e'Zf (z) for all z. Let V denote the value that the 
government derives from pegging the exchange rate. The 
government also faces costs by defending the exchange rate that 
depend on both the state of fundamentals and the total demand for 
foreign currency, X. 10 Let C(X, z)denote the cost function which 
we assume is continuous and is increasing in X and decreasing in 
z. Then the government's objective is to maximise V-C(X, z). 
When at period T=2 all agents learn the state of 
fundamentals, the government decides whether to keep defending 
the peg an action that takes place right after period T=2. For 
simplicity, we assume that the state of fundamentals at period 
T=1 is such that the government has an incentive to defend the 
currency. Allowing for the case of weak fundamentals at period 
T=1 would only introduce some extra cases without yielding any 
10 Later on we show that X depends on the proportion of agents that 
demand foreign currency. 
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further insight into the causes of banking and exchange rate 
crises. 
6.5 Financial Crises under Banking Stability 
Before T=1 all agents learn the state that signifies whether 
the returns of the risky technology depend on the fundamentals of 
the economy. In this Section, we assume that the signal was 
S=s,, which implies that agents know with certainty that they 
can withdraw c3 in period T=3. 
When the state of fundamentals is revealed, type 3 agents, 
whose payoffs depend on the decision of the government whether 
or not to keep defending the peg, have two options. " The first 
option is not to participate in the foreign exchange market, in 
which case their consumption allocation in period T=3 will be 
equal to c3, since S=s,. The second option involves their 
participation in the foreign exchange market, where in period T=2 
they convert any funds available into foreign currency at the 
pegged rate e' and in period T=3 they convert them back into 
domestic currency (using the single good as the numeraire), 
"Notice that type 2 agents do not have this option because they only 
consume in period T=2. 
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either at the same rate (if the government decides to defend the 
peg) or at the rate )/f(z) (if the government abandons the peg). 
In the case of a stable banking system type 3 agents can only 
participate in the foreign exchange market by pretending to be 
type 2 agents. If they do so then the bank must liquidate the risky 
technology and each type 2 and type 3 agent will receive 
RM+I(1-r) 
D, 
= 1- 1. 
The numerator is equal to the total amount 
available for distribution, made up of the return of the medium 
term technology and the liquidation value of the long-term 
technology, and the denominator is equal to the total mass of type 
2 and type 3 agents. Then, when the banking system is stable the 
second option payoffs are equal to either D, (if the government 
defends the peg) or D, eýf(Z) (if the government abandons the 
peg). 
The total demand for foreign currency, Xs1 
, 
is obviously 0 
if type 3 agents choose the first option, i. e. they decide not to 
attack the currency. If they choose the second option and attack 
the currency X,, =jr A. 
The following table shows the payoffs of type 3 agents and 
of the government conditional on their actions and the state of 
fundamentals when S=s,. 
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Table 6.1: Payoffs Under Banking Stability 
DO NOT ATTACK ATTACK 
Government 
Type 3 
Agents 
Government 
Type 3 
Agents 
DEFEND V 
-C(0, z) C3 V -C(, t3D1, z) Di 
ABANDON 0 C3 0 Jet el (z) 
In order to make the analysis economically interesting we 
impose the following restrictions on the payoffs: 
1) C3 <D, e/ (O); if this is not the case then type 3 
depositors would never attack the currency. 
2) C(0,0)>V; in the worst state of fundamentals even if 
type 3 depositors do not attack the currency the government's 
payoff from defending the peg is negative. 
3) C(ir3D,, 1)>V; if type 3 depositors attack the 
currency, then even in the best state of fundamentals the 
government's payoff from defending the peg is negative. 
Denote by z the value of z that solves C(O, z)=O; in other 
words, if z<zthen the cost of defending the currency exceeds the 
value even if type 3 depositors do not attack the currency. In 
addition, denote by the value of z that solves c3 <D1 e/(O); in 
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other words, if z>i then type 3 depositors cannot benefit by 
attacking the currency. Then, assuming 1>z, we get the 
following three distinct regions of fundamentals: 
(a) if z<z the government does not benefit from 
supporting the peg and type 3 depositors attack the currency with 
funds obtained by a run at the banking system. 
(b) if z>z>z there are two self-fulfilling equilibria. If 
there is no demand for foreign currency, then the benefits of 
defending the currency are higher than the costs and the 
government maintains the peg, justifying the decision of 
depositors not to run at the banks and attack the currency. 
However, if there is high demand for foreign currency, the 
government will abandon the peg and since z<z, if depositors 
expect the currency to be abandoned, they will also expect 
positive profits, making the decision to force a bank run and 
attack the currency a rational action. 
(c) if z> z type 3 depositors do not attack the currency 
since there are no gains to be made from doing so and the peg is 
not challenged. Consequently the banking system experiences no 
runs. 
Notice that in case (a) with certainty and in case (b) 
depending on the expectations of the government and type 3 
depositors, an exchange rate crisis leads to a bank run. 
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6.6 Financial Crises under Banking Instability 
In this Section, we assume that the signal S=s2 reveals 
that with probability z' the return of the long-term technology 
will be equal to R, (and with probability (1-z*) the return will 
be Rh) and that the banking system is unstable. The banking 
system is unstable because with probability z` the return 
promised for withdrawals in period T=3 is 
R' 
c3 (and with 
h 
probability (1-z') the allocation is c3). In this case, the agents' 
expected utility from the deposit contract allocation is reduced to 
" (c )'`' R 
1' , where 
A=(1-z')+z'Rn)''r. 
_y 
This will result in information-based bank runs, if the 
following inequality holds: 
Ä (C `ý-r 
< 
(D2 )l-r 
3J 
1-y 1-y 
(109) 
where D2 =(1-M-1)+(M+l)(1-z) We assume that if an I 
information run is about to take place, the bank will liquidate its 
investments in the two technologies and the liquidation proceeds, 
together with what was kept in storage, will be distributed to all 
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depositors. If the expected utility from withdrawing in period 
T=3 is less than the allocation given out following a bank run, 
type 3 consumers will choose to misrepresent their type. 
Note that if R, is sufficiently low and/or z' sufficiently 
high then the deposit contact will cease to be incentive 
compatible. For simplicity and to facilitate the purpose of this 
Chapter to study financial crises, we assume that the inequality in 
(118) holds. 12 
Let us now turn our attention to the foreign exchange 
market. When the state of fundamentals is revealed type 3 agents 
have two options just like under banking stability. The first 
option is not to participate in the foreign exchange market in 
which case their consumption allocation in period T=3 will be 
equal to D2 since in this Section we assume that signal S=s2 
reveals an unstable banking system. The second option involves 
their participation in the foreign exchange market where in period 
T=2 they convert any funds available into foreign currency at the 
pegged rate e' and in period T=3 they convert them back into 
12 To complete the argument that information-based bank runs will 
take place in period T=1 if signal S= s2 is received, we also need to show 
that type 3 agents will not wait until period T=2 and pretend to be type 2 
agents, and that type 2 agents will also run at the bank at period T=1 
pretending to be type I agents. We show under which conditions the run 
takes place in period T=1 in Appendix 6.3, where we also demonstrate that 
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domestic currency. The payoffs from the second option will be 
equal to either D2 (if the government defends the peg) or 
D2 el (Z) (if the government abandons the peg). 
Consider the total demand for foreign currency, XJ= 
. 
If 
type 3 agents choose the first option X,, =0, while if they choose 
the second option and attack the currency X52 =ß3D2. 
The following table shows the payoffs of type 3 agents and 
of the government conditional on their actions and the state of 
fundamentals when S=s2. 
Table 6.2: Payoffs Under Banking Instability 
DO NOT ATTACK ATTACK 
Type 3 Type 3 
Government Government 
Agents Agents 
DEFEND V 
-C(0, z) D2 V -C(lr3D2, z) D2 
ABANDON 0 D2 0 D2 e zi f' (z) 
The above table suggests that when the banking system is 
already unstable then attacking the currency becomes a weakly 
dominant strategy for type 3 depositors. In other words, an 
unstable banking system leads to betting against the exchange 
the alternative of a bank run in period T=2 does not affect our results in any 
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rate fix, imposed by the government, with certainty. This will 
lead to the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate depending on 
the true state of fundamentals and on the total demand for foreign 
13 
currency. 
6.7 Suspension of Convertibility 
Consider the implications of a policy that prohibits the 
premature liquidation of the medium and long-term technologies. 
The banks follow the following rule: they distribute c, to ; r, 
withdrawers in period T=1 and suspend further payments for that 
period. In period T=2 they distribute c2 to r2 withdrawers, and 
suspend further payments until period T=3 where they distribute 
the remaining good to the remaining withdrawers. We term this 
policy suspension of deposit convertibility. 
Suppose that the signal received before period T=1 and 
relating to the state of the banking sector was S=s,, signifying 
that the return of the long-term investment is R. with certainty. 
significant way. 
13 Note that, given our model's assumptions, under banking 
instability the demand for foreign currency is 'r' 3D2, while under banking 
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Just like the case without suspension of convertibility, when the 
state of fundamentals is revealed, type 3 agents have two options. 
By not participating in the foreign exchange market, they cause 
no bank run and the demand for foreign currency is Xa,. &c =0. By 
participating in an attack against the exchange rate peg, they 
pretend to be type 2 agents, causing a run on the banking system. 
This time however, the banks are not allowed to liquidate their 
investments and have to follow the distribution of promised 
allocations described earlier. 
Of the ; r2 available c2 allocations to be distributed in 
period T=2, 'T2'T' of type 3 agents will receive this allocation. 
'r2 +7t, 
This implies that the demand for foreign currency is 
Xf' Soc = 
lrz; rs 
c2 14 Let us compare this with the demand for 
7r2 + 9r3 
foreign currency under no suspension of convertibility. If 
stability and an attack on the currency peg the corresponding demand is 
ßt3D,. 
Z 
7r14 2 
of type 2 agents get C2, while the remaining 23 of 
7C2 f 7C3 7i2 
-F 7i3 
2 
type 2 agents get nothing. The 
7C3 
of type 3 agents that received 
7I2 +1i3 
nothing in period T=2, withdraw in period T=3 and receive allocation 
IRh (7r2 + 7s ) C3 =2 
; 73 
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X5 <X, 1 9 
then suspending convertibility will be the 
government's preferred policy: 
X:,. soc < Xsl a0<I (1- z) (110) 
Unless 1=0 or r =l, the above inequality holds and the 
governments preferred action is to suspend deposit convertibility. 
This policy however leaves some type 2 depositors with zero 
consumption. Since our government's utility does not incorporate 
the welfare of depositors, suspension is still the best policy in 
this environment. We investigate this issue further in the next 
Section. 
Let us now turn to the case where the signal regarding bank 
stability was S=s2, thus there is instability in the banking sector. 
In this case the return of the long-term technology is R,. 
All depositors run to withdraw in period T=1. Of the ; r3 
type 3 depositors, 'r1, r3 manage to get c, allocation in T=1 before 
suspension takes place. 
15 In period T=2 another type 
lr2 + %C3 
15 Also 7rl2 of type I depositors and ; C1T2 of type 2 depositors get C, 
in period T=1. This implies that 7r1(1-1ri) of type I depositors have zero 
consumption. 
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3 agents get c2 allocations. 16 The total demand for currency in 
this case is X52. &c = n, 7r3c, +23+ c2.17 
The government will 
z3 
prefer suspension of convertibility if the policy implies lower 
demand for currency: 
X, 
l. soc <Xf2 
RM <I(1-z) (111) 
So the government will prefer to suspend convertibility if 
the return of the medium-term technology is low or if the return 
from liquidation is high (since the liquidation of the medium- 
term technology could otherwise yield higher amounts available 
for speculation in the foreign currency market). Note that some 
type 1 and type 2 depositors will receive nothing for 
consumption. Once again we point out that we have made the 
16 Also 2 
(I_ Ir 
' of type 2 consumers receive C2 allocations for 
7r2 + 7C3 
consumption. This leaves 
1L27[3 (1 
- 
7t, ) 
type 2 consumers consuming 
7[2 + 'c3 
nothing. Note that we have assumed that there is excess demand from both 
type 2 and type 3 depositors for withdrawal of c2 allocations in period T=2. 
Altering this assumption of high proportions of type 2 and type 3 agents 
would not alter our conclusion in any significant way. 
17 Type 3 depositors that did not manage to withdraw in periods 
T=1,2 but received c3 in period T=3 are also unable to participate in a run 
against the exchange rate fix in the foreign currency market. 
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extreme assumption of a government that does not care about the 
welfare of depositors and the well being of the banking sector. 
We explore the consequences of.. the elimination of this 
assumption in the following Section. 
6.8 Government's Sensitivity to Depositors' Welfare 
Consider how our results would change by the inclusion of 
depositors' welfare in the utility function of the government. 
Qualifying the optimality of suspension of convertibility 
with a government insensitive to the welfare of depositors was 
straightforward. If the policy results in a lower demand for 
foreign currency, it is in the interest of the government to impose 
it. Nevertheless, if we were to alter the government's utility 
function to depend on the aggregate ex-post utility of the banking 
sector a policy dilemma may arise. 
As we noted in the previous Section, suspension of 
convertibility will result in lower demand for foreign currency 
with certainty under banking stability and under certain 
conditions given banking instability. However, we also noted that 
the policy resulted in zero consumption for some type 2 agents 
under banking stability and some type I and 2 agents under 
banking instability. This may considerably lower the aggregate 
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ex-post utility achieved in the banking sector, particularly given 
the specification of our utility function, where the marginal 
utility of consumption goes to infinity as consumption becomes 
zero. 
Thus a government that is sensitive to depositors' welfare 
will be faced with a dilemma. Suspending convertibility will 
decrease the foreign currency demand and may save the peg, but 
at the same time it will significantly affect the ex-post utility of 
the banking sector, which we now assume the government does 
care about. 
We may be tempted to conclude that suspension will be 
unlikely given zero consumption for a large proportion of agents. 
But we need to be careful. Our result of zero consumption 
crucially depends on our choice of corner preferences. If we 
changed our analysis to include smoother preferences, although 
bank runs would still result in lower utilities for type I and 2 
agents, zero consumption would not be possible. Thus the 
dilemma is non-trivial. 
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6.9 Discussion 
In this Chapter, we studied a model of twin crises 
independent of foreign agents' interactions. Focusing on the 
importance of domestic depositors, our aim was to demonstrate 
the interplay among banking and currency crises and the effect 
that a policy of suspending deposit convertibility would have in 
this set-up. 
We showed how a stable banking sector can come under 
threat from weak fundamentals and speculative opportunities in 
the foreign currency market, as well as how an unstable banking 
sector can lead to speculative attacks against a fixed exchange 
rate regime. 
Allowing for suspension of convertibility, we demonstrated 
how a government insensitive to depositors' welfare is likely to 
suspend deposit payments in the banking sector to prevent the 
collapse of the currency peg. We also discussed how a 
government that cares about ex-post utilities in the banking 
sector will face a dilemma about suspension of deposit 
convertibility, since suspension decreases the funds available for 
an attack on the currency regime but also lowers the welfare of 
domestic depositors. We propose the formal proof of this 
argument as future research. 
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Furthermore, we would like to point out the work of Morris 
and Shin (1988) in identifying a unique equilibrium, unlike the 
multiple equilibria of Obstfeld, in the foreign currency market by 
allowing for noise in the signals about fundamentals that 
speculators receive. Future additions to the model presented in 
this Chapter could demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium, 
making policy evaluations significantly easier, since currently we 
cannot attach a priori a probability to each of the multiple 
equilibria. In that case, we could make specific policy 
recommendations regarding the use of policies like suspension of 
deposit convertibility. 
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Appendix 6.1 
The two expressions we need to consider more carefully for 
a viable contract are: 
AC3I-r :> C11-r 
1-y 1-y 
1-r I-r 
A C' ? c2 
1-y 1-y 
(112) 
From the first order conditions in expression (105) we have 
that: 
C3 =(p2ARa)yc, 
C2 = (pR)y c, 
(113) 
Plugging the expressions of (113) in (112) we get 
A(p2Rh)'--' >(pR)'"r >1 for y<1. This is the assumption used so 
that the need for including incentive compatibility constraints 
will not arise. Notice that this assumption occurs naturally as we 
show in Appendix 6.2. 
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Appendix 6.2 
Let us consider the constraints imposed more carefully. We 
do this for v<1: 
A(p2Rh)'"r >(pR)'-' >1, where A=(1-9)+8(R' )'"'' (114) Rh 
If we substitute for A: 
[(1-0)+6(Ri )t-r](p2Rh)ý-r >(pR)1-r >1 
115 Rh () 
[(1- ©)Rh'-r + OR, 1-r )p2('-r) > R'-r p-r >1 
Now also consider when the long-term technology will be 
preferred to the medium-term technology, which should also be 
preferred to storage by the risk-averse investors: 
Rhi-r R 1-r R'-r 1'--' C(1-4) 
1-Y 
+© 11 y 1-y 
> 1-y p (116) 
[(1- ©)Rh'-r + ©RI'-r ]> R'-r >1 
The expected utility derived from investing in the risky 
technology must be greater from the utility from the medium-term 
technology, which must be greater than the utility from storage. 
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As p approaches one, expressions (115) and (116) 
converge. Thus the assumptions made ensure that the long-term 
and the medium-term technologies are not forced on the risk- 
averse consumers by the design of the contract, but they are seen 
as productive, efficient investments that they would choose to 
invest in. 
Appendix 6.3 
To complete the argument that information-based bank runs 
will take place in period T=1 if signal S=s2 is received, we also 
need to show that type 3 agents will not wait until period T=2 and 
pretend to be type 2 agents, and that type 2 agents will also run at 
the bank at period T=1 pretending to be type I agents. 
Note that if type 2 agents run in period T=1, type 3 agents 
will do so as well. Other things equal type 3 agents prefer the 
type 2 allocation to the type 1 allocation. We now investigate 
whether type 2 agents prefer the type I allocation to the one that 
they would receive in period T=2 conditional on type 3 agents 
pretending to be type 2 and the bank liquidating the long-term 
risky technology. The relevant inequality is: 
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-r 1-r D, 
p 
1-y 1-y 
ý2 +ý, >ý2(PR)' +lc, (P2ARJr 
(1-z) 
a (117) 
Rh 
(P2ARS)r (1-z) 
- 
"r3 1- (pR) r 
11 
We know from Section 6.3 that (pR)1 >1 and (p2ARh)T >1. 
If (1-r) is low enough type 2 agents will choose to misrepresent 
their true type. Alternatively the information-based run will take 
place in period T=2. 
If the run takes place in period T=2, type 3 depositors 
receive allocation D, and the demand for foreign currency is 
equal to ; r, D,. The following table shows the payoffs of type 3 
agents and of the government, conditional on their actions and 
the state of fundamentals, when S=s2 and the run takes place in 
period T=2. 
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Table 6.3: Payoffs Under Banking Instability 
DO NOT ATTACK 1ATTACK 
Type 3 Type 3 
Government Government 
Agents Agents 
DEFEND V 
-C(0, z) Di V -C(n3D,, z) Dl 
ABANDON 0D0D ex 
The above table suggests, just as in the case where the bank 
run took place in period T=1, that when the banking system is 
already unstable, attacking the currency becomes a weakly 
dominant strategy for type 3 depositors. An unstable banking 
system leads to betting against the exchange rate fix, imposed by 
the government, with certainty, whether the bank run took place 
in period T=1 or T=2. This will lead to the abandonment of the 
fixed exchange rate depending on the true state of fundamentals 
and on the total demand for foreign currency. The only difference 
, 
is that with the banking crises taking place in period T=2, the 
demand for foreign currency is lower, increasing the chances of 
the peg's survival. 
Thus, whether the inequality of (109) is satisfied or not has 
no significant relevance to the result we wish to highlight in 
Section 6.6 regarding financial crises, that an unstable banking 
system will lead to an attack on the currency peg. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Discussion 
Maturity transformation has characterised banking since its 
early existence. Bankers discovered that they could promise quick 
convertibility of deposits into currency while keeping a relatively 
small reserve requirement, with the excess currency being 
invested in profitable projects. This arrangement crucially 
depended on a predictable day-by-day withdrawal demand and on 
the public's confidence on the guarantee of convertibility. 
The work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) highlighted this 
function of banking and the risks attached to such transformation 
of liquidity. If depositors fear mass withdrawals for an indefinite 
reason, redeeming more than what can be readily supplied by the 
bankers' reserves (that are contingent on a predicted average rate 
of short-term demands) can lead to self-fulfilling bank failures. 
Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) demonstrated that information 
on the state of a bank's portfolio can also lead to runs if future 
profitability is expected to be low, thus offering an alternative 
explanation to that of panics. 
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The discussion on the appropriate explanation of banking 
failures, assuming there is a single one, has moved on to the 
empirical research field, with information-based bank runs 
receiving the most support. Nevertheless, until the issue of the 
causes of problems in the banking sector is resolved, policy 
makers must weight the consequences of their actions against 
both possible sources of instability. We provide a simple 
environment, combining features of the work of Diamond and 
Dybvig and Jacklin and Bhattacharya, that allows for both 
sunspot panics and information-based bank runs, unlike the 
models in the existing literature. 
This framework can be used for the study of a number of 
policies related to the banking sector. We put the policy of 
suspension of convertibility on the test and observe that a trade 
off emerges regarding the policy's implementation. As Diamond 
and Dybvig pointed out, a pre-announced rule of suspension of 
convertibility can eliminate the rational behind panics. But in the 
presence of information-based bank runs we show that the 
decision may not be without dear consequences. The basic model 
allows for costly premature liquidation of banks' illiquid long- 
term investments. This feature enables us to demonstrate that it 
may be optimal to maintain convertibility and allow premature 
liquidation if such an action performs better than a deteriorating 
Discussion 215 
bank portfolio in ex-post welfare terms. Alternatively, if fire-sale 
prices are too low, suspension may still be preferred. 
Furthermore, we expand the basic model to take into 
account the possibility of contagion, using information as the 
propagation mechanism in contrast to most of the studies that 
concentrate on an inter-bank market. We show that the strict rule 
of suspension of convertibility limits the government's ability to 
signal to depositors of banks other than the troubled ones that 
continuation of investments should still be desirable. In a world 
where banks' portfolios are positively correlated, a single 
information-based bank failure may spread by panic to the rest of 
the banking sector. If discretion is followed regarding suspension 
of convertibility, the observation of the policy's implementation 
on troubled banks suggests to depositors of the remaining banks 
in the economy that investments are not performing as bad as 
observers may have originally deduced, thus averting a systemic 
panic. 
Given these results our policy recommendations strive for 
rules that allow for all possible states of the economy, thus 
indirectly supporting transparency in policy related decision 
making and implementation. A rule that suspends payments in all 
cases would be too strict, forbidding liquidation when it is the 
optimal option and restricting the signalling properties of 
discretion. Discretion on the other hand does not eliminate 
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sunspot panics. But a rule that restricts payments in all cases, 
except when the banks' portfolio returns are extremely low, 
combines all the desired properties of the other two extreme 
possibilities. 
Extensions of the basic model can be used to study deposit 
insurance, inter-bank markets and other possible policies and 
features of banking. Cross-policy comparisons would then be 
possible, for example, evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency 
of suspension of convertibility versus deposit insurance. 
Furthermore we could apply our structure of information-based 
contagious panics to study geographical spread patterns based on 
the portfolio return correlation knowledge among agents in the 
economy. 
Another risk highlighted in the research of Diamond and 
Dybvig was that of aggregate uncertainty about consumption time 
preference. In other words, the question arises of what can be 
done when day-to-day withdrawals are not predictable. Building 
on the work of Wallace (1988), we show in a richer environment 
that partial suspension may be welfare improving in comparison 
to full suspension of convertibility. Nevertheless, if there are no 
restrictions associated with the creation or the efficient 
functioning of an inter-bank market, borrowing and lending 
among banks will be the optimal solution. We demonstrate this by 
altering the Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) model to respect an 
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important feature of banking, namely the sequential service 
constraint. This constraint necessitates that depositors' claims are 
honoured in a first-come first-served basis and respecting it 
implies that banks participating in an inter-bank arrangement 
must make common early consumption allocation promises, a rule 
embedded in our basic model but which has not always been 
honoured in the literature. 
In our study of aggregate uncertainty we abstracted from 
the possibility of information-based bank runs, because this 
would have complicated our results extensively without 
significantly contributing to the aim of the particular exercise. 
Nevertheless, such an extension would be particularly interesting 
for exposing the role of asset risk in the workings and possible 
malfunctions of an inter-bank mechanism. 
Our last study opens up the domestic banking sector to a 
foreign exchange market in an economy with an imposed currency 
peg. Our aim was to demonstrate the possibility of twin crises 
and explore the interactions between the two sectors. In contrast 
to the existing literature that places emphasis on the role of 
foreign capital in the domestic banking system as an explanation 
of simultaneous banking and foreign exchange market crises, we 
focus on the domestic depositor as the main factor of instability. 
If domestic speculators use domestic bank deposits to take 
advantage of opportunities in the foreign exchange market, a 
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currency crisis triggers a banking crisis. On the other hand, if a 
banking crisis takes place because of bad performing bank 
portfolios, depositors may use withdrawn funds to speculate 
against the currency peg and the regime may subsequently 
collapse depending on the strength of fundamentals. In this set-up 
we examine the role of a policy of suspension of convertibility. A 
government insensitive to depositors' welfare may prevent a 
currency crisis by imposing restrictions on the convertibility of 
deposits into domestic currency, thus decreasing the pool of 
money available for speculation in the foreign exchange market. 
However, as a direct consequence of this policy, many depositors 
are left with little or no consumption at all. Alternatively, a 
government that weights the survival of the regime against the 
loss on depositors' welfare will be left with a dilemma regarding 
suspension of convertibility. 
The set-up explored can be particularly useful for studying 
policy implementation if it is integrated with the work of Morris 
and Shin (1988). Morris and Shin introduce noisy signals about 
fundamentals, thus resolving the indeterminacy of equilibria in 
the foreign exchange market. Given a unique equilibrium, we 
could attach a probability to each of the current multiple 
equilibria, thus making policy evaluations significantly easier. 
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